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ABSTRACT 
The United States (U.S.) national strategy countering violent extremism (CVE) has yet to 
be updated and currently does not provide the necessary national framework to best 
combat self-radicalization and violent extremism (VE) in the United States. If people 
subscribe that the need for an updated strategy is evident, then the question is “What are 
the necessary and effective components of the national U.S. CVE strategy that best 
prevent self-radicalization and VE in the United States?” 
This research examined the concepts and strategies surrounding extremism  
and self-radicalization in the U.S., the United Kingdom (UK) and Australia. Through  
this analysis, multiple findings and recommendations were made. One such finding  
was the identification of overarching elements that, if implemented, would increase  
the effectiveness and applicability of the U.S. CVE strategy. These elements include:  
1) identifying the federal agency in charge of administering the U.S. CVE strategy,  
2) developing a more robust and actionable national CVE framework, 3) refocusing the 
federal government on support and not local engagement of CVE, 4) requiring all CVE 
related terms be defined in every document, and 5) requiring regular evaluations and 
updates of the U.S. CVE strategy. The details of these and other findings are contained in 
this thesis. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Between September 12, 2001 and July 2013, 49 publicly known thwarted and successful 
homegrown radicalized terrorist plots were perpetrated against the United States (U.S.).1 
These plots included people who were “American citizens, legal permanent residents, or 
visitors radicalized predominately in the United States.”2 Nearly one-fifth of these self-
radicalized plots occurred in 2009 alone.3 
Unprecedented at the time, these plots indicated a new development whose 
magnitude was largely unseen prior to 2009—self-radicalized or recruited U.S. 
individuals attacking Americans on U.S. soil.4 It was another two years before the U.S. 
government initially addressed the concern of domestic self-radicalization and violent 
extremism (VE) with the implementation of the August 2011 Empowering Local 
Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States, and its partner document, the 
December 2011 Strategic Implementation Strategy Plan (SIP) for Empowering Local 
Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States.  
However, a full three years after implementation, these strategy documents have 
yet to be updated, and still remain in their original versions that do not provide the 
necessary relevant and applicable national framework to best combat self-radicalization 
and VE in the United States. Missing are tangible resources and guidance for the 
American people to understand the potential causal factors of VE, as well as any truly 
actionable programmatic strategies for communities to partner together their public and 
private sectors to detect, prevent, and combat self-radicalization, and VE in a trusted and 
collaborative environment. In its current 2011 iteration, the U.S. countering violent 
extremism (CVE) strategy does not fully leverage the potential of community-based 
resources nor does it support a full engagement of CVE strategies at the local level. As 
                                                 
1 Jessica Zuckerman, Steven Bucci, and James Carafano, “60 Terrorist Plots Since 9/11: Continued 
Lessons in Domestic Counterterrorism,” The Heritage Foundation, July 31, 2013, 1. 
2 Ibid., 2. 
3 Bruce Hoffman, “American Jihad,” The National Interest Online, April 20, 2010, 4. 
4 Ibid. 
 xx
recently as February 2014, it was unclear which federal agency manages the U.S. CVE 
strategy or what evaluative criteria should even be considered to assess the effectiveness 
of the strategy.5 Compounding this concern is that the threat of self-radicalization and VE 
in the United States—largely due to the Internet—is more significant today than it was 
even just five years ago.6 This state of affairs adds to the critical importance of delivering 
an updated and more effective U.S. CVE strategy in the near term.  
If people subscribe that the need for an updated strategy is evident, then the 
question is “What are the necessary and effective components of the national U.S. CVE 
strategy that best prevent self radicalization and VE in the United States?” 
This thesis examined many of the broader concepts surrounding extremism, self-
radicalization, and strategies to counter VE in the United States, the United Kingdom 
(UK), and Australia. The research then progressed with a specific review of the CVE 
strategies and concepts in place in these three countries. Through this case study analysis, 
several effective overarching CVE elements and concepts were identified. As a result of 
this analysis, ensuing recommendations have also been made. These recommendations 
include identifying the federal agency in charge of administering the U.S. CVE strategy, 
developing a more robust and actionable national CVE framework, refocusing the federal 
government on support and not local engagement of CVE, requiring all CVE related 
terms be defined in every document, as well as regular evaluations and updates of the 
U.S. CVE strategy. The details of these and other findings and recommendations are 
contained in this thesis. 
Through this research, this thesis argues that the creation and implementation of 
an updated national CVE strategy, which incorporates many of the CVE components, 
identified in the United Kingdom and Australia, would increase the effectiveness and 
applicability of the U.S. CVE strategy. The ensuing U.S. strategy will then be able to 
offer better support for local agencies to deliver effective localized CVE programs. The 
result will generate collaboration between law enforcement and community 
                                                 
5 Jerome P. Bjelopera, Countering Violent Extremism in the United States (CRS Report No. R42553) 
(Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, February 19, 2014), 26–28. 
6 Seth Jones, email message to author, June 29, 2014 and July 17, 2014. 
 xxi
organizations, and thereby, increase community awareness, preparedness, and resiliency 
to VE within the United States. If the United States develops and implements a detailed 
CVE strategy supported by the strong core foundational principles that these countries’ 
CVE strategies have succeeded upon, then it stands to reason that the United States will 
also enjoy a robust CVE program that ensures the best chances of successfully countering 
VE within its borders. 
 xxii
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 xxiii
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
I must first and foremost thank my wife, Kris, who is simply the most wonderful 
person I have ever known. Your support of me, not only throughout this program, but 
also throughout my entire career, is a large part of why I am able to pursue my many 
interests and whims. Thank you for your continuously unwavering support and for 
agreeing to tag along on this journey. If you had refused, I would have likely starved long 
ago.  
Thank you to my two wonderful sons, Craig and Conner, for your patience and 
teaching me much more about the truly important things in life than I could ever hope to 
teach you. I am very proud of the fine young men you both have become. Keep pursuing 
your dreams! 
Thank you to Dr. Nadav Morag for your willingness to guide my research and 
writing throughout the entire Center for Homeland Defense and Security (CHDS) 
program. Your constructive feedback and support over the last 18 months has directly 
contributed to my development as a student. You have furthered my appreciation of the 
importance of looking at the entire globe for answers to this nation’s homeland security 
challenges. For these reasons, you were a logical choice as an advisor on this project. I 
have come to appreciate your instruction and advising style, both of which have 
significantly contributed to my success in this program.  
Thank you to Dr. Kathleen Kiernan for your help in leading me toward a relevant 
and important topic that adds value to the homeland security profession. Your willingness 
to serve as a co-advisor and your support throughout the process has significantly 
contributed to the success of this project. 
Thank you to Dr. Mark Baird for your interest in my thesis topic and agreeing to 
serve as a reader on this project. Your generosity, patience, and friendship have 
contributed immeasurably to the success of this project and enriched my educational 
experience. I especially appreciate your willingness to read my drivel at all hours of the 
day or night.  
 xxiv
Finally, thank you to all the indispensable faculty and staff at CHDS and my 
CHDS classmates. You have provided me with a fantastic experience I will not soon 




Until the attacks on the United States (U.S.) on September 11, 2001—indelibly 
known as 9/11—the awareness of terrorism and the realization of any physical impacts it 
could have on the American public within the boundaries of the United States were 
relatively minimal. Concern of any real significance was relegated to an international 
level. Further, terrorism related intelligence and information sharing was largely confined 
to matters that had little direct involvement with U.S. citizens.  
As noted by Adrienne Butler, Allison Panzer, and Lewis Goldfrank, the enormous 
degree of impact of the 9/11 attacks, coupled with the fact it occurred on such a level 
never before experienced, and therefore, unprecedented and unfamiliar to the United 
States, caused a high degree of fear, anxiety, and sense of lack of control over terrorism 
at that moment.1 As a result, the idea that large-scale terrorist acts could occur on 
American soil became self-evident and the topic of intelligence and information 
collection and sharing was now destined for the forefront of topics that would impact the 
relationship between the American people and its government. This relationship was 
essentially predicated on two elements, fear and expectation, the fear of terrorism and the 
expectation that the government would do something about it without eroding the rights 
and freedoms of U.S. citizens.  
Another result of the 9/11 attacks was that the American public was also 
introduced to a newly formed perception of what a terrorist represented and of the 
religiosity of terrorism. Both of which—to some degree—have been mischaracterized 
over the years, contributing to the notion that Americans hold a unique perspective on 
terrorism. While their conceptualization of this terrorism phenomenon typically initiates 
from the iconic events of 9/11, many only see counterterrorism (CT) efforts through the 
global prism of the Iraq and Afghanistan wars.  
                                                 
1 Adrienne Butler, Allison M. Panzer, and Lewis R. Goldfrank, ed., Committee on Responding to the 
Psychological Consequences of Terrorism, Preparing for the Psychological Consequences of Terrorism: A 
Public Health Strategy, National Research Council (Washington, DC: The National Academies Press, 
2003), 45. 
 2
Although immediately following the 9/11 attacks, fear of another imminent attack 
occurring on U.S. soil was palpable, that particular fear was quickly overshadowed by the 
then declared Global War on Terror (GWOT). Any actions and concerns related to 
domestic CT efforts were primarily focused on keeping terrorists out of the United States 
at its borders. The impact to the American people now surrounded the issue of freedom of 
movement and the government’s intelligence gathering efforts. The United States, 
believing that radicalization and recruitment within its borders was not conceivable, 
implemented an outward facing strategy and engaged in battles abroad.2  
According to the Heritage Foundation, as of July 2013, 60 publicly known 
terrorist plots were identified—including both thwarted and successful—against the 
United States since 9/11.3 Of these 60 plots, 49 are considered to be “homegrown,” 
defined by the Heritage Foundation as “[O]ne or more of the actors were American 
citizens, legal permanent residents, or visitors radicalized predominately in the United 
States.”4 In 2009, no less than 10 known domestic terrorist plots—including both 
successful and thwarted—were revealed.5 Most notably was the November 2009 Fort 
Hood attack by Major Nidal Hasan, who killed 13 people and wounded 32 others, self 
admittedly in support of the Taliban.6 Unprecedented at the time, this attack indicated a 
new development whose magnitude was largely unseen prior to 2009—self-radicalized or 
recruited U.S. individuals attacking Americans on U.S. soil.7 It was not until two years 
later that the U.S. government initially addressed this domestic self-radicalization and VE 
issue with the president’s implementation of the August 2011 Empowering Local 
Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States and its partner document, the 
                                                 
2 Bruce Hoffman, “American Jihad,” The National Interest Online, April 20, 2010, 4. 
3 Jessica Zuckerman, Steven Bucci, and James Carafano, “60 Terrorist Plots Since 9/11: Continued 
Lessons in Domestic Counterterrorism,” The Heritage Foundation, July 31, 2013, 1. 
4 Ibid., 2. 
5 Hoffman, “American Jihad,” 4. 
6 Chelsea J. Carter, “Nidal Hasan Convicted in Fort Hood Shootings; Jurors Can Decide Death,” CNN, 
last updated Friday August 23, 2013, http://www.cnn.com/2013/08/23/justice/nidal-hasan-court-martial-
friday/index.html. 
7 Hoffman, “American Jihad,” 4. 
 3
December 2011 Strategic Implementation Strategy Plan (SIP) for Empowering Local 
Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States.  
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
As is described in more detail in a later chapter, these two documents stop well 
short of their potential. For example, a year after implementation of these two documents, 
some federal agencies—including the Department of Justice (DOJ)—were not able to 
demonstrate how they were meeting their responsibilities under the national countering 
violent extremism (CVE) strategy.8 In its recent February 2014 report to Congress, the 
Congressional Research Service (CRS) noted, “There is no single agency managing all of 
the individual activities and efforts of the (CVE) plan.”9 Additionally, no specific eligible 
federal CVE grant programs or correlating criteria are identified and no criteria have been 
established to evaluate the effectiveness—outputs—of the CVE strategies.10  
Missing are tangible resources and guidance for the American people to 
understand the potential causal factors of VE, as well as any truly actionable 
programmatic strategies for communities to partner together its public and private sectors 
to detect, prevent, and combat self-radicalization and VE in a trusted and collaborative 
environment. In its present 2011 iteration, the U.S. CVE strategy does not provide a 
current and adequate national CVE framework, and thereby, does not fully leverage the 
potential of community-based resources necessary to promote and support a full 
engagement of CVE strategies at the local level. This observation is represented by the 
fact that these documents are overly vague and do not contain actual, substantial 
programmatic strategies, exemplified by a program lead agency, specific CVE programs, 
or CVE approved grants or other available resources. 
                                                 
8 Government Accountability Office, Report to the Committee on Homeland Security and 
Governmental Affairs, United States Senate, Countering Violent Extremism: Additional Actions Could 
Strengthen Training Efforts (GAO-13-79) (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Accountability Office, 
2012), 9.  
9 Jerome P. Bjelopera, Countering Violent Extremism in the United States (CRS Report No. R42553) 
(Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, February 19, 2014), 27. 
10 Ibid., 26, 28. 
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B. RESEARCH QUESTION 
The research question established for this thesis acts as a foundation for inquiry 
into multiple national level CVE strategies and their potential effectiveness as a 
programmatic strategy for the purpose of better preparing the United States and its 
communities to counter self-radicalization and VE.11 The lack of an actionable and 
community-oriented counter-radicalization strategy—essential to information and 
intelligence sharing in local communities as an effective component of CT efforts—is 
reflective of the absence of a detailed, clear, and actionable strategy framework at the 
national level. Given that the need for such a strategy is evident, the research question 
proposed is, “What are the necessary and effective components of the national U.S. CVE 
strategy that best prevent self radicalization and VE in the United States?” The elements 
identified and collated within this national strategy should be articulated as guidelines, 
regulations and tactics, and techniques and procedures (TTPs), and act as the foundation 
from which these partnerships implement their actions and interactions in support of the 
national objective to prepare local governments and communities satisfactorily in this 
realm. To accomplish this objective, a clearly articulated and relevant national level CVE 
strategy must exist that facilitates community-based participation with the common 
objectives of both decreasing the risk of VE and increasing the level of community 
resiliency should an act of VE occur. 
The current U.S. CVE strategy—discussed in detail throughout this thesis—does 
not contain these necessary strategic components and is not a truly strategic document. 
Developing a national standardized and actionable strategy to counter self-radicalization 
and VE, and then delivering this strategy through a deliberative process to local 
communities, is a necessary course of action to protect the United States and its citizens 
better from the danger of self-radicalized terrorism within its borders. 
                                                 
11 It is acknowledged that the private sector also plays a significant role in natural disaster mitigation, 
preparedness, response, and recovery. However, although these tangible benefits may be noted periodically 
throughout this document, this thesis does not focus on that role to any detail. 
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C. HYPOTHESIS  
As of 2011, the United States has possessed a framework for countering VE 
within its borders exemplified by three generally recognized documents. These 
documents are the June 2011 National Strategy for Counterterrorism, the August 2011 
Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States, and the 
December 2011 Strategic Implementation Strategy Plan (SIP) for Empowering Local 
Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States. 
These documents are a good start and demonstrate the government’s awareness of 
the importance of countering VE within this nation’s borders. However, these documents 
are vague and do not contain an actual, substantial programmatic strategy, exemplified by 
a program lead agency, specific CVE programs, CVE approved grants, or other available 
resources. Due to this void, federal, state, and local agencies, along with their private 
sector partners, are left to develop individualized criteria that can be inconsistent in 
design, poorly constructed, ineffective in their implementation, and short lived. As a 
result, local governments and their communities are left to feel their way through the 
minefields of crafting relationships and processes for sharing and utilizing information 
within an arguably sensitive subject area.  
This thesis asserts that the creation and programmatic implementation of an 
updated national CVE strategy will offer support for local agencies to deliver effective 
localized CVE programs, which can generate collaboration between law enforcement and 
community organizations, and thereby, increase community awareness, preparedness,  
and resiliency to VE within the United States. If the United States develops a detailed 
CVE strategy supported by the strong core foundational principles that other countries’ 
CVE strategies have succeeded upon, then it stands to reason that the United States will 
also enjoy a robust CVE program that ensures the best chances of countering VE within 
its borders. 
D. RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY  
The research, which complements this thesis, is comprised of three main 
elements. 
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 LITERATURE REVIEW—An examination of the literature surrounding 
VE and CVE, and a review of associated terms relevant to the concepts of 
radicalization, extremist ideology, and religiosity are conducted in an 
effort to understand the application of these terms better within social 
science to provide the reader with a foundational understanding of VE and 
CVE. This understanding is necessary to examine and judge better the 
content presented in the case studies and review of U.S. strategy.  
 U.S. CVE STRATEGY REVIEW—An examination of the perception of 
terrorism and a brief review of the CT strategies in place in the United 
States prior to 9/11 allow the reader an opportunity to recognize better that 
Americans hold a unique perspective and conceptualization of terrorism 
stemming from the iconic events of 9/11. This offers the reader a 
framework for the evaluation of the subsequent U.S. CVE strategy review, 
as well as the UK and Australian case studies. A review of the current 
U.S. VE environment—and its challenges—along with the relative 
application and effectiveness of the CT and CVE strategies in place since 
2011, provides the reader with a basic awareness of VE in the United 
States and its approach to domestic CVE applications since 2011.  
 CASE STUDY ANALYSES—A study of the United Kingdom and 
Australia related to their development and implementation of 
programmatic strategies to counter VE within their borders and the 
applicability of those principles to the United States is presented. 
These varied research methodologies allow for thorough well-rounded research intended 
to identify the most essential environmental and organizational attributes that may lead to 
a more effective CVE programmatic strategy in the United States going forward. 
E. CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
Chapter I is an introduction to CVE. It identifies the problem statement and 
research question developed as the foundation for this thesis. The process undertaken to 
establish these two criteria helps to understand the problem space best and then determine 
the appropriate question with which to conduct the research. The varied research 
methodologies utilized throughout this project are intended to help ascertain the most 
beneficial recommendations provided at the end of this research. The chapter also 
outlines the content of the remaining chapters of this work. 
Chapter II reviews existing academic literature on the definition of terrorism and 
the concept of CVE to allow for a broader understanding of the complexity of the subject. 
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This complexity is evident in the diverse application of CVE programmatic strategies by 
various countries of both Muslim and non-Muslim majority populations, which offers an 
opportunity to view the casual factors surrounding self-radicalization and extremism, and 
the non-linear path that can lead to the utilization of violence as a means to further that 
ideology. This chapter includes a brief discussion of terms generally associated with 
terrorism, VE and CVE, for purposes of terminological clarification. While this thesis 
makes every effort to use terms within their intended meaning, attempts at agreeing upon 
universally accepted key definitions and concepts for such terms are still frequently 
contested by pundits and scholars.12 Therefore, the intent of this review of terminology is 
not to debate the definitions themselves but rather to understand their frequent 
universal—albeit at times incorrect—application in describing certain societal and 
individualized conditions associated with terrorism and VE. This review presents an 
analysis of the overall CVE framework, an analysis of the gaps in reviewed literature, and 
concluding remarks and opportunities for future analysis.  
Chapter III provides an examination of the history of terrorism and CT in the 
United States, the perception of terrorism by the American public as a result of 9/11, and 
the progression—both philosophically and practically—towards awareness of self-
radicalization and VE as an emerging concern for U.S. security. This chapter provides a 
broad platform from which a comprehensive CVE strategy can be built. 
Chapter IV offers a critical review of the 2011 Empowering Local Partners to 
Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States and the follow-on Strategic 
Implementation Strategy Plan for Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent 
Extremism in the United States. This chapter then presents a brief look at the role the 
Internet has played in the furtherance of VE, and then concludes with a review of the 
2010 CVE Working Group and its recommendations. This review provides a framework 
to understand better, the current U.S. paradigm as it relates to CVE and to guide the case 
study analyses of CVE programs internationally. 
                                                 
12 Minerva Nasser-Eddine et al., Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) Literature Review, Australian 
Government Department of Defense (Edinburgh, South Australia: Counter Terrorism and Security 
Technology Centre, 2011), 1.  
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Chapters V and VI provide case study and comparative analyses of the United 
Kingdom and Australia, respectively, to examine their use of well-established CT 
programmatic strategies that incorporate local community partnerships. This analysis 
allows for the determination of the qualitative attributes that may contribute to a similar 
CVE programmatic strategy in the United States. This research approach is important to 
identify which organizational factors—in the form of conditions, commonalities, 
attributes and impediments—exist at varying levels within these organizations and to 
determine further if these factors are present intentionally—by strategy and design—or 
even unintentionally. Further, this broad spectrum of cultural and bureaucratic diversity is 
necessary to ensure enough environmental differences exist to best discover and identify 
relevant organizational similarities and differences—the underlying causes, effects, and 
variables—that influence CVE programs. 
Chapter VII first restates the problem space, hypothesis, and research problem to 
act as a framework for the remainder the chapter. Utilizing a comparable table, this 
chapter then presents the research and analysis of the U.S., UK and Australian CVE 
programs by focusing on those core components deemed necessary and effective for a 
national CVE strategy to prevent self-radicalization and VE effectively within its borders. 
It is presented in an attempt to answer the initial research question satisfactorily.  
The chapter then progresses to the presentation of overarching 
recommendations—the output—for consideration toward the creation and 
implementation of an updated national CVE strategy to act as a model framework for 
communities to implement consistent CVE programs through this national guidance and 
support. The intended result is to increase organizational and community awareness, 
preparedness, and resiliency against acts of self-radicalization and VE. This chapter then 
provides a description of the limitations of this work, as well as an identification of areas 
in which additional research may be beneficial to the CVE topic.  
Finally, this last chapter offers a formed conclusion by the author of the research 
results with the intent to assist policy makers, homeland security practitioners, and 
community leaders with a better understanding of how CVE programs should be 
supported at the national level and implemented at the local level. The goal of this 
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research is to add to the generalizable knowledge of CVE, generate recognition of the 
imminent concern, and to further the discussion on the issue. The desired result of which 
is to increase community capacity for CVE and decrease the capacity for VE. 
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THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 11
II. COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMISM— 
A REVIEW OF ASSOCIATED TERMS AND THE LITERATURE 
ASSOCIATED WITH COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMISM  
Seemingly, volumes of available literature exist that discuss the many facets of 
terrorism, and to a lesser degree CVE, by utilizing a multiplicity of associated terms, 
along with their variations. However, much of the literature fails to first establish the 
definition and intended use of such terms. While ostensibly rudimentary, the nuances 
within the meaning of words, as well as their own definitional transformation over time, 
leave readers to either wonder about the application of the term or—more often—to 
inject their own understanding and biases into the meaning of the terms used.13 As a 
result, the intended meaning of the literature can be significantly altered. 
This chapter first examines the literature surrounding many terms and 
terminologies used in the discourse on CVE and the broader discourse on terrorism 
overall. Some of the more frequently used terms include terrorism and CVE themselves, 
radicalization, VE, and ideology. Some differentiate themselves as only nuanced 
variations of other closely related terms, which are applied —correctly or incorrectly—as 
interchangeable terms. Once this foundation has been established, this chapter then looks 
at the literature encompassing CVE. This review includes the literature associated with 
defining CVE, researching CVE, and the programs associated with CVE.  
The goal of this chapter is to define and clarify the intended application of the 
terms and terminologies—the expression of terms—used in the following research to 
allow the reader an opportunity to place these terms in context, and thereby, better 
understand the narrative surrounding their use. The result is a more thorough analysis of 
the strategies presented in this thesis. While the research primarily focuses on the 
literature associated with CVE, it is important to first begin with a review of the 
terminology more broadly associated with terrorism, and then focus on the literature 
more aligned with CVE in particular. 
                                                 
13 See, for example “What Is Terrorism: Key Elements and History” by Scott Gerwehr and Kirk 
Hubbard and “Political Terrorism: A New Guide to Actors, Authors, Concepts, Data Bases, Theories, and 
Literature,” by Alex P. Schmid and Albert J. Jongman. 
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A. DEFINING THE TERMS TERRORISM, RADICALIZATION AND 
EXTREMISM  
1. Terrorism 
The term “terrorism” itself, along with its ubiquitous use, has come to prominence 
since 9/11.14 However, scholars, pundits, and societies as a whole have yet to come to a 
consensus on a definition for terrorism. While some common definitional elements within 
the multiple meanings of terrorism do exist, the nuances are vast. Further complicating 
the understanding of the term is that the very word itself is used either explicitly or 
implicitly as a core element within the definitions of many other related terms.15 In 
addition, the term is used as part of other terminologies, such as political terrorism, cyber 
terrorism, environmental terrorism, and religious terrorism; the latter is used incorrectly, 
as argued by Manas Chatterji.16 Part of the obstacle may be that the very word conjures 
up vastly different images and interpretations among people. While Chatterji suggests the 
term itself has become better known since 9/11, the struggle to define terrorism dates 
back to well before 2001.  
In their 1988 literature Political Terrorism, Alex Schmid and Albert Jongman 
present research they conducted in 1984 that revealed no fewer than 109 definitions of 
terrorism at the time.17 This observation was made 17 years before the 9/11 attacks upon 
the United States. Schmid and Jongman offer an explanation, opining, “The question of 
the definition of a term like terrorism cannot be detached from the question of who is the 
defining agency.”18 This nuance in scholar’s attempts to define the term adequately 
overlaps into the psychological realm as well. Viewing the term from a psychological 
rather than political perspective, Arie Kruglanski and Shira Fishman concur with Schmid 
                                                 
14 Manas Chatterji, “Understanding Terrorism: A Socio-Economic Perspective—Forward,” in Conflict 
Management, Peace Economics and Development vol. 22, ed. Manas Chatterji (United Kingdom: Emerald 
Group Publishing Limited, 2014), ix. 
15 Arie Kruglanski and Shira Fishman, “The Psychology of Terrorism: “Syndrome” Versus “Tool” 
Perspectives,” Terrorism and Political Violence 18, no. 2 (2006): 201, http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/ 
10.1080/09546550600570119. 
16 Chatterji “Understanding Terrorism: A Socio-Economic Perspective—Forward,” ix.  
17 Alex P. Schmid and Albert J. Jongman, Political Terrorism: A New Guide to Actors, Authors, 
Concepts, Data Bases, Theories, and Literature (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1988), 5. 
18 Ibid., 27. 
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and Jongman, and further suggest that an added difficulty in defining terrorism stems 
from the fact that the term has become highly pejorative over time, which furthers the 
desire to differentiate it from other forms of aggression that individuals wish to 
condone.19 As further evidence of this differentiation, they offer the well-known 
statement “[O]ne person’s terrorist is another person’s freedom fighter” as an example of 
allowing a group’s personal motivations to dictate its definition of what constitutes an act 
of terrorism.20 In their work related to extremist literature, Nasser-Eddine et al. concur 
with Kruglanski and Fishman that terrorism is a pejorative term.21 However, they 
elaborate deeper on this particular point by suggesting that the use of the term implies a 
moral judgment and that the ability to attach the label of terrorist to an opponent can 
indirectly persuade others to adopt this same moral viewpoint.22 This use suggests that 
the pejorative nature of the term may be, in part, the result of the intentional exploitation 
of the term in such a context. To do so may serve a strategic purpose but can also add to 
the confusion of the understanding of the term.  
The literature reviewed thus far attempts to define terrorism by framing the 
broader environment of its use and focusing on the intent of its application by various 
user groups. This approach appears more as an exercise in social identity theory (SIT) 
and ingroup–outgroup behavior than an attempt to define terrorism from a scholarly 
perspective.23 
Professor Fathali Moghaddam offers a more detailed and scholarly meaning of the 
term defining terrorism as “[P]olitically motivated violence, perpetrated by individuals, 
groups, or state-sponsored agents, intended to bring about feelings of terror and 
helplessness in a civilian population in order to influence decision making and to change 
                                                 
19 Kruglanski and Fishman, “The Psychology of Terrorism: “Syndrome” Versus “Tool” Perspectives,” 
201. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Nasser-Eddine et al., “Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) Literature Review,” 5. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Pioneered by the work of Henri Tajfel, social identity theory (SIT) and intergroup relations is 
generally recognized as the study of the relationship between individuals and their groups, as well as the 
social conflict between groups. See for example, Henri Tajfel, preface to Social Identity and Intergroup 
Relations, ed. Henri Tajfel (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1982), xiii. 
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behavior.”24 Moghaddam both concurs and dissents with elements of Kruglanski and 
Fishman’s application of the phrase “one person’s terrorist is another person’s freedom 
fighter.” Moghaddam concurs that the phrase contributes to the confusion in defining the 
term terrorism overall, yet at the same time, counters the general acceptance of the phrase 
as useful in the discourse on terrorism.25 In explaining this position, Moghaddam states 
that while certain social conditions give rise to the question of the morality of support for 
acts of terrorism, it is the actions of governments and their policies, the United States 
included, that further this appearance of legitimacy in the debate over whether one group 
defines a person as either a terrorist or a freedom fighter.26 The labelers will always call 
their fighter’s ‘‘freedom fighters” and the enemy’s fighters “terrorists” regardless of the 
factors surrounding the issue, which suggests the phrase has become highly politicized, 
and therefore, virtually irrelevant.27  
The politicization of terms associated with terrorism is not necessarily avoidable, 
nor should it automatically be, and the recognition of the political element may be as 
important as the understanding of the terms themselves. Author Bruce Hoffman offers 
that in the most widely accepted use of the term terrorism is inherently political, and 
therefore, fundamentally a political concept.28 Using power as a means to achieve 
political change, Hoffman defines terrorism in the following manner; “Terrorism is thus 
violence—or, equally important, the threat of violence—used and directed in pursuit of, 
or in service of, a political aim.”29 In their literature, “What is Terrorism,” Scott Gerwehr 
and Kirk Hubbard generally elucidate on Hoffman’s concepts of violence and political 
aim. They offer that terrorist violence is a means of communication intended to alter 
attitudes and perceptions, and political change is achieved through social influence—of 
which violence is one method—and therefore, conclude that terrorism is a form of social 
                                                 
24 Fathali Moghaddam, From the Terrorists’ Point of View: What They Experience and Why They 
Come to Destroy Us (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2006), 9. 
25 Ibid., 9–10. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006), 2. 
29 Ibid., 2–3. 
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influence.30 Merriam-Webster defines terrorism as “[T]he use of violent acts to frighten 
the people in an area as a way of trying to achieve a political goal.”31 This definition 
closely mirrors Hoffman’s and offers itself as a broad yet succinct definition that captures 
the violence, fear, and political aim commonly associated with terrorism.  
Governmental agencies also provide their own definitions for terrorism, which, 
upon review, seem to reflect the notion previously offered by Schmid and Jongman that 
the meaning is intrinsically connected to the defining agency.32 As an example, the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) states that its “top priority” is protecting the United 
States from terrorist attacks.33 The FBI then chooses to define terrorism as an activity 
with three distinct characteristics; thereby, allowing the FBI the ability to engage in its 
priority mission. The FBI differentiates the term as either domestic terrorism or 
international terrorism, and offers two separate definitions based upon this bifurcation. 
The definitions offer the same first two characteristics: 1) involve violent acts or acts 
dangerous to human life that violate federal or state law, 2) appear to be intended (i) to 
intimidate or coerce a civilian population, (ii) to influence the policy of a government  
by intimidation or coercion, or (iii) to affect the conduct of a government by mass 
destruction, assassination, or kidnapping, and bifurcate the third characteristic 
differentiating between activities that occur either domestically—“primarily within the 
territorial jurisdiction of the U.S.,” or internationally—“primarily outside the territorial 
jurisdiction of the U.S., or transcend national boundaries in terms of the means by which 
they are accomplished, the persons they appear intended to intimidate or coerce, or the 
locale in which their perpetrators operate or seek asylum.”34 
                                                 
30 Scott Gerwehr and Kirk Hubbard, “What Is Terrorism: Key Elements and History,” in Psychology 
of Terrorism 2007, ed. Bruce Bonger et al. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 87–88. 
31 Merriam-Webster, “Terrorism,” accessed June 22, 2014, http://www.merriam-webster.com/ 
dictionary/terrorism. 
32 Schmid and Jongman, Political Terrorism: A New Guide to Actors, Authors, Concepts, Data Bases, 
Theories, and Literature, 27. 
33 Federal Bureau of Investigation, “Terrorism,” accessed June 22, 2014, http://www.fbi.gov/about-
us/investigate/terrorism. 
34 Federal Bureau of Investigation, “Definitions of Terrorism in the U.S. Code,” accessed June 22, 
2014, http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/investigate/terrorism/terrorism-definition. 
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With the exception of Moghaddam’s inclusion of “state-sponsored agents” in his 
definition of terrorism, and Kruglanski and Fishman’s reference to the desire to 
differentiate terrorism from other forms of aggression that people wish to condone, the 
majority of definitions do not distinguish between conventional military violence and 
unconventional violence, or between state and non-state actors. Rather, they appear to 
focus on the motivations and tactics, which offer an ideal interpretation and 
understanding of terrorism. Multiple definitions of terrorism are available, some of which 
are paragraphs in length. However, the detailed elements captured by Moghaddam, 
Hoffman, Merriam-Webster, and Gerwehr and Hubbard coalesce well to form an 
understanding of terrorism in its most fundamental form. This allows the truest 
understanding of the term without attaching the influences or biases of those defining it.  
This examination of the term “terrorism” supports the notion that the term itself 
has undergone a definitional transformation over time and can still be subjectively 
applied today due to its wide-ranging interpretation. As used in this thesis, terrorism is 
understood to include an element of violence, which is committed with the intention to 
influence political or social change. 
2. Radicalization and Extremism  
According to Randy Borum, the overall result of this still emerging field of 
research on radicalization is that the professional literature is limited and that the 
literature that does exist primarily focuses on why—and to a lesser extent how—a person 
comes to adopt beliefs and behaviors that lead to violence, particularly toward civilians.35 
Moreover, much like the term terrorism, the term “radicalization” has been used more 
frequently since 9/11, and particularly in the period since 2005, a reflection of its use in 
relation to the emergence of homegrown terrorism.36 As a result of this emergence, many 
Western European countries began implementing counter-radicalization programs during 
                                                 
35 Randy Borum, “Radicalization into Violent Extremism I: A Review of Social Science Theories,” 
Journal of Strategic Security 4, no. 4 (2011): 14, accessed July 10, 2014, http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/ 
cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1139&context=jss. 
36 Mark Sedgwick, “The Concept of Radicalization as a Source of Confusion,” Terrorism and 
Political Violence 22, no. 4 (2010): 479. 
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this period and radicalization became a familiar expression within the terrorism 
vernacular.37  
However, during this same period—2005 to 2009—the United States generally 
felt that American Muslims were “essentially immune to radicalization and therefore, did 
not begin pursuing a similar strategy until much later.”38 In 2011, the United States 
implemented its own counter-radicalization strategy, yet within this document, it uses an 
even more emerging expression, “violent extremism,” as an interchangeable term with 
violent radicalization. Is counter-radicalization the same thing as CVE? Are the terms 
radicalization and extremism synonymous? In addition, more importantly, are the 
strategies to counter radicalization the same as the strategies to counter VE? Since this 
thesis research implements case study analysis of two Western democratic valued 
countries—the United Kingdom and Australia—with the intent of applying their positive 
attributes to an updated U.S. CVE strategy, these questions are essential to address at this 
juncture. 
Again, in similar fashion to the term terrorism, complicating the understanding of 
radicalization is the fact that the term can be used in either a relative or an absolute 
application and that it is utilized as a central component in many other related terms. This 
use is particularly evident in the CVE realm and examples related to this area include 
terms such as self-radicalization, counter-radicalization, de-radicalization, cognitive 
radicalization, and violent radicalization. While these terms are referenced throughout 
this thesis, this section focuses on the root definition of radicalization and its application 
as a synonym to the term extremism. Understanding the term radicalization in this 
manner allows for a more productive understanding of the other terms referenced 
throughout this research. However, according to Nasser-Eddine et al., “Defining what 
radicalisation is or who radicals are is as difficult as defining terrorism.”39  
                                                 
37 Sedgwick, “The Concept of Radicalization as a Source of Confusion,” 480. 
38 Lorenzo Vidino, Countering Radicalization in America: Lessons from Europe (Washington, DC: 
United States Institute of Peace, 2010), 2. 
39 Nasser-Eddine et al., “Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) Literature Review,” 13. 
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Merriam-Webster, in part, defines radical as a “a) very different from the usual or 
traditional; extreme, b) favoring extreme changes in existing views, habits, conditions, or 
institutions, c) associated with political views, practices, and policies of extreme change 
and d) advocating extreme measures to retain or restore a political state of affairs.”40 To 
define the term radicalization requires a review of the term radicalize. Merriam-Webster 
defines the term radicalize as “to make radical” and then offers radicalization as a variant 
to the term radicalize—rather than as a stand-alone term—and describes it as a transitive 
verb, which supports the idea that radicalization is the process by which an individual 
becomes radical.41 Of note is the frequent use of the word “extreme” throughout the 
aforementioned definition for radical. A review of the definition of “extreme” also 
reveals, in part, that it means to “very great in degree, very serious or severe, very far 
from agreeing with the opinions of most people: not moderate” and “going to great or 
exaggerated lengths: radical, exceeding the ordinary, usual, or expected.”42 Due to its 
connection to terrorism and VE, the term radicalization, or labeling someone as a radical, 
carries a strong negative connotation. However, by the very definitions offered, extreme 
views and radicalized thinking can also lead to positive outcomes, such as innovations in 
research and solving socially complex problems.43 It is, therefore, the resulting actions of 
radicalized individuals and groups that best contextualizes the term.  
Based on their 2103 research on community perceptions of radicalisation in 
Australia, Hussein Tahiri and Michele Grossman found that radicalisation and extremism 
involve an element of “intolerance for the viewpoints of others and the imposition of 
one’s own truth claims on other people or on society as a whole.”44 This added element 
of imposition—implying some type of action beyond the thought—of “one’s own truth 
                                                 
40 Merriam-Webster, “Radical,” accessed June 22, 2014, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/ 
radical?show=0&t=1404078073. 
41 Merriam-Webster, “Radicalize,” accessed June 22, 2014, http://www.merriam-webster.com/ 
dictionary/radicalize. 
42 Merriam-Webster, “Extreme,” accessed June 22, 2014, http://www.merriam-webster.com/ 
dictionary/extreme. 
43 Mark Baird, email message to author, July 3, 2014. 
44 Hussein Tahiri and Michele Grossman, “Community and Radicalization: An Examination of 
Perceptions, Ideas, Beliefs and Solutions throughout Australia,” Counter-Terrorism Coordination Unit, 
Victoria Police and Victoria University, September 2013, 8. 
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claims on other people or on society as a whole” is a deviation from those definitions of 
radicalization that focus solely on the extreme thoughts and beliefs. However, Tahiri and 
Grossman do not elucidate on the term imposition, which leaves people to wonder if their 
reference to the term—within the context of radicalization—is intended to imply 
violence. Instances, for example, in which the imposition of an individual’s radical 
beliefs upon others is conducted through the use of non violent means can be found; 
thereby, agreeing in concept with Tahiri and Grossman but expounding further the 
question of the necessity of violent action in defining radicalization. One such example is 
offered by the Muslim Public Affairs Council (MPAC) and contained within its important 
work in developing the Safe Spaces Initiative. MPAC suggests that the term 
“radicalization” is problematic and misunderstood, and therefore, the term “radical”—as 
used in the radicalization construct—is now perceived as a negative term.45 MPAC then 
defines radical as “…someone who simply holds views that are unconventional or outside 
the majority’s opinions and/or behaviors. Radicals are not necessarily violent, nor 
negative.”46  
In similar fashion to the research surrounding VE, the field of research on 
radicalization is still developing.47 According to Mark Sedgwick, in relative rather than 
absolute cases, the meaning of radical may be used as a synonym for extremist when used 
in support of an extreme position and an antonym for the term moderate.48 These 
definitions suggest frequent overlap occurs between the various forms of the words 
radical and extreme. To some, they are synonymous and interchangeable. Another 
noteworthy observation is the lack of reference to violence, as either a necessity or 
consideration to define the terms. This distinction serves to enforce the notion that while 
all terrorists are presumed to be radical in some respect—that can include views, as well 
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as actions—not all radicals become terrorists.49 While not controversial, it is relative to 
the understanding of the terms presented.  
Interestingly, when defining the term “radical,” most scholars and researchers fail 
to qualify it in terms of the social environment in existence at the time the label is 
applied. What was deemed radical by yesterday’s standards may be socially acceptable 
by today’s standards, and just as notably, what was socially acceptable by yesterday’s 
standards may be deemed radical by today’s standards. Whether or not scholars and 
researchers imply this concept, this important distinction should be formally 
acknowledged when discussing VE and CVE within the social construct. One noteworthy 
exception to this observation is offered by MPAC. Elaborating on its definition of 
radicalization, MPAC offers the example of Dr. Martin Luther King as a person who held 
“radical” views and engaged in non-violent behavior during the civil rights movement; 
views that are today considered acceptable by the majority of society.50  
The research indicates the terms radicalization and extremism—along with their 
variations—are synonymous and often used interchangeably. Further, in this native form, 
they neither require nor imply violence as a defining element. Following the general 
definition offered by Merriam-Webster, the terms radicalization and extremism, as 
inserted throughout this thesis, are used interchangeably and do not refer to actions 
involving violence. However, understanding that radicalization and extremism can follow 
a non-linear path towards violence, the result can be violent radicalization or VE. When 
this issue is discussed, the term is preceded by the appropriate adjective clearly 
delineating it as such.  
B. UNDERSTANDING THE ROLE OF IDEOLOGY AND OTHER 
MOTIVATORS TO RADICALIZATION, AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS 
TO COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMISM 
When beginning to understand that terrorism includes an element of violence 
committed with the purpose to influence political or social change, it is possible to gain 
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greater insight into the rationale behind its use and the motivators that may drive the 
transition to radicalization. RAND Researcher Kim Cragin suggests that motivations 
toward terrorism can be generally classified into three broad categories: ideology, 
politics, or poverty.51 Hussein Tahiri and Michelle Grossman describe motivators to 
terrorism as “drivers of violent actions” and categorize them as personal, socio-cultural, 
and political factors.52 Notable terrorism scholar Peter Neumann also offers three  
drivers: grievance, ideology, and mobilization, which transform people’s beliefs to 
radicalization.53 The drivers offered by Neumann incorporate similar elemental concepts 
of the drivers offered by Cragin, Tahiri, and Grossman. Neumann then cautions that 
while these drivers are a necessary part of the radicalization discourse, they are by 
themselves “not sufficient as explanations for extremist violence.”54 In the case of 
ideology, Neumann concurs with Cragin on its significance as a categorical topic. In the 
case of politics, Tahiri and Grossman concur with Cragin that it is a categorical topic and 
further that politics—as discussed in this thesis and in the “review of terms…” in section 
A above—is a familiar component to terrorism.  
Overall, this suggests that while the names of the categories offered by these 
researchers may vary slightly, the descriptions contained within the individual category 
narratives are extremely similar. Understanding the motivators that can lead to VE is as 
necessary to the research as understanding the terms associated with VE. 
1. Ideology 
Ideology, a standalone category according to Cragin, and an identified factor 
under political factors according to Tahiri and Grossman, is a term frequently used in the 
discourse on terrorism, radicalization, VE, and CVE. It is also regularly discussed as a 
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significant challenge in the CVE literature. The “terrorist organization’s ideology,” the 
“ideological motivation of the self radicalized individual,” and conversely, the efforts to 
“counter the terrorists narrative” (a reference to ideology), are all broadly applied phrases 
in this discussion as well. The terms ideology or ideologies are also referenced frequently 
in the U.S. 2011 CVE Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the 
United States.55 Therefore, it is prudent to discuss ideology briefly to understand the term 
better, its role in forming actions of individuals and groups, and its influence in both the 
radicalization and counter-radicalization processes as an important element in the 
development of effective CVE programs.  
Central to a comprehensive understanding of ideology is the recognition that the 
term itself is not pejorative in nature. While some may attempt to frame ideology in a 
negative context, it is neither good nor bad.56 Ideology represents the thoughts and i 
deas that comprise people’s beliefs, goals, and actions. It governs how they see not only 
their environment but also their place within that environment. Understanding this 
representation of ideology allows it to be separated from religion and extremism to allow 
the reader an opportunity to examine each in isolation beforehand to then better 
understand how they interrelate with one another within the broader terrorism framework. 
This understanding allows people the opportunity to contextualize the information 
offered and to understand the role ideology plays in VE and CVE, the latter as a counter-
radicalization strategy and not as a broader CT strategy.  
Merriam-Webster defines ideology as “visionary theorizing; a systematic body of 
concepts especially about human life or culture; a manner or the content of thinking 
characteristic of an individual, group, or culture; the integrated assertions, theories and 
aims that constitute a sociopolitical program.”57 This definition appears overly broad, and 
it is actually the synonymic terms doctrine and dogma, which provide more insight 
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towards an understanding of ideology. Briefly looking at these terms suggests ideology is 
more than a belief itself. It allows ideology to be the interpretation and communication 
mechanism to assert that theory or belief. Ideology can be thought of as an ongoing 
communication process, or the dialogue of a belief system.58 As a synonym to ideology, 
doctrine is defined as a position or principle, or the body of principles, within a branch of 
knowledge or belief system, developed through past decisions and experiences, which is 
intended to be shared with others as a matter governing policy.59 Dogma is also 
synonymous with the term ideology; however, dogma typically refers to a position or 
principle, or the body of principles, within a branch of knowledge or belief system being 
held as authoritative but without evidence or proof.60  
While the majority of contemporary literature in this realm is grounded in Islamist 
extremism—which is also the primary focus of the U.S. CVE strategy—it is important to 
recognize that ideology itself is neither a religious nor an extremist term. One such 
example of the broader non-religious application of ideology is Marxism. According to 
Stevenson and Haberman, Karl Marx, a German philosopher, economist, sociologist, and 
eventual atheist, whose theories on socialism and capitalism led to what is known today 
as Marxism, suggested that ideology plays a significant role in a society’s economic 
structure.61 This viewpoint supports the previous notion that ideology is neither good nor 
bad, and therefore, requires a supporting narrative to determine the context of its 
application.62 The overall virtue of its application largely resides with the ideology of the 
person making that determination. Professor Randy Borum notes that many known 
terrorists, including those who espouse a militant jihad ideology, are not particularly 
religious, and often only have a rudimentary understanding of the religious ideology they 
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represent.63 This realization requires researchers and practitioners to look further into 
other motivations to develop a menu of effective CVE strategies.  
Even so, a concurrent pragmatic approach should also remain focused on 
countering violent ideologies of an individual’s interpretation of religion. It is an 
important distinction that a religion does not direct people to violence but rather it is the 
interpretation of that religion by these individuals or groups. While some may choose to 
state otherwise, religion—regardless of whether that religion is Islam, Judaism, or 
Christianity—is not synonymous with terrorism. According to studies referenced by 
Professor Jim Breckenridge of the Naval Postgraduate School, no corollary exists 
between religiosity and support for terrorism.64 Further elaborating on this position, 
Breckenridge adds that religion is not the actual motivator to terrorism. Rather, it is the 
dissatisfaction with U.S. policies and in their own governments that correlates to the 
support of terrorism.65 
Although many examples of religion are used as justification for terrorism, it is 
not the religion itself that should be viewed as a doctrine for violence. Stevenson and 
Hagerman offer a definition that represents a more nuanced sociological aspect of 
ideology by defining it as “A system of beliefs that is held by some group of people as 
giving rise to their way of life…”66 The definition of ideology offered by The 
Collaborative International Dictionary of English synthesizes these collective concepts 
by stating ideology is  
A set or system of theories and beliefs held by an individual or group, 
especially about sociopolitical goals and methods to attain them; in 
common usage, ideology is such a set of beliefs so strongly held by their 
adherents as to cause them to ignore evidence against such beliefs, and 
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thus fall into error—in this sense it is viewed as a negative trait; contrasted 
to pragmatism, and distinct from idealism.67  
This definition suggests ideology is best placed within the broader sociological 
context and directly affects interactions among societies as a result of competing 
ideologies.  
This recognition provides a more accurate lens to view the terrorist and their 
organizations, and perhaps better understand—not to imply an agreement with—many of 
the ideological motivations discussed in the previous paragraphs. This recognition is not 
only necessary; it is fiscally and morally responsible. Continuously committing resources 
and implementing actions and strategies to combat terrorism without first developing an 
accurate understanding of terrorists themselves is a waste of billions of dollars and 
hundreds of thousands of people dedicated to this effort.68  
The influence of ideology in the radicalization process is present in many 
instances, and recognizing that presence is an important step in countering VE. 
According to Lydia Khalil, visiting fellow at the Australia Strategic Policy Institute, 
“[B]elief in the ideology is a precursor to action for those who commit violence in the 
name of jihad,” and if not addressed directly, “[H]ome-grown radicalisation will continue 
to appeal to the alienated and continue to be a matter of concern for American 
policymakers.”69 However, not all scholars agree that ideology is a precursor. Borum 
dissents with Khalil’s position on this matter by stating, “To focus narrowly on 
ideological radicalization risks implying that radical beliefs are a proxy—or at least a 
necessary precursor—for terrorism, though we know this not to be true.”70 Borum further 
supports his position on ideology by adding, “Ideology and action are sometimes 
connected, but not always” and “[M]any known terrorists—even many of those who 
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carry a militant jihadi banner—are not especially pious and have only a cursory 
understanding of the radical religious ideology they claim to represent.”71 These 
statements demonstrate the importance of understanding that ideology is only one of the 
potential drivers, and interpreting its significance as an element—not the element—of 
CVE strategies is essential. Further, while ideology may be a significant driver, this 
attempt to understand it is not intended to imply that practitioners should focus solely on 
ideology-based CVE strategies to the exclusion of other strategies. Consequently, it is the 
practitioners’ own conception of an ideology that frames their approach to countering an 
ideology.72 Therefore, when developing CVE programs, policies, and strategies, how a 
person comes to understand and then interpret a particular ideology is just as important as 
the ideology itself.  
Not all radicalized or extremist views lead to acts of violence. As defined in the 
previous section, radicalized views are those views recognized as extreme and typically 
held outside the norm of society, and as such, are not generally considered illegal in the 
United States. In fact, it can be argued that a group of radicals, who in fact, did choose 
violence as a means to support their radical views, founded the United States. 
Nonetheless, although VE by its very name is a form of extremism that has transformed 
into violence, not all circumstances of extremism turn into violence. Therefore, it is, 
important to keep in perspective that the extremist ideology itself does not cause  
the violence. Rather, it is the frustration over being unable to further the tenets  
of that ideology through socially acceptable and non-violent means.73 As an example, 
Hamas—which has even managed to get elected and function as part of government—is 
still unable (or unwilling through these traditional and non-violent means) to bring about 
the changes it wishes to see based upon its ideology, and as a result, continues to terrorize 
Israeli citizens in an effort to influence the government to act in a manner favorable  
to its cause.74 
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This differentiation is best labeled as “cognitive radicalization” and “violent 
radicalization.”75 Policies to prevent cognitive radicalization will differ from policies to 
prevent violent radicalization and the selection of community partners will be most 
instrumental in this effort.76 This important distinction recognizes that radicalization is 
not a linear process and just because a person becomes radicalized does not mean that 
violence is inevitable.77 The confluence of ideology or one of the other motivators to 
terrorism and the means to carry out violence, are two components needed for terrorism 
to occur, and it is prior to this blending of components that offers the best opportunity for 
these prevention, intervention, and disengagement strategies. To understand these causes 
better may allow policy makers an opportunity to design programmatic strategies that can 
eliminate, or even counter, these contributors. 
2. Four Functions of Ideology 
This discussion has established that ideology itself is neither good nor bad, neither 
religious nor extremist. Therefore, it requires a supporting narrative in order to determine 
the context of its application.78 Regardless, the significance of the application of ideology 
to an extremist’s interpretation of religion and its use as a power and control tactic to 
attract and guide members of particular groups cannot be dismissed.79 When applied in 
this manner, ideology serves the functions of naturalizing, obscuring, universalizing, and 
structuring.80 Each of these elements is discussed in its context with ideology as follows. 
a. Naturalizing Function of Ideology 
The role of naturalizing is to turn socially constructed and politically motivated 
ideas into generally accepted assumptions and beliefs to give them the appearance of 
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naturally occurring and being self-evident.81 Thus, the extremist ideology is allowed to 
appear as if it is the description—rather than the creation—of the current condition. 
According to behaviorist Burrhus Skinner, in this context, religion can be viewed as a 
method for manipulating human behavior by exerting pressure on others to conform.82 
Further, if this natural state appears to be in severe crisis, then the extreme methods  
used to respond to the crisis can be more easily justified.83 Referring to it as “dominant 
ideology,” Professor Fathali Moghaddam suggests a comparative ideology that is 
shaped—socially constructed—by the ruling elite through selecting which ideological 
narratives to endorse in an effort to preserve the status quo.84 This ideology also requires 
conformity to the commonly known and accepted narrative within the group. 
b. Obscuring Function of Ideology 
This ideological function allows for the denial, masking, or justification of 
seemingly contradictory narratives or actions.85 One example of obscuring is 
“[E]xtremist ideology that makes jihad into a special situation where rules against killing 
Muslims don’t apply.”86 If the narrative appears credible—supported by the scripture or 
religious clerics for example—then extremist groups can use violence while still 
demonstrating their commitment to an ideology, and thus, remaining authentic.87 
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c. Universalizing Function of Ideology 
Universalizing frames the interests of extremists as the interests of all members of 
a group. This strategy is most evident in the framing of suicide bombing as an act of 
martyrdom, conducted for the best interests of all members of the community and not 
solely for the leaders of the organization.88 This phenomenon is also represented in social 
psychology literature which suggests that in a group environment individuals will readily 
sacrifice their personal interests to the greater collective interests and perform in a 
manner that they would not otherwise have considered had they been alone.89 
Universalizing creates the appearance of an environment that offers itself as part of the 
collective greater good rather than one that serves the interests of a small group. 
d. Structuring Function of Ideology 
Once an organization achieves the ideological functions of naturalizing, 
obscuring, and universalizing, it must engage in the preservation of this overarching 
ideology through the structuring function, which involves the creation and enforcement 
of strict rules designed to reinforce the ideology.90 In this capacity, ideology is used to 
justify the way of life for a particular group by placing pressure on individuals to 
continuously acknowledge it, which makes it difficult for members to consider it 
objectively.91 This process further strengthens the ideology by ensuring it is woven into 
its members’ daily routines in everyday life.92  
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3. Other Notable Motivating Factors 
Researchers utilize many approaches to analyze terrorism, and even more 
hypotheses exist surrounding the drivers of terrorism.93 Terrorism is not a result of any 
single cause; more typically, it is the result of many causal factors generally categorized 
as being psychological and sociological.94 Likewise, VE and radicalization tend to occur 
as the result of a confluence of multiple factors.95 However, researchers recognize the 
presence of some common factors that may contribute toward the likelihood of a person 
becoming radicalized or prone to committing acts of terrorism.96 These factors include 
the following.  
 Feeling angry, alienated, or disenfranchised 
 Believing that their current political involvement does not give them the 
power to effect real change 
 Identifying with perceived victims of the social injustice they are fighting 
 Feeling the need to take action rather than just talking about the problem 
 Believing that engaging in violence against the state is not immoral 
 Having friends or family sympathetic to the cause 
 Believing that joining a movement offers social and psychological 
rewards, such as adventure, camaraderie, and a heightened sense of 
identity97 
The emergence of the role of self-radicalized and autonomously directed 
individuals in terrorism, along with the recruitment tactics targeted at these individuals by 
groups, such as al-Qaeda, provide a sense of exigency to understand the psychological 
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and sociological dynamics of terrorist groups and individuals better.98 If radicalization 
can be considered one of the many roots of VE, these motivating factors can then be 
considered the seeds. Once planted, the emergence and growth of these factors is largely 
representative of the environment in which they develop. It is in that environment that 
CVE strategies should focus their resources. Organizations can thereby demonstrate their 
understanding that tending to the development of ideology and other motivating factors 
prior to radicalization through community partnerships and alignments with those 
institutions best positioned to engage in this effort will be more effective than traditional 
hard power strategies.  
C. A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE ASSOCIATED WITH COUNTERING 
VIOLENT EXTREMISM 
The previous brief discussion of related complementary terminologies associated 
with CVE is an important first step in understanding the literature associated with CVE 
and in understanding the role of CVE as a soft power programmatic approach to 
countering terrorism. This approach is a departure from more traditionally used hard 
power strategies in this realm. This latter distinction is important because this thesis 
primarily focuses on the application of CVE within the category of soft power 
approaches.  
Since the term CVE is relatively new, the literature pertaining to it may be 
organized into several categories related to the conceptualization of CVE and the subject 
of CVE itself. Works may be categorized as contributing to the concept of CVE, the 
definition of CVE, or other literature with an association to CVE. In addition to an 
examination of this literature, the gaps in the literature reviewed are analyzed, and 
opportunities for future analysis and concluding remarks are provided. This process will 
assist in the later examination of the U.S. CVE strategy and the comparative case study 
analyses of the UK and Australian CVE strategies, to include the identification of 
commonalities and discrepancies (agreements and divergence) of CVE principles among 
the United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia. 
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1. Countering Violent Extremism—The Concept 
While a number of CVE related strategies are contained within a multiplicity of 
CVE frameworks in various countries, existing academic literature on the specific subject 
of CVE is relatively new and therefore, limited in its scope. This may be due, in part, to 
the recent emergence of CVE as a specific prevention component in the broader CT 
effort. According to author Georgia Holmer, this shift towards the concept of prevention 
began to occur after 9/11 in response to the changing nature of terrorism—particularly, 
the introduction of the decentralized terrorist structure and self-radicalization—to include 
autonomously directed small groups and individual actors.99 Over the past decade, 
understanding the concept of CVE, along with the potential effectiveness of CVE specific 
programs designed to counter terrorists’ recruiting efforts, has become a recognized focus 
in the greater CT effort.100  
These statements are not to suggest that the concept of countering VE as an 
approach to countering terrorism overall is new. In fact, as a strategy used to manage 
aspects of potential conflict, efforts to counter VE have likely been around as long as 
conflict itself. Rather, it is necessary to understand that CVE has traditionally been 
embedded within other CT literature and not necessarily evaluated in isolation. In 2011,  
a collective review by scholars Nasser-Edine, Garnham, Agostino, and Caluya of  
the progression of CVE as a CT strategy noted that this integration of CVE—as a  
sub-element of broader efforts to address extremism at its causal roots—was most 
appropriate, and therefore, necessitated that CVE be embedded within these social, 
economic, and political constructs.101 Holmer agrees with the perspective that CVE has 
emerged from the broader CT effort as an identified program but adds that CVE 
continues to remain conceptually and programmatically within the broader policymaking 
framework of CT efforts.102 Clarifying this nuanced conception of CVE allows for the 
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inclusion and review of literature associated with the concept of CVE that predates the 
use of the specific terminology associated with CVE. 
Although not formally called CVE in the literature until most recently, 
recognizable components of the CVE concept can be found within broader strategies 
developed to counter insurgencies throughout history. The most notable example of 
formalized recognition of this concept is found in literature in the United Kingdom dating 
back to the British counter-insurgency (COIN) doctrine in the early part of the 20th 
century.103 British COIN operations were much more militaristic and geographic centric 
than today’s CVE programs, implementing a “hard power” philosophy to counter 
insurgency. However, although the implementation of COIN operations differed 
significantly from today’s “soft power” philosophy, according to Retired Colonel 
Michael Crawshaw, “At the heart of any counter-insurgency campaign lies one basic 
requirement—the population of the territory concerned should form the perception that 
the government offers a better deal than do the insurgents.”104 This ideology translates to 
elements of today’s CVE efforts, particularly those designed to counter the narrative of 
terrorist organizations in an attempt to curtail the process of self-radicalization, which can 
lead to violence. While the CVE programs in Western democratic societies of today may 
not be intended to retain control of geographic territory from traditional insurgency 
campaigns, they are aimed at countering campaigns of violence. Beyond this generalized 
comparison of the concepts of insurgency and CVE, the term insurgency is used 
synonymously with CVE in its application in counter-radicalization policies used in other 
parts of the world.105  
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2. Countering Violent Extremism—Defining the Term 
The term CVE is rather nascent while at the same time seemingly ubiquitous in 
current CT discourse; the result of the progression of the role of CVE within the broader 
CT narrative. This has allowed the term “CVE”—much like other terms associated with 
the discussion on terrorism—to be applied rather broadly. Neither the Oxford nor 
Merriam-Webster dictionaries offer a definition for CVE, which suggests that CVE is 
essentially a phraseology utilized to describe a desired objective achieved through a 
combination of programmatic efforts.106 Author Brad Deardorff offers the notion that 
CVE is an effort but also argues that CVE, as an effective CT strategy, must embrace a 
strategic method of confronting the ideologies of terrorism.107 Holmer agrees with 
Deardorff that countering ideology is intrinsic to CVE and then elaborates further by 
offering examples of ideology, such as extreme political, social, cultural, and religious 
ideologies.108 Former Department of Homeland Security (DHS) CVE Working Group 
member Michael Downing offers an alternative method of defining CVE by succinctly 
stating what it is not and what it is, “It (CVE) is not an inoculation against extremism. It 
is however, a good prescription to build healthy, resilient communities making it more 
difficult for violent extremism and violence for that matter to take root.”109 Holmer also 
chooses to describe CVE by utilizing a similar approach as Downing, which defines CVE 
as an emerging field of policy and practice that “…focuses on countering the pull of 
terrorist recruitment and influence by building resilience among populations vulnerable to 
radicalization.”110 
Although nuances within these definitions exist, Crawshaw, Deardorff, Downing, 
and Holmer share the opinion that CVE must focus on the root causes of extremist 
violence and implement strategies that focus on prevention and disengagement. As the 
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concept of CVE has matured and developed as a natural outgrowth of other CT concepts, 
it has become a more familiar and understood term in the CT vernacular.  
With few exceptions, the overall majority of literature tends to focus on an 
analysis of the effectiveness of CVE programs rather than on the attempt to define CVE 
as a term. Scholars Will McCants and Clinton Watts opine that the lack of a clear 
definition for CVE is problematic and can lead to conflicting and counterproductive 
programs.111 This confusion can also lead to flawed assumptions regarding CVE, and 
thus, assessments of CVE programs become difficult.112 McCants and Watts then 
propose the following definition for CVE, “[R]educing the number of terrorist group 
supporters through non-coercive means.”113 McCants and Watts unsatisfactorily brief 
definition of CVE seems to contribute to the very ambiguity they observed in their own 
review of the term.  
Overall, the literature suggests the specific term CVE, along with its associated 
concepts, is often intertwined within the literature on terrorism, CT, and extremism. 
Nasser-Eddine et al. explain this absence of scholarly definition by offering perhaps the 
best explanation of CVE, which suggests its foundation is “in government policy rather 
than scholarship,” and therefore, is rarely defined within the literature.114 
3. Countering Violent Extremism—The Programmatic Environment 
Going Forward  
Briefly reviewing specific CVE programs through a lexicon that includes 
governmental policy as suggested by Nasser-Eddine et al. offers a mixture of varied 
approaches for review. In the past decade, as self-radicalization and VE have become a 
more focused area of interest for countries in their efforts to fight terrorism domestically; 
the result has been a global elevation in the overall importance of the concept of CVE, as 
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well as its specific programmatic strategies designed to prevent or counter (de-radicalize) 
radicalization.115 This effort includes both Muslim and non-Muslim majority countries. 
Examples include Canada’s Building Resilience against Terrorism strategy, Denmark’s 
Polarization and Radicalization Action Plan, Saudi Arabia’s Prevention, Rehabilitation, 
and After Care (PRAC) program, the UK’s Prevent and Channel programs, Australia’s 
Building Communities of Resilience Grant Program and its dedicated CVE Unit and the 
U.S.’s Strategic Implementation Plan for Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent 
Extremism in the United States.116 This direction implies a change in the position of CVE 
from a sub-element—as noted in the research by Nasser-Edine, Garnham, Agostino, and 
Caluya—to that of a primary element, which further suggests that social, economic, and 
political factors have now inverted and become necessary sub-elements for effective 
CVE strategies. 
Although CVE is understood to be a highly contextualized effort, these programs 
share similar foundational components, and countries recognize that the commonalties of 
their CVE programs—the understanding of common platforms underpinning the 
radicalization and de-radicalization process—far outweigh the political differences. As an 
example, an impressive number of Muslim and non-Muslim majority countries, to 
include Australia, Canada, China, Colombia, Egypt, the European Union, France, 
Germany, India, Indonesia, Japan, Jordan, Nigeria, Pakistan, Qatar, Russia, Saudi Arabia, 
South Africa, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom, and 
the United States, have come together to participate in the Global Counterterrorism 
Forum (GCTF).117 Through this collaboration, the GCTF offers continuously developing 
CVE related research and literature for use by member and non-member countries alike 
that focuses on “highlighting key counterterrorism themes that are flexible enough to be 
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amended and adapted for regional or national use.”118 This trend supports Holmer’s 
position that the concept of CVE, along with the potential effectiveness of CVE specific 
programs designed to counter terrorist recruiting efforts, has become a recognized focus 
in the greater CT effort in recent years.119 The U.S., UK, and Australian CVE strategies 
are examined in more detail as part of the case study analysis. 
4. Analysis and Gaps in Reviewed Literature  
Although the future for CVE literature appears positive, the current literature on 
the concept of CVE, along with practitioner focused CVE strategies, is still emerging. 
While the term CVE is becoming more common in the terrorism vernacular, its 
influential role in CT now appears generally accepted by researchers, academics, and 
practitioners. With little exception at this time, the literature in the area of the long-term 
effectiveness of CVE programmatic strategies, and their applicability and effectiveness in 
the United States in particular, is relatively void of any significant analysis. This includes 
substantive research and literature in the following sub-topical areas. 
 Identifying potential cultural and ideological barriers 
 Identifying group(s) of experts through criteria development and role 
identification who have proper authority and knowledge to develop such 
programs 
 Criteria used to establish local government and community participation 
requirements 
 The appropriate method—if any—to incentivize local communities and 
governments to participate  
According to Magnus Ranstorp, as late as 2010, little in depth scholarly literature 
existed that evaluated the progression of radicalization to violence and the corollary 
relationship between the impact of VE to the effectiveness of CVE measures.120 
Additionally, Ranstorp noted that scholars tended to focus their research into distinct and 
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separate sociological and psychological categories, and focused heavily on VE and 
radicalization and much less on the examination of CVE.121  
With little exception, also missing from the literature are meaningful analyses and 
recommendations central to CVE as an effective tool in soft power engagement against 
VE throughout the United States. This particular analysis should also be conducted in 
addition to the ongoing review of the more programmatic oriented steps associated with 
CVE. This thesis offers recommendations for the latter which, if reviewed and updated 
on an ongoing basis, can support an evaluation of the larger soft power issue. 
D. OPPORTUNITIES FOR FURTHER ANALYSIS 
With an understanding of the defined intent of CVE and its relatively recent 
implementation within the United States when compared to its use throughout the world, 
a review of the applicability of CVE as an effective soft power CT strategy within the 
United States should be conducted. In this further analysis, the following question should 
be asked, “Can such a strategy deliver a consistent and effective CVE programmatic 
framework that allows for meaningful collaboration between local governments and their 
communities to engage in the prevention of VE and self radicalization?” In essence, “Can 
such a comprehensive strategy, if properly developed at the federal level, reduce VE in 
this nation’s communities and increase community resiliency for when such event 
occurs?” The relevant academic literature offers a significant amount of additional 
scholarly resources through their bibliographies and works cited. Each of these additional 
sources provides further opportunities for exploration into the nuances of each of the sub-
areas touched in this review. It is anticipated that these additional research opportunities 
will further support the notion that the current U.S. strategy for countering VE is not 
feasible, and in the wake of continuous developments in the CVE realm, will not be an 
effective tool to support homeland security at the local and state level in the United 
States. The U.S. CVE strategy must be updated and embrace a process of continuous 
review to stay relevant and effective in the efforts to counter VE in the United States. 
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Utilizing the CVE resources offered through the GCTF, as well as those lessons offered 
by the existing CVE strategies from throughout the world, a revised, updated, and 
relevant national strategy to counter VE in the United States is achievable. 
E. CONCLUSION 
This literature surrounding CVE is being produced with relative frequency and 
offers an opportunity for further evaluation in the near term. Therefore, this brief 
examination of the literature should not be considered conclusive. This chapter examined 
the literature surrounding many terms and terminologies used in the discourse of CVE 
and attempted to clarify the intended application of certain terms used in the following 
research.  
The intention of this chapter was to allow the reader an opportunity to place these 
terms in necessary context, and thereby, better understand the narrative surrounding their 
use. Understanding the context of their application allows the reader to scrutinize the 
encompassing CVE literature offered in this review and in the following chapters more 
effectively.  
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III. AN EXAMINATION OF TERRORISM AND 
COUNTERTERRORISM IN THE UNITED STATES  
Americans hold a unique perspective on terrorism. Their conceptualization of this 
phenomenon typically stems from the iconic events of 9/11. Similarly, many only see CT 
efforts through the global prism of the Iraq and Afghanistan wars. However, in reality, 
terrorism—and the efforts to thwart terrorism—have a longer and broader history in 
America. This chapter examines that history of terrorism in the United States and its 
more recent efforts to counter terrorism, both globally and domestically. It briefly 
examines the perception of terrorism held by many Americans and attempts to identify 
some of the broader reasons for this somewhat uniquely held perspective by offering 
some of the more notable theories. 
Additionally, the chapter briefly reviews the origin and ensuing progression of the 
U.S. National Security Strategy (NSS) and other supportive CT strategies designed to 
support the NSS. This review continues with an examination of the multiple iterations of 
CT strategies including the National Strategy for Homeland Security, the Department of 
Homeland Security Strategic Plan, the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, and 
the National Counterterrorism Strategy. These strategies are collated and presented by 
strategy type—as opposed to chronology—to examine better the various individual 
strategy iterations and to understand their individual roles in relation to the  
broader CT efforts. It also highlights their relationship to one another. Concurrently, the 
chapter examines the progression and evolution of these strategies to include moving 
from hard power outwardly focused offensive and defensive strategies towards a soft 
power holistic approach that includes prevention and intervention components designed 
to deter VE. This review intends to provide an overview of these U.S. security and CT 
strategies to understand better the philosophical transformation the United States has 
undergone through the various iterations of the aforementioned strategies. The chapter 
then concludes with an analysis of the U.S. CVE strategies implemented for the first time 
in 2011.  
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The goal of this chapter is to develop a basic understanding of the U.S. approach, 
both philosophically and practically, to combating and countering terrorism and the 
progression towards awareness of self-radicalization and VE in particular. This 
evaluative process contributes to this thesis by formulating a basic understanding of the 
various U.S. security strategies in existence, along with their intended scope and purpose. 
With this foundational understanding in place, this analysis can then offer a critique of 
the U.S. CVE efforts and propose changes or additions, as offered in future chapters. 
A. BRIEF OVERVIEW OF TERRORISM IN THE UNITED STATES 
1. The Current Perception of Terrorism in the United States  
If the American population were asked to associate the word terrorism with an 
event, most would likely say September 11, 2001 or simply 9/11. Thirteen years later, it 
is still fresh in the minds of many. In fact, The National September 11 Memorial Museum 
in New York City just recently opened, and it will appropriately continue to be a vivid 
reminder of that fateful day.122 As a subject for terrorism studies, policy debates and CT 
program development, the difficulty with 9/11 is that is has become synonymous with the 
concept of terrorism. It is an iconic event whose viciousness and magnitude is fortunately 
not reflective of the vast majority of terrorism acts. However, this magnitude has also 
caused many Americans to erase from their memory any recollection of terrorism 
incidents on U.S. soil prior to 9/11.123  
Some of the difficulty in separating 9/11 from other acts of terrorism—and the 
broader category of disasters in general—can be attributed to the fact that terrorism as a 
category of disaster itself is unique since, unlike natural disasters or technological 
failures, it is purposeful. Therefore, an act of terrorism has the propensity to result in 
greater psychological impacts than other types of disasters.124 Additionally, a correlation 
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exists between this resulting impact and the sense of an individual’s lack of control since 
“degree of control”—or lack thereof—directly correlates to familiarity and knowledge.125 
The 9/11 terrorist attacks were not only incredibly purposeful in their intent, from an 
analytical perspective, they were also exceedingly successful in their collective objective 
to convey a sense of inflated power.126 This perspective created the fear that terrorism of 
this magnitude could impose its will upon the United States—the fear of a new normal 
for terrorism—that Americans today know has not come to fruition. However, as noted 
by Butler, Panzer, and Goldfrank, the enormous degree of impact of the 9/11 attacks, 
coupled with the fact it occurred on such a level never before experienced, and therefore, 
unprecedented and unfamiliar to the United States, caused a high degree of fear, anxiety, 
and sense of lack of control over terrorism at that moment.127  
Additionally, effects from terrorism can be long lasting and manifest themselves 
over a longer period than the timeline surrounding the initial event. An element that 
contributes to this incongruent perception of 9/11 as a baseline for terrorism is the 
continual and ubiquitous reference to 9/11 by the U.S. government in nearly every 
security related strategic document produced since the attacks.128 Politically, the United 
States operates in an environment in which failure to reference 9/11 could appear 
insensitive and disrespectful. 
Since so many uncertainties surround terrorism, the government’s attempt to 
explain terrorism to the American public can actually provoke the ongoing cycle of 
uncertainty, fear, and anxiety.129 This situation is compounded by the fact that the 
government cannot itself wholly redefine terrorism without losing some of its own 
credibility and support.130 Although the 9/11 attacks have proven to be an anomalous 
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event in the United States, for these reasons, this disproportionate act of terrorism will 
likely continue to be associated with the standard perception of terrorism by many 
Americans. 
As a result of the 9/11 attacks, the American public was also introduced to a 
newly formed perception of what a terrorist represented and of the religiosity of 
terrorism. Both of which—to some degree—have been mischaracterized over the years. 
This perception originated with the awareness—not necessarily understanding—of why 
Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda were claiming responsibility for the 9/11 attacks. This 
viewpoint is represented most notably with U.S. discourse around the topic of “Why do 
they hate us” and Presidents Bush’s over simplified response that “They hate our 
freedoms.”131 This newly formed perception continued with the 9/11 Commission 
Report’s description of bin Laden and religious extremism, by entitling Chapter Two of 
the report, “The Foundation of the New Terrorism”132  
Islamic extremism was now synonymous with terrorism, and as a result, 
America’s perception of the threat of terrorism is much different now than it was 35 years 
ago.133 As the GWOT progressed, a focus on extremism and its relation to violence 
began to develop that fit into the widening aperture of discourse regarding CT strategies. 
Like the United Kingdom in the last several years, the United States has begun 
incorporating soft power approaches to its more traditional compliment of hard power 
tactics.  
2. A Brief Overview of Terrorism in the United States—1970 to 2000  
The United States needs not look too far back in the annals of history to see the 
pervasiveness of terrorism on U.S. soil. The decade during the 1970s saw 60 to 70 
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terrorist incidents, primarily bombings, occurring on U.S. soil every year that resulted in 
the deaths of 72 people between 1970 and 1978.134 The frequency of terrorism was at a 
level 15–20 times greater than that experienced in the post-9/11 era.135 Notwithstanding 
9/11, the actions too, were on a scale not recognized today. For example, between 1970 
and 1977, The Weather Underground was responsible for 45 bombings, including the 
U.S. Capital, the Pentagon and the U.S. Department of State. The New World Liberation 
Front is believed to be responsible for nearly 100 bombings in California between 1974 
and 1978, and Cuban exile groups claimed responsibility for nearly 100 bombings.136 
Additional organizations, such as the Armed Front for National Liberation, the Jewish 
Defense League, the Ku Klux Klan, and émigrés from Croatia and Serbia, all engaged in 
acts of terrorism—typically bombings—during the decade.137 These groups could be 
understood to have been self-radicalized—although that label is largely reserved for 
individuals or small groups—and these larger groups discussed are more likely to be 
labeled as organizations. 
Some may attribute the ideologies of the 1970s a result of the period’s newly 
formed socially progressive values and social awareness of U.S. politics and global 
policy. While the decade ended, terrorism and the use of violence to further newly 
formed ideologies continued well into the 1990s. In addition to the historical presence of 
terrorist organizations, the presence of self-radicalized individuals—or lone wolf actors—
who committed acts of terrorism, also existed prior to 9/11. Three of the more notable 
self-radicalized individuals were Ted Kaczynski, Timothy McVeigh, and Eric Rudolph.  
Between 1978 and 1995, the “Unabomber” Ted Kaczynski, detonated 16 
bombs—including one on an American Airlines flight—to further his anti-industrialism 
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and anti-technology ideologies.138 Over the course of Kaczynski’s 17-year campaign, 
three people were killed and 23 were injured.139 Kaczynski even used the term 
“terrorism” when offering to stop the bombing campaign if a national syndicated 
newspaper would print his manifesto.140 In 1995, Timothy McVeigh bombed the Alfred 
P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma, which killed 168 and wounded over 500.141 In 
the years prior, McVeigh’s paranoia of the federal government developed into anger and 
to self-radicalization. This final stage was attributed to the perceived injustice that 
McVeigh felt as a result of the federal government’s handling of the Ruby Ridge standoff 
in 1992 and the Branch Davidian standoff in 1993.142 Between 1996 and 1998, Eric 
Rudolph was responsible for four bombings that killed three people and wounded over 
120 others.143 These bombings included Atlanta’s Centennial Olympic Park in 1996, an 
abortion clinic and gay bar in 1997, and a second abortion clinic in 1998.144  
Terrorism in the United States, although not as ubiquitous as in other countries, 
was prevalent during this period, and more so, more common than it is today. Although 
the interpretation of religion, to include extreme views of religion, may have played a 
role in some of these terrorist events, religion does not appear to be acknowledged as an 
overt or primary contributing factor toward extremism during this period. This correlation 
would come after the terrorist attacks upon the United States on 9/11. Also notable is that 
the term “terrorism” had not yet worked its way into the national vernacular. Although 
these events were reported by the media, they were often not associated with the concept 
of terrorism as things are in today’s terrorism conscious environment.  
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3. A Brief Overview of Terrorism in the United States—2001 to Present 
In the morning hours of September 11, 2001, American Airlines (AA) Flight 11 
and United Airlines (UA) Flight 175 departed from Boston at 7:59 and 8:14, respectively, 
AA Flight 77 departed from Washington Dulles at 8:20, and UA Flight 93 departed from 
Newark at 8:42.145 By 9:03, AA Flight 11 and UA Flight 175 had each crashed into the 
two separate towers at the World Trade Center in New York; 30 minutes later AA Flight 
77 crashed into the Pentagon and 30 minutes afterwards—at 10:03—UA Flight 93 
crashed into a field in Pennsylvania.146 On this day, the United States suffered it largest 
loss of life on U.S. soil—2,973 lives—and its relationship with terrorism would undergo 
a significant transformation. Radicalized violence on U.S. soil was not new, but a vicious 
and unimaginable attack of this magnitude was unprecedented, and placed all other 
terrorist events prior to 9/11 into secondary and tertiary categories of significance.  
Other significant terrorist incidents have occurred since 9/11. The 2009 Fort Hood 
attack by Major Nidal Hasan killed 13 people and wounded 32 others. Major Hasan was 
self admittedly a supporter of the Taliban.147 Unprecedented at the time, this event 
indicated a new development whose magnitude was largely unseen prior to 2009—self-
radicalized or recruited U.S. citizens attacking Americans on U.S. soil.148  
On April 15, 2013, two bombs detonated near the finish line of the Boston 
Marathon that killed three people and wounded over 260 others, many severely.149 
Brother’s Tamerlan and Dzhokhar Tsarnaev are believed to be responsible, and 
Dzhokhar, the surviving brother, has indicated that the attack was in support of Muslims 
                                                 
145 Kean, 9/11 Commission et al., The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National 
Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 4, 7.  
146 Ibid., 32–33. 
147 Carter, “Nidal Hasan Convicted in Fort Hood Shootings; Jurors Can Decide Death.” 
148 Hoffman, “American Jihad,” 4. 
149 Herman B. “Dutch” Leonard et al., “Why Was Boston Strong? Lessons from the Boston Marathon 
Bombing,” Harvard Kennedy School and Harvard Business School, April 2014, 1–2. 
 48
suffering at the hands of the American war in Iraq.150 Further, all evidence appears to 
support the idea that the brothers were self-radicalized and acted without specific 
direction or operational support from any structured terrorist organization.151 The Boston 
bombing, perhaps due to its use of bombs as its method of violence, coupled with its self-
radicalized and anti-American sentiment by two Muslims, has been referred to as the 
“next attack”—a reference to the post-9/11 era.152  
Other less notable terrorist attempts identified as extremist ideologically centered 
and self-radicalized have not come to fruition or drew the attention that these two 
incidents have. Moving forward, self-radicalized VE will continue to be a part of the 
domestic terrorism narrative, and in parallel, the continual evolution of CVE 
programmatic strategies should also be a part of this same discourse. 
4. The Perception of Terrorism in the United States—Future Challenges 
The United States has not, before now, been subject to the kind of security 
threats, or the risk of external wars with domestic consequences, that have 
characterized many European democracies.153 
While the acts of violence were significantly more frequent and the death toll 
significantly higher during the time before 9/11 than in the decade since 9/11, the 
presence of fear and anxiety today represent the fact that 9/11 is the foundation of 
reference for terrorism for so many Americans. Further analyses of this observation 
indicates that 9/11 was viewed by many Americans as a surprise attack on the nation as a 
whole, not upon a particular individual or group, and perceived to be on the same level as 
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the Japanese attack upon Pearl Harbor.154 Further, localized attacks, like those described 
in a pre-9/11 America, were not recognized as an act of violence by large organized 
terrorist networks, but rather as “behavior” of one or two individuals.155 On a personal 
level, Americans felt safer believing that the attacks were not directed at them as 
individuals. Americans felt the opposite regarding the 9/11 attacks.  
Applying this methodology to the 2013 Boston Marathon bombings, it would 
stand to reason then that this terrorist event—that killed three people and was perpetrated 
by two individuals—would be on a level similar to the 1996 Centennial Park bombing in 
Atlanta. On the other hand, as an alternate narrative, if the Boston bombings were 
intended to further a political ideology, then it would be on a level similar to the Croatian 
and Serbian émigré terrorism from the 1970s. The problem with this methodology is 
9/11. Precisely what makes 9/11 iconic is that with regard to terrorism and 
counterterrorism, a pre-9/11 and post-9/11 America will always exist. In fact, as  
noted earlier, the Boston bombing has been referred to as the “next attack”—a reference 
to the post-9/11 era.156 Americans before 9/11 utilized a framework for categorizing 
individualized attacks that did not contain a conscious awareness of an attack on the scale 
of 9/11. While today’s environment is certainly not the same as it was in the months 
following 9/11, it will never return to its pre-9/11 condition. Even though 9/11 has so far 
proven to be an anomaly—due in large part to the U.S. response—it is nonetheless the 
standard for terrorism in many citizens’ minds. Today, Americans live in anticipation of 
another significant attack and look at each new event as potentially being that next attack.  
According to researchers Brandon and Silke, who studied the psychological 
effects of terrorist attacks, “[F]ear and anxiety, once aroused, do not dissipate, adapt, or 
habituate.”157 These feelings result in higher expectations being placed upon the 
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government to prevent terrorism, particularly as Americans have conceded more 
authority to the government since 9/11 than occurred in the 1970s. In addition to the 
utilization of 9/11 as the standard that Americans use to measure terrorism, the paradox is 
that what makes terrorism so frightening to Americans is that it is so unfamiliar.158 As a 
contrast, from an emotional health and post-incident recovery perspective, in Northern 
Ireland and Israel, habituation and familiarity to such events affords an individual the 
opportunity to recover more fully emotionally and return to a sense of normalcy much 
quicker.159 It is not to imply that terrorism is a good thing. It simply suggests that the 
more familiar people are with it, the less anxiety they tend to retain. 
This potentially unique circumstance in the United States places pressure on 
governments—federal in particular—to perform at a level almost unattainable when it 
comes to preventing terrorism. This requires the implementation of effective CT 
programs developed using well-founded principles and careful analysis, and then 
delivered with long-term objectives in mind. This further underscores the importance of 
community partnership programs, and the value of local, engaged, communities to not 
only enhance the U.S. CVE efforts but to reduce anxiety and fear in citizens.  
B. RELEVANT U.S. SECURITY AND COUNTERTERRORISM 
STRATEGIES—THE PROGRESSION TOWARDS COUNTERING 
VIOLENT EXTREMISM 
1. The National Security Strategy—A Brief History and Review of the 
2002, 2006, and 2010 Strategies 
Immediately following WWII, the concept of a formalized National Security 
Strategy, to include the implementation of the National Security Council, and the creation 
of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), was established under the direction of the 
National Security Act of 1947.160 This act remained largely intact until the Reagan 
Administration and was amended as part of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of 
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Defense Reorganization Act of 1986.161 Among other things, this act requires the 
president to annually submit to Congress a comprehensive national security strategy 
report that focuses on  
1) worldwide interests, goals, and objectives of the United States that are 
vital to the national security of the United States; 2) The foreign policy, 
worldwide commitments, and national defense capabilities of the United 
States necessary to deter aggression and to implement the national security 
strategy of the United States, including an evaluation of the balance 
among the capabilities of all elements of national power of the United 
States to support the implementation of the national security strategy.162  
The first national security strategy published after 9/11 was the 2002 NSS issued 
on September 17, 2002. As part of the national strategy framework theme, the 2002 NSS 
continued with a globally focused overarching strategy. However, primarily due to the 
anticipation of what a post-9/11 global environment would convey, the 2002 NSS 
specifically references the threat of terrorism and the strategies required to defend against 
it and defeat it.163 Additionally, the 2002 NSS offers a view of the ongoing and 
impending restructure of the federal government by suggesting that the current structure 
was designed for a different era, and further, to meet the new requirements and 
challenges posed by this new era, all the major national security institutions would need 
to be transformed.164  
In March 2006, the White House released the 2006 National Security Strategy. As 
the second such strategy since 9/11, the 2006 NSS continued forward many of the 
objectives developed in the 2002 NSS. Further, it also reported on the results of several 
of the 2002 NSS objectives, such as the governmental transformation of major national 
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security institutions. These particular changes included the establishment of the DHS and 
its compilation of 22 federal agencies, the newly formed National Counterterrorism 
Center and National Counter Proliferation Center and the creation of the position of 
Director of National Intelligence.165 
In May 2010, the White House released the comprehensive 2010 National 
Security Strategy; the first such strategy for President Obama. While the NSS is intended 
to be a globally focused overarching strategy, the 2010 NSS departs from previous 
themes with more focus on extremism and domestic concerns surrounding self-
radicalization. In reference to domestic VE, it states,  
several recent incidences of violent extremists in the United States who 
are committed to fighting here and abroad have underscored the threat to 
the United States and our interests posed by individuals radicalized at 
home. Our best defenses against this threat are well informed and 
equipped families, local communities, and institutions.166  
The 2010 NSS then outlines the need to empower local communities to counter 
radicalization and the importance of community engagement and partnerships toward 
these efforts.167 This terminology was directly inserted into the national CVE strategies 
published the following year. The 2010 NSS demonstrated the government’s growing 
awareness of VE, self-radicalization, and the impending need for CVE strategies to 
effectively counter this emerging concern.  
In March 2014, the Quadrennial Defense Review was published and is normally 
used as a guidepost to construct the national security strategy. While anticipated soon, the 
2014 NSS has yet to be published. 
2. Other Relevant National Strategies—2001 to 2011 
On October 8, 2001, less than one month after the terrorist attacks upon the 
United States, President George W. Bush—through Executive Order—established the 
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Office of Homeland Security, the precursor to the DHS created on March 1, 2003 after 
passage of the Homeland Security Act of 2002.168 The move to establish the DHS, along 
with the subsequent strategies discussed in this section, represented the beginning of a 
bifurcation of the national security philosophy into two generalized categories. The first 
category continues to be the overarching globally focused NSS, while the second 
category—in actuality, a complementary document to the NSS—has a narrower strategic 
focus on the threat of terrorism to the homeland. This second category has evolved over 
time through a progression of strategies that today also include strategies for CVE.  
a. The National Strategy for Homeland Security—A Review of the 2002 
and 2007 Strategies  
While still the Office of Homeland Security, the first directive given by the 
president was to establish a National Strategy for Homeland Security (NSHS).169 The 
objective of this strategy—intended to be a complementary strategy to the NSS—was to 
focus on the threat of terrorism in the United States, and to develop a framework by 
which CT related activities could be coordinated between federal, state, local, and private 
sector organizations.170 This new strategy also gave the American public its first look at 
the newly created definition of the term “Homeland security.” “Homeland security is a 
concerted national effort to prevent terrorist attacks within the United States, reduce 
America’s vulnerability to terrorism, and minimize the damage and recover from attacks 
that do occur.”171 
The 2002 NSHS mainly focused on hardening critical infrastructure key resources 
(CIKR) and formalizing intelligence and information-sharing capabilities between 
agencies. This focus, as a means of hardening the U.S.’ defense against the external 
threat of terrorism emanating from outside its borders, was void of the recognition or 
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inclusion of programmatic strategies designed to prevent terrorism from occurring at the 
outset. This lack of an inward facing perspective typifies the strategic philosophy in place 
at the time, largely as a result of the still very fresh memory of the 9/11 attacks.  
As it delivered this new domestic strategy, the federal government recognized the 
potential sensitivity to the multiplicity of state and local governments, and announced the 
NSHS was a national strategy and not a federal strategy. It acknowledged that the 
democratic philosophy of governance in the United States is founded on the principles of 
federalism.172 Additionally, the strategy emphasized that this new domestic oriented 
direction should not “overly federalize the war on terrorism.”173 With over a decade of 
experience and observation as the GWOT, and subsequent domestic strategies, have 
played out, the matter of whether or not the federal government could be described as 
having overly federalized the war on terrorism is a matter for debate. Overall, the 2002 
NSHS recognized that even though a connection between national security and homeland 
security existed, each now needed separate but corresponding strategies going forward. 
In October 2007, an updated NSHS was published. Between the 2002 version and 
the 2007 update, the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism—2003 and 2006 
versions—were published. The 2007 NSHS presented the first iteration of the now 
familiar Prevent, Protect, and Respond framework.174 The framework, which 
incorporates a fourth element of Continue, defines each element as follows. 
 Prevent and disrupt terrorist attacks 
 Protect the American people, critical U.S. infrastructure, and key 
resources 
 Respond to and recover from incidents that do occur 
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 Continue to strengthen the foundation to ensure this nation’s long-term 
success175  
The 2007 NSHS reflects a shift from being terrorism centric towards an all-
hazards methodology that, while still mindful of terrorism prevention, now includes non-
terror related events, such as large-scale catastrophes, including but not limited to, man-
made and natural disasters.176  
b. The 2012–2016 Department of Homeland Security Strategic Plan—A 
Recognition of Countering Violent Extremism 
In February 2012, the DHS published its third edition of the Department of 
Homeland Security Strategic Plan.177 This 2012–2016 document followed the 2008–
2013 edition, which in turn, followed the initial 2004 strategic plan. This 2012–2016 
strategy document was, in part, the result of the Quadrennial Homeland Security Review 
(QHSR) process, which is designed to ensure the resulting plan incorporates the unified 
strategic framework used in setting its mission and goals.178 Although still not yet 
providing a comprehensive CVE platform, for the first time, the DHS Strategic Plan 
acknowledged VE and the value of engaging communities as part of a broader CVE 
strategy. This acknowledgement is demonstrated by the following statements, to “prevent 
and deter domestic VE and the radicalization process that contributes to it” and to 
“Increase community participation in efforts to deter terrorists and other malicious actors 
and mitigate radicalization toward violence.”179 
A general concern with the DHS is the absence of a single strategy—as 
represented by the NSHS and the Homeland Security Strategic Plan—and that such a 
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strategy will complement and conform to the overarching national security strategy.180 
Absent a single strategy, confusion can occur regarding the priorities, mission, and 
objectives caused by multiple strategies within one organization, and the propensity 
exists for miscommunication and confusion. 
c. The National Strategy for Combating Terrorism—A Review of the 2003 
and 2006 Strategies 
First published in February 2003, the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism 
(2003 NSCT) was intended to be an elaborative strategy. It was developed to support the 
National Security Strategy by “expounding on our need to destroy terrorist organizations, 
win the “war of ideas,” and strengthen America’s security at home and abroad.”181 The 
2003 NSCT was designed to identify, attack, and defeat terrorist threats prior to those 
threats reaching U.S. borders.182 It delineates itself from the NSHS, which is intended to 
focus on the prevention of terrorist attacks within the United States.183  
As a comprehensive strategic document, the 2003 NSCT was detailed and 
straightforward in outlining its objectives. Further, it was one of the first public 
documents that demonstrated the U.S. government’s understanding of terrorist 
organizational networks and structures. One such example is Figure 1, which represents 
the basic structure of terrorism. The corresponding narrative (not shown) discusses the 
overarching strategy affecting each of the levels.  
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Figure 1.  The Structure of Terror184  
The overall objective of the 2003 NSCT ultimately was to eliminate terrorist 
organizations abroad by being vigilant and relentless in its global pursuit of these 
organizations to ensure their operational capabilities and spheres of influence are made 
irrelevant.185 The theory of the 2003 strategy was that the elimination of these terrorist 
organizations, coupled with the furtherance of political and economic tools, would 
stabilize regions otherwise vulnerable to the influence of these organizations, and 
thereby, allow the opportunity for democracy to establish itself.186 
One such observation made in the strategy was the belief that terrorist 
organizations needed to maintain a physical base in which to operate.187 By implication, 
the belief was that if terrorist organizations were deprived of their ability to maintain a 
presence physically from which to operate, terrorism could be eliminated. Ten years later, 
while the effectiveness of these conventional military tactics are argued by scholars, it 
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can also be argued that decentralized terrorist cells and self-radicalization may—to some 
degree—be the manifestation of the success of these early U.S. CT strategies.188 
The 2006 National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (2006 NSCT) was released 
by the White House on September 5, 2006.189 The strategy continued with the 2003 
theme as it relates to protecting the United States and its global partners from terrorist 
attacks with an offensive strategy of preemptive disruption and disabling of terrorist 
networks.190 In addition, it broadened the terrorism threat by adding rogue nations states. 
However, the 2006 version offered a more detailed set of strategies by dividing them 
between short-term and long-term objectives. The short-term objectives included the 
prevention of attacks by terrorist networks; the denial of weapons of mass destruction 
(WMD) to terrorists and rogue states, the denial of support and sanctuary to terrorists by 
rogue states, and not allowing terrorists to control and nation.191 The long-term 
objectives included winning the “war of ideas” through the global advancement of 
effective democracies, the promotion of international coalitions and partnerships, and the 
enhancement of CT infrastructure and capabilities.192 
Criticism of the 2006 NSCT centers on the concerns that the U.S. government has 
taken an overly simplistic view on the motivations that lead to terrorism—particularly 
ideological motivations—on the characterization of transnational terrorism, and that 
narrowly focusing on a “war of ideas” limits the United States in its ability to divert 
attention and effort towards other alternative strategies.193 An additional concern is the 
2006 NSCT minimizes the impacts of U.S. global policy as a contributing factor toward 
the underlying cause of terrorism.194 
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However, supporters of the strategy contend that actively confronting ideology 
and religion-centered radicalization is a necessary next step in the evolution of countering 
terrorism.195 This reference to prevention and intervention of the ideological narrative as 
a security strategy is an example of U.S. progression on the hard power to soft power 
continuum. As noted in the other strategies examined in this chapter, the 2006 NSCT is in 
congruence with these other strategies as it begins to address CVE themed objectives to 
counter terrorism.  
d. A Review of the 2011 National Strategy for Counterterrorism  
In June 2011, the White House released the National Strategy for 
Counterterrorism (NSCT). In a departure from previous national terrorism strategies’ 
“seek and destroy,” and “combating terrorism” methodology, the current version utilizes 
a “counterterrorism” methodology. Even so, the White House intriguingly communicates 
that the new strategy “…neither represents a wholesale overhaul—nor a wholesale 
retention—of previous policies and strategies.”196 However, the strategy does continue to 
adhere to the principles of disrupting, dismantling, and defeating al-Qaeda, it affiliates, 
and supporters.197 The strategy also continues to be a complementary element to the 
National Security Strategy while focusing on the U.S. capacity for CT and homeland 
security efforts.  
The 2003 and 2006 NSCTs were outward facing and any reference to defense 
against terrorism from coming into the United States was generally outwardly postured at 
the U.S. borders; distinguishing its objectives from the NSHS, which is intended to focus 
on the prevention of terrorist attacks within the United States.198 The 2011 National 
Strategy for Counterterrorism represents a shift in this posture. While the 2011 NSCT 
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only briefly discusses engagement with communities and information sharing among law 
enforcement organizations to build resilience against al-Qaeda inspired radicalization, its 
reference to community engagements and partnerships offers an indication of the future 
direction the U.S. government intends to move the CT discourse. In August, just two 
months after the National Strategy for Counterterrorism was released, the White House 
published the first ever Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the 
United States, which was immediately followed up with the Strategic Implementation 
Strategy Plan (SIP) for Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the 
United States, released in December 2011. 
C. CONCLUSION 
Americans have a unique conceptualization of terrorism that stems from the 
iconic events of 9/11. As a result, this conceptualization presents additional challenges 
for the United States in its CT and CVE efforts. However, this chapter illustrated that, in 
reality, terrorism has a much longer and broader history in America. Viewing the pre-
9/11 terrorism environment in the United States—through this brief historical 
examination—has offered itself as a basis for the analysis of the successive progression 
of strategies to counter terrorism and combat VE. As a result, this methodology has 
allowed the reader to form a basic understanding of the various U.S. security strategies in 
existence, along with their intended scope and purpose. With this foundational 
understanding now in place, this thesis research can next move forward with an analysis 
and critique of the current U.S. CVE efforts. 
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IV. AN OVERVIEW OF VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN THE UNITED 
STATES AND AN EXAMINATION OF THE CURRENT U.S. 
STRATEGIES FOR COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMISM 
In the fight against terrorists, and the subsequent impacts of terrorism activities, 
the United States—at a national level—has historically focused its CT strategy on 1) the 
pursuit of terrorists abroad, 2) building foreign partnerships, and 3) strengthening the 
country’s resilience.199 These strategies are reflected in ongoing military operations, the 
hardening of critical infrastructures identified through formalized CIKR programs, and 
the significant amount of “homeland security” related equipment and training provided to 
first responder agencies. Until 2011, domestic strategy was not designed to engage local 
communities in support of building community partnerships for the purpose of countering 
self-radicalization and VE. As the U.S. government turned its focus inward, this soft 
power approach needed to ensure it incorporated practical “whole of community” 
preventive strategies rather than relying on traditional intelligence gathering law 
enforcement measures.  
This chapter briefly looks at the emerging concept of self-radicalization and VE in 
the United States and its comparison to VE of the past. The chapter examines the use of 
the Internet as an effective recruitment and radicalization tool implemented by al-Qaeda 
and other supporters of jihad that placed the issue on a global platform. Thus, new 
challenges were created for the United States that required a shift in strategy from 
traditional hard power military tactics toward more soft power community-based and 
counter-narrative tactics. The chapter then examines the two strategies implemented by 
the United States to counter VE. These strategies—codified in two documents released in 
2011—are the Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United 
States, and its partner document, the Strategic Implementation Strategy Plan for 
Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States. 
The goal of the chapter is to develop a basic awareness of VE in the United States 
and its approach to domestic CVE applications since 2011. Through this analysis, this 
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chapter contributes to this thesis by evaluating the overall effectiveness of the U.S. CVE 
strategies in place since 2011, and then offering policy and program design 
recommendations intended to improve the current CVE strategy. 
A. THE RECOGNITION OF VIOLENT EXTREMISM AND SELF-
RADICALIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES 
Much like terrorism in general, radicalization and VE have been part of the U.S. 
fabric long before September 11, 2001. The more recent recognition of “religious based 
ideological extremism moving into stages of violence” is rooted primarily in the choice 
of words people select to communicate on this issue. Not intending to over simplify the 
complex set of factors that surround the discourse, VE occurs when extremist or radical 
views turn to violence as a means to further that ideology. While the views are legal in 
the United States, the violent actions associated with them are not. If people subscribe to 
this definition, then viewing violence as a means to further their ideology is rooted in this 
country’s history all the way back to its beginnings. This country’s founding fathers, by 
definition, were radicals who took to violence as a means to further an ideology and 
influence a government in an attempt to alter its policies. Moreover, historically, violence 
in this sense has traditionally been contextualized and localized geographically—either 
regionally or nationally—but not globalized. New within the construct of terrorism today 
is its global reach. This reach also has been perpetuated by the U.S.’s own use of the term 
“global” in the frequently used phrase “Global War on Terror” during the Bush 
administration. Additionally, the religious underpinnings of this call to global jihad—
through the exploitation of religion, as well as the issuance of fatwa’s by Muslim clerics, 
as a means to support and justify violence—underscores the complex nature of this 
challenge. An additional factor that complicates the discourse is that, in a similar fashion 
to the earlier discussion of Americans’ markedly unique perspective of terrorism after 
9/11, VE or self-radicalization is now viewed in much the same way; through a post-9/11, 
jihadist centric lens. 
Prior to 2011, the United States fought the GWOT utilizing conventional military 
tactics that, due in large part to the U.S. military’s success, has led to an operational 
decentralization and use of smaller terrorist cells along with the furtherance of an 
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individual jihad strategy.200 As a result of the overall effectiveness of this strategy, this 
movement towards self-radicalized VE has become an important challenge for the United 
States today. This challenge is due, in part, to the fact that these elements are extremely 
difficult to detect and prevent with conventional military tactics. 
1. The Internet—An Effective Method of Recruitment Towards Self 
Radicalization and Violent Extremism 
Terrorist organizations and the United States would agree on few issues. One such 
issue is the emerging trend toward the use of small cell and self-radicalized actors as an 
effective means of violence in support of extremist ideological beliefs. This newly 
identified strategy by terrorist organizations moves away from the expensive, long-term 
planning, and large cell operations like the 9/11 attacks, and focuses on decentralized 
Internet-driven strategies to radicalize individuals to commit localized terrorist acts. The 
terrorist message is to “think globally but act locally.”201 Overall costs for such 
operations fluctuate between $2,000 and $4,000 as opposed to the estimated $400,000 to 
$500,000 spent by al Qaeda on the 9/11 attacks.202 Due to the low number of operatives 
and lack of central planning, this new trend also reduces the likelihood of detection and 
exploits local opportunities to strike targets in the United States. It is the ultimate low 
risk, high reward model of operation.  
The primary recruitment weapon of choice in this new threat is the Internet. 
According to thesis research conducted in 2012 by former Naval Postgraduate student 
Charles Eby, “The use of the Internet is an emerging trend in lone-wolf terrorism. The 
number and percentage of total cases that have actively used the Internet has increased 
since 2008.”203 According to a 2011 FBI report, “The Internet has allowed terrorist 
groups to overcome their geographic limits and plays an increasing role in facilitating 
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terrorist activities.”204 Since 2010, Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) has 
published the online English language magazine Inspire to recruit individuals into self-
radicalization based on messages of ideology and to provide technical assistance for 
weapons making.205  
In March 2014, al-Qaeda announced on YouTube it would soon launch the online 
magazine Resurgence.206 This course of action continues the theme of using the Internet 
to connect directly with individuals—particularly U.S. and British Muslims—in an 
attempt to recruit them to violence.207 Terrorists today are becoming creative in the 
delivery of their online messaging and delivering these calls for violence in a manner 
more emotionally appealing to the youth than a sit down conversation with an Imam or 
reading a fatwa condemning terrorism and violence.208 The YouTube promotional video 
announcing the launch of Resurgence incorporates the voice of Malcolm X delivering a 
1965 speech justifying—and thereby calling for—the use of violence as an appropriate 
and necessary response to the already existing presence of violence by an oppressor.209 
Deliberately, al-Qaeda has associated its struggle to one very familiar and 
personal to many Americans—the civil rights movement of the 1960s. In further 
comparison, al-Qaeda is presenting its grievance as a struggle—not a war—against a 
common oppressor. The oppressor is the U.S. government and its policies as they relate 
to areas of the Middle East and North Africa. Even though the narrative is from 1965, the 
video blends depictions of current U.S. promulgated violence that seems to modernize the 
perceived Muslim struggle and call to jihad by framing it as a modern era “struggle.” 
This viewpoint makes the issues relevant to today’s generation and moves it away from a 
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historical 600 CE era religious centric issue to a social “awakening” more similar to the 
1960s civil rights movement. This messaging may appeal to a much broader Muslim and 
non-Muslim audience who may not otherwise subscribe to a more direct Salafist Islamic 
ideology.210 As an example of this messaging, Figure 2 represents a screenshot from the 
video visually incorporating the words from Malcolm X with the visual image of a young 
Muslim. The image portrayed by al-Qaeda offers a Muslim youth with a sling shot that 
presents the viewer with an image of a non-militant, rather unimposing youth protestor, 
not the image of a more proverbial Mujahideen fighter or Islamic terrorist.  
You have to find out what does this man speak. And once you 
know his language, learn how to speak his language and he will 
get the point.” —Malcolm X211 
Figure 2.  Visual Incorporation of Malcolm X’s Words and a Young Muslim212 
Al-Qaeda’s comparison of jihad to historically familiar uses of violence in the 
United States, as a means of response to perceived grievances, attempts to justify and 
normalize VE as a common, familiar, and socially accepted tactic. This strategy can be 
viewed as al-Qaeda’s attempt to counter the ongoing narrative by the U.S. government 
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that VE is something new—a new form of terrorism—not before seen by Americans on 
U.S. soil.  
The video does not reveal the fact that Malcolm X was allowed to share his 
radical views within the United States under the benefit and protection of the U.S. 
Constitution or that Malcolm X was a Muslim himself who was assassinated by members 
of the Nation of Islam. The U.S. response should be to continue to counter the al-Qaeda 
narrative aggressively through not only words, but actions as well. However, offering a 
counter narrative in areas such as the Malcolm X issue, particularly as it relates to his 
Muslim faith or the events surrounding his assassination, can be extremely sensitive 
areas for the U.S. government to operate in. Muslim-American religious leaders 
can best deliver this counter narrative. 
This operational focus still accomplishes the terrorist organization’s agenda of 
instilling fear in U.S. citizens by exploiting the U.S. government’s inability to detect, 
deter, and prevent 100 percent of these localized attacks from occurring. The 2009 Major 
Nidal Hassan Fort Hood shootings and the 2013 Tsarnaev brothers Boston bombings are 
two examples of successful implementation of this strategy.213 The U.S. government 
began to recognize that unless this strategy is effectively defeated at the grass roots 
ideological level, it is likely to continue as the preferred method of attack well into the 
future. A strategy that recognizes indicators of violence prior to an event are crucial but 
also the most difficult to implement; particularly in communities that may already 
possess an inherent mistrust of government. 
The Internet has proven to be a useful environment for radicalizing and recruiting 
others to violence. Preventing this situation from occurring is a critical component to 
preventing U.S. “homegrown” terrorism.214 An effective response requires a paradigm 
shift from this country’s traditional military efforts in a global theater to a more localized 
community response strategy. In his remarks at the National Defense University on May 
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23, 2013, President Obama acknowledged that after a decade of war using traditional 
tactics to fight large terror networks, the United States must acknowledge this new threat 
and recognize that U.S. tactics must change from a military response to a more localized 
response.215 
B. CURRENT U.S. STRATEGY FOR COUNTERING VIOLENT 
EXTREMISM—BACKGROUND AND OVERVIEW  
1. Development of the 2010 Countering Violent Extremism Working 
Group  
From 2001 to 2009, U.S. authorities generally felt that American Muslims were 
not as susceptible to radicalization as their European counterparts. However, since that 
time, incidents on U.S. soil began to challenge that long-held assumption.216 Although 
radicalization can be a highly individualized process, through observing both Muslim and 
non-Muslim majority countries engage in various counter-radicalization efforts, it 
became evident that the radicalization process is preventable.217 Today, it is widely 
understood that radicalization can lead to violence, and further, that this progression 
towards violent radicalization can actually be prevented and even reversed.218 
Since the United States was not immune from radicalization, and programs in 
other countries, particularly those in non-Muslim majority Western value-based 
countries, were having an effect then, the United States determined an appropriate 
strategy that would fit within the framework of U.S. values was necessary. 
In 2010, DHS Secretary Janet Napolitano tasked the Homeland Security Advisory 
Council to work with state and local law enforcement and community group 
representatives to present recommendations for a community-based CVE initiative 
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premised on the community oriented law enforcement approach.219 Six local law 
enforcement officials participated on the 26-person CVE Working Group, and while 
representatives were present from federal agencies, there was no representation from the 
FBI—the agency tasked by law with the responsibility to investigate terrorism in the 
United States.220 This focus towards local law enforcement influence on a national 
strategy is an example of the federal government’s recognition that the local agencies 
know their communities best and have a history of successful community-based 
engagement strategies. According to CVE Working Group member Los Angeles Police 
Department (LAPD) Deputy Chief Michael Downing “The White House got it—that this 
type of work is best left with state and locals—no one knows the landscape better.”221 In 
addition to being well positioned to interact with communities, by addressing individual 
and community issues, local agencies are able to mitigate causal factors that may 
contribute to VE.222 
The committee focused on three core areas for its CVE programming: 1) best 
practices—a focus on existing best community-based practices to reduce and prevent 
violent crime, 2) information sharing—relative to the information and intelligence 
exchange between DHS and state and local authorities to address ideologically motivated 
violent crime effectively, and 3) training and other support—to determine ongoing 
training needs, technical assistance, and funding to support CVE programs.223 The 
committee delivered its final work product to the DHS Secretary in spring 2010, which 
included multiple findings and recommendations within each of these categories.  
As a foundation for analysis of the resultant strategies implemented by the federal 
government in 2011, it is important to view and understand these committee findings and 
                                                 
219 Homeland Security Advisory Council, Countering Violent Extremism Working Group (CVE) 
(Washington, DC: Homeland Security Advisory Council, Spring 2010), 2. 
220 Ibid., 27–29. Observation based on author’s review of the CVE Working Group members list. 
221 Downing, email message to author. 
222 Dina Temple-Raston, “White House Unveils Counter-Extremism Plan,” NPR, August 3, 2011, 
http://www.npr.org/2011/08/04/138955790/white-house-unveils-counter-extremism-plan. 
223 Homeland Security Advisory Council, Countering Violent Extremism Working Group (CVE), 3. 
 69
recommendations to confirm their inclusion or exclusion into the final CVE strategies 
and to evaluate the efficacy of those decisions. 
 CVE committee findings include the following. 
 Community-oriented policing works in preventing violent crime 
 Emphasis should be on building safe, secure, resilient, and crime 
resistant communities 
 All violent crime is local crime 
 Tension can occur between those involved in law enforcement 
investigations and those collaborating to establish local 
partnerships to stop violent crime224  
 CVE committee recommendations include the following. 
 Develop and use common terminology 
 Expand Civil Rights Civil Liberties (CRCL) engagement efforts 
separate from support of community-oriented policing 
 Incorporate information-driven, community-based violent crime 
reduction into local preparedness efforts  
 Support efforts to establish local dispute resolution capabilities 
 Through policy, the DHS should utilize the philosophies based on 
communication, trust, and mutual respect to develop relationships 
with local law enforcement 
 Generate threat-related information products  
 Establish communication platform to share threat-related 
information directly with faith-based or other communities 
 Increase public awareness regarding terrorism and other homeland 
security related trends so that they can be demystified and 
incorporated into local violent crime reduction efforts 
 Develop case studies 
 Continue efforts to ensure that fusion centers have the capacity to 
receive and understand threat-related information and to share that 
knowledge with local authorities 
 Expand availability of training and technical assistance focused on 
the understanding, identification, and mitigation of threats through 
community-oriented policing 
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 Improve quality of training 
 Expand availability of training for state, local and tribal law 
enforcement and DHS components.225 
This focus on the existing local government/local community partnerships for 
programmatic strategies to counter VE is well placed and follows the same general 
premise recognized in many other Western valued countries that have also pursued 
similar strategies. The initiative takes advantage of—and builds upon—the existing 
community oriented policing model rather than developing an entirely new federally 
based program. Integrating CVE elements within the framework of existing community 
programs allows for the participants to approach a new concept while using a familiar 
well-established platform; thereby, mitigating any perceived threat by community 
members, and at the same time, reducing the learning curve for delivery of such programs 
by local governments. 
This approach wisely recognizes that within the United States—and even the 
broader base of Western-valued countries—no single Muslim organization typically 
claims the majority voice for all Muslims.226 Implementing a flexible localized program 
allows local partnerships to serve the needs of localized Muslim communities within that 
jurisdiction without trying to force a singular “one size fits all” CVE strategy into all 
communities across the United States. 
2. Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the 
United States—An Overview 
The Federal Government will often be ill-suited to intervene in the niches 
of society where radicalization to violence takes place, but it can foster 
partnerships to support communities through its connections to local 
government, law enforcement, Mayor’s offices, the private sector, local 
service providers, academia, and many others who can help prevent 
violent extremism.227 
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In August 2011, the White House released the first of two documents specifically 
intended to communicate the government’s approach towards countering VE on U.S. soil 
through the prevention of self-radicalization. The delivery of this eight-page document, 
entitled Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States 
(hereafter referred to as Empowering Local Partners…), represented the first such CVE 
document for the Obama Administration and further advanced the philosophical shift 
towards the inclusion of soft power strategies in the “war on terror.” The Empowering 
Local Partners… document recognizes that groups such as al-Qaeda are actively 
“seeking to recruit or inspire” Americans to execute attacks in the United States. The 
Empowering Local Partners… communicates the U.S. intent to address all forms of 
extremism that lead to violence but names al-Qaeda specifically, and refers to its “hateful 
ideology.”228 As a result, the Empowering Local Partners… calls upon communities—
particularly the Muslim communities—to enjoin in the effort to counter the al-Qaeda 
narrative and deter self-radicalization. 
The Empowering Local Partners… document outlines its approach into four 
distinct objectives. The first objective, entitled “the challenge,” highlights several 
intuitive observations with CVE. These include: 1) The recognition that, as a pluralistic 
nation, the United States must embrace all cultures, religions, and ethnicities, 2) actions 
required to counter VE effectively must respect and balance the rights of individuals 
protected by the U.S. Constitution to express their views freely and further their 
ideologies, including those considered hateful or unpopular. However, the document 
draws the distinction—a very clear demarcation—between this constitutionally protected 
activity and the use of violence, the latter either through direct use or the encouragement 
of its use as a means to further an individual’s ideology, 3) CVE is best achieved not by 
government intervention but by engaging and empowering assets at the local community 
level to build resilience against VE, and 4) real or perceived discrimination toward 
Muslim Americans related to CVE efforts can create the perception that America is anti-
                                                 
228 Office of the President of the United States, Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent 
Extremism in the United States, ii. 
 72
Muslim or anti-Islam; thereby, increasing any existing sense of alienation or 
discrimination that furthers the terrorist narrative.229  
The second objective, “a community-based approach,” expounds on the theme 
that communities are best positioned to recognize signs of radicalization and effectively 
intervene. This section of Empowering Local Partners… introduces the notion that rather 
than develop new programs and funding institutions, leveraging existing community-
based problem solving programs, such as community oriented policing—a prominent 
theme observed throughout the analysis—provides an experienced programmatic base to 
address VE as part of the broader community safety focus.230  
The third objective, “goal and areas of priority action,” recognizes that efforts 
must be taken to prevent violent extremists from inspiring, recruiting, or financing 
persons to engage in acts of violence. It proposes to accomplish this objective by 
providing federal level government support to local partners in three general categories. 
The first category within this section, entitled “enhancing federal engagement with and 
support to local communities that may be targeted by violent extremists,” critically 
emphasizes that any community-based effort towards CVE by government must ensure it 
is not conducted at the exclusion of other community concerns and that these community-
based relationships are not built upon national security concerns alone.231 This category 
is an important acknowledgement and an essential element for analysis now that the 
Empowering Local Partners… document has been in existence for three years. 
The second category, “building government and law enforcement expertise for 
preventing violent extremism,” focuses on education and information sharing. It 
recognizes the importance of incorporating best practices through the exchange of shared 
experiences with America’s foreign partners, which lends itself well to understanding that 
while not all lessons and methodologies are directly applicable, common elemental 
characteristics are found in all similarly positioned challenges. This theme continues with 
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the assurance that the federal government is, with regard to better understanding 
radicalization and counter radicalization methodologies, “…building a robust training 
program with rigorous curriculum standards…based on intelligence, research, and 
accurate information…”232 This theme represents the awareness that misinformed 
stakeholders can—particularly as it relates to cultural proficiencies and culturally 
oriented-community engagement efforts—do more harm than good by creating tension 
and further eroding trust. 
The third and final category under the “goal and areas of priority action” objective 
is entitled “the countering violent extremist propaganda while promoting our ideals.” 
This category focuses on challenging violent extremist propaganda—particularly that 
which is delivered online—to include its anti-Western ideologies and promotion of 
violent radicalization as a justifiable and legitimate course of action. As part of the CVE 
efforts, it affirms the United States will aggressively counter this fomenting rhetoric by 
promoting American ideals of inclusiveness and unification.233 A final note of caution is 
offered in the form of a reminder that “[O]ur words and deeds can either fuel or counter 
violent ideologies abroad, so too can they here at home.”234 This area in particular is one 
that continues to be exploited by al-Qaeda and other supporters of jihad through the use 
of online communication. The fourth objective, “guiding principles,” outlines the 
foundational elements of this country—civil liberties and civil rights—and commits to 
supporting these ideals through the expression of seven supporting but broadly worded 
statements.235  
Overall, the Empowering Local Partners… document broadly communicates the 
federal government’s recognition that it is community outreach- and community-based 
partnerships—through already locally established relationships—that will be most 
effective in countering VE in the United States. Further, the document affirms that 
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established and proven programs, such as community-based policing—also known as 
community-oriented policing—are well positioned as a delivery model for CVE 
programs. Some scholars, policy analysts, and pundits debated whether this eight-page 
document, which does not call it itself a strategy, was, in fact, a strategy for CVE in the 
United States. LAPD Deputy Chief Michal Downing, a member of the original Homeland 
Security Advisory Council (HSAC) CVE Working Group, best described the document 
as a “policy statement”—not a strategy—by the federal government to acknowledge that 
state and local governments are the right vehicle to deliver CVE and that this policy 
statement also communicates that CVE in the local context is best exemplified as a 
“verb,” and in the federal context is best exemplified as a “noun.”236 This statement best 
captures the intent of the Empowering Local Partners… strategy as a representation of 
the role the federal government should play in CVE in the United States.  
3. The Strategic Implementation Plan for Empowering Local Partners to 
Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States 
In December 2011—four months after the Empowering Local Partners… 
document was published, the White House followed up with the more comprehensive 
strategy and partner document, aptly entitled the Strategic Implementation Plan for 
Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States (hereafter 
referred to as SIP). The SIP recombines the four areas identified in the Empowering 
Local Partners… document and focuses on three core areas: 1) enhancing community 
engagement, 2) building government and law enforcement expertise, and 3) countering 
violent extremist propaganda.237 Although the SIP indicates it is intended as a framework 
to apply to all forms of VE, it points out that its priority focus is on VE inspired by al-
Qaeda as the most significant violent extremist threat to this country at present.238 The 
SIP is recognizable as a strategy and outlines what it calls core objectives and sub-
objectives. Further, the SIP outlines the alignment of activities between agencies and 
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assigns federal agency leads and partners for a number of activities outlined within the 
document. Some, not all, of these objectives and activities are recognizable outgrowths 
from the recommendations proposed by the 2010 CVE Working Group. The following 
activities are identified throughout the SIP. 
 Whole-of-government coordination 
 Leveraging existing public safety, violence prevention, and resilience 
programming 
 Coordination of domestic and international efforts 
 Addressing technology and virtual space 
 Enhancing federal engagement with and support to local communities that 
may be targeted by violent extremists 
 Building government and law enforcement expertise for preventing violent 
extremism 
 Countering violent extremist propaganda while promoting our ideals 
Throughout the SIP, the responsibility for these activities are divided among the federal 
government “…departments, agencies, and components focused on law enforcement and 
national security and those whose efforts support, but do not directly lie within, these 
areas.”239 
The SIP, by name and content, is a CVE strategy—albeit a broad-brush strategy—
that identifies objectives and assigns responsibilities. The SIP recognizes the unique 
challenge of the CVE operating environment, its affected communities, the nexus to 
religious ideology, and its potential for improper encroachment on civil rights and civil 
liberties. It is necessary to tread cautiously in this area, and the SIP recognizes that 
getting it wrong can potentially do more harm than good.240  
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C. AN EXAMINATION OF THE CURRENT U.S. CVE STRATEGY  
1. The Evolution towards a CVE Strategy in the United States 
Beginning in 2006, five years before the Empowering Local Partners… and SIP 
strategies were introduced (collectively referred to in this chapter as a singular U.S. CVE 
strategy), some government officials, terrorism pundits, and terrorism scholars began to 
opine that conventional military tactics would not be the determining factor in the war on 
terror. No doubt existed that the U.S. military and its tactics were far superior to the 
military force presented by al-Qaeda and other terrorist organizations. However, the 
battle of ideology—the narrative—was not such a lopsided matchup and some posited 
that this battle was being won by the terrorist organizations. In many ways, today’s U.S. 
CVE strategy is an outgrowth of the U.S.’s own slowly transforming ideological 
progression from a methodological, reactive war fighting strategy to today’s holistic, 
community-minded proactive strategy. As the United States became more aware and 
more educated, it recognized the battlefront must include resources to combat conflicting 
ideologies and the causal factors of self-radicalization. As a result, its strategies 
contemporaneously reflected this paradigm shift.  
Even though the United States still very much espoused a GWOT mindset at the 
time, the first evidence of this awareness of ideology as a concept is presented in the 
2006 NSCT, which is considered the overarching CT strategy that other strategies 
support. The word “ideology” is used 19 times throughout the 23-page document and is 
often preceded by the word “radical” or “murderous” in its use, which is reflective of the 
military attack attitude still held by practitioners of the GWOT philosophy during that 
time. The expression of ideology in the 2006 NSCT centers on defeating ideology by 
replacing it with democracy and freedom, and not by preventing or countering the 
ideology itself. This concept is emphasized numerous times throughout the document and 
reflected in statements, such as “The long-term solution for winning the War on Terror is 
the advancement of freedom and human dignity through effective democracy” and “In 
effective democracies, freedom is indivisible. They are the long-term antidote to the 
 77
ideology of terrorism today. This is the battle of ideas.”241 The United States was in 
essence stating that to defeat terrorism, it was going to offer something more tangible and 
personally valuable, democracy and freedom. Dangerously, this narrative presumes that 
people will clearly pick democracy and freedom over an ideology founded in religion. 
The concepts of prevention and countering through alternative narrative and 
programmatic strategy, appears yet to be developed. While recognition of ideology as a 
factor in the GWOT itself is evident, the U.S. government took an overly simplistic view 
of the motivations that lead to terrorism—particularly the ideological motivations.242 
Nonetheless, the recognition of ideology as a factor in what later would be commonly 
termed radicalization and VE was a necessary initial step in the evolution of countering 
violent terrorism strategies in use today. This strategy soon found itself in congruence 
with other strategies as the discourse on CVE progressed. 
The federal government listened to the pundits, analyzed the research, and 
recognized that the United States needed a domestic focused soft power strategy that was 
proactive and preventative rather than reactive and offensive in nature. Additionally, this 
strategy needed to focus on prevention-oriented actions that could fit within an existing 
program framework and leverage existing local partnerships. It took an additional five 
years—from 2006 until 2011—for a CVE specific strategy to be implemented in the 
United States, and an additional three years later, it still remains in its original version. 
The fortuitous result of this delay is that it has allowed the United States to observe 
similarly positioned countries—the United Kingdom in particular—adjust and amend 
their CVE strategies as a result of significant push back and criticism of applications of 
original versions of their strategy. The negative aspect of this delay by the United States 
is that CVE is not a “one size fits all countries” strategy, and countries have created 
counter-radicalization programs that significantly differ in their scope and objectives. The 
United States has its own unique challenges that also differ significantly from its Western 
democratic-valued neighbors. One brief example is the over 18,000 federal, state, local, 
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and tribal law enforcement agencies ranging in size from the 35,000 members (New York 
Police Department) to one officer agencies. This nation’s own unique challenges have not 
been adequately addressed. The United States could, and should, be further down the 
CVE road. 
2. Examination of the U.S. CVE Strategy—Background  
In 2010, the year before the U.S. CVE strategy was introduced, three million 
Muslims were living in the United States, and less than 100 individuals—or .3%—had 
committed themselves to violence in support of jihad.243 While the broader American 
non-Muslim population struggles with an ongoing heightened sensitivity to terrorism—as 
discussed in the previous sections—it is important to recognize that the American 
Muslim population must not only grapple with the same fears, they must also deal with 
the stereotype that Muslims on the whole are engaged in, or associated with, terrorism. 
Islamophobia creates significant challenges among the Muslim communities and 
governments must address the bigotry. These factors suggest that the American Muslim 
population overwhelmingly rejects the violent ideology associated with jihad. 
Understanding that this rebuke of violence alone will not stop VE, under the right 
parameters, these communities would welcome partnerships with the government to 
implement intervention and counter-narrative programmatic strategies, which is an 
essential component to CVE. The government must recognize that no CVE program can 
be successful without the assistance of the Muslim community.244 
While the 2011 U.S. CVE strategy admittedly focuses on countering the al-Qaeda 
narrative, it appropriately recognizes the application for countering all forms of VE, and 
that fundamentally, the path an individual takes towards radicalization is similar 
regardless of the underlying theme. The thoughtful and deliberative process utilized 
through the initial establishment of a CVE Working Group demonstrates the cognizance 
of the role of local governments and local relationships in the delivery of CVE programs. 
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Upon its delivery, the U.S. CVE strategy received high marks from the MPAC for its 
focus on community-based solutions to counter VE.245 Above all, the delivery of such a 
strategy in 2011 demonstrated the initiative and leadership by the federal government to 
take the necessary first steps to focus the discussion and begin the process of developing 
a CVE strategy.246 The 2011 Empowering Local Partners… and SIP are a good start for 
the United States towards countering this emerging threat. The strategy development 
process and the resulting strategy, both represent the government’s more sophisticated 
understanding of terrorism and the notion that radicalization is comprised of a multitude 
of causal factors. This includes the recognition of communal environmental factors as 
elements of the broader sociological construct, as well as more individualized 
psychological factors.  
The government has demonstrated through this collective engagement process 
that it has come to understand that countering radicalization is much more complex than 
providing an oversimplified alternate choice in the form of democracy and freedom. This 
paradigm shift is most evident when looking back and attempting to identify the point in 
time at which the United States first began to brand 9/11 as an attack on its freedom; 
thereby, opining that offering freedom and democracy—whether in the United States, or 
establishing it through force in other countries—will satisfactorily address the conflict. 
This viewpoint can be traced back to the days immediately following the 9/11 attacks 
when on September 20, 2001, President Bush addressed Congress, and in response to, 
“why do they hate us” President Bush replied, “They hate our freedoms.”247 It then 
follows that if the oversimplified belief is that the 9/11 attacks were about hating U.S. 
freedoms, to offer what the United States believes “they” are “jealous” of—in the form of 
freedom and democracy—to those would be jihadists, would mean they would choose 
freedom and democracy over a religious ideology that leads them to choose violence. The 
failure with that perception, as evidenced over the last 10 years, is that the provision of 
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freedom and democracy specifically may have very little to do with a person’s choice to 
join jihad. Rather, it is the religious interpretation by some of how freedom and 
democracy are in conflict with their ideology, and can lead people away from an ideal 
Islamic society, that causes the conflict.248 Democracy and freedom are not the envy; 
they are the enemy. In the United States, in which freedom and democracy already exist 
as pillars of this pluralistic society, VE is likely more closely aligned with social and 
psychological factors. These factors, which support the concept of localized community-
oriented CT programs, include socioeconomic factors, integration and socialization 
factors, feelings of belongingness, and religious guidance. Therefore, VE and CVE are 
considerably localized issues. 
3. Examination of the U.S. CVE Strategy—Effectiveness and 
Application 
Three years of performance has now allowed ample time for an evaluation and 
reassessment of this U.S. CVE strategy. The rapid evolution of change, along with 
resulting swift adaptation to this rapid change as it relates to terrorist methodologies and 
tactics, necessitates a frequent review and update of the U.S. CVE strategy. This update 
to the U.S. CVE strategy—arguably the tool that has the most potential to be effective 
against VE—has yet to occur. This malady is conflated due to the observation by some 
experts that neither the 2011 NSCT nor previous similar published CT strategies provide 
clear guidance to federal, state, and local agencies to plan, prepare, or implement 
effective CT strategies.249 
The 2011 U.S. CVE strategy is a commendable first step. The nascent philosophy 
surrounding the strategy is representative of the well-qualified and diverse members on 
the 2010 CVE Working Group. Like any strategy or operation, the application of CVE is 
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always evolving, and now is the time to refine and refocus not only the philosophy, but 
also the approach to CVE as well.250 
a. The Strategy Framework 
The strategy states, “The SIP provides a blueprint for how we will build 
community resilience against violent extremism.”251 However, in actuality, the strategy 
provides little federal guidance to community groups on how to engage or intervene with 
people who may be susceptible in radicalization.252 This blueprint per se, is nonexistent. 
The U.S. federalist system of governance should not preclude the federal government 
from providing more direct oversight and program support, particularly, if federal 
funding is provided. Providing a model policy framework that agencies can adopt still 
allows local agencies to build and deliver a malleable community tailored CVE program 
within this broader federal framework. While customizable, some overarching standard 
must be available to ensure a nominal level of consistency exists throughout the country 
regardless of community size. Further, it is possible that smaller less recognizable 
agencies are engaging in CVE activities under the auspice of community-oriented 
policing, or simply localized policing efforts, and are unaware that they may benefit from 
federal support for CVE specific programming. This situation supports the widely held 
notion that the application of CVE programming, through the leveraging of local 
networks and relationships, is best placed at the state and local levels, and guidance, 
resources, and coordination—in the form of funding, support, training, tools and 
structure—are best provided at the federal level.253 
b. The Relationship between Countering Violent Extremism and the 
Muslim Community 
The strategy noticeably focuses on engagement with Muslim communities and 
while this strategy is logical, the United States must be careful not to portray the strategy 
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as a Muslim CVE strategy, which can result in a number of unintended consequences. 
One such consequence is the potential for perception by non-Muslim Americans that only 
Muslims can be terrorists or that only Muslims are susceptible to self-radicalization. If 
the focus is heavily oriented to a particular group in practice, regardless of what the 
language in the strategy indicates, that group can become labeled and stereotyped as 
either not deserving of funding or assistance, or conversely, as being the only group 
eligible for funding and assistance. This perception of exclusivity on either end of the 
spectrum can negatively impact CVE efforts. The United States must acknowledge that 
this anti-Muslim bias is very real. While addressing the members of the Committee on 
Homeland Security in June 2012, Mr. Faiza Patel, Co-Director at the Brennen Center  
for Justice, noted his analysis of 2009 and 2010 FBI hate crime statistics revealed a 
nearly 50 percent increase in anti-Islamic hate crimes in the United States over the one-
year period.254  
An additional caution with this existing approach is that countering a religious 
narrative requires the government to weigh in on religion, or at least, provide some level 
of support to communities to engage in religious centered activities, both of which can 
have First Amendment implications. In essence, to counter a religious-based narrative 
requires countering the theology behind the message and then offering an alternative 
narrative or interpretation of a religion, a slippery slope for government. Juan Zarate, 
former Deputy National Security Advisor for Combating Terrorism, and a CVE advocate 
in the Bush administration, acknowledged this very concern.255 In addition, the UK and 
Australian comparative case studies also demonstrated similar concerns with providing 
government funding to religious organizations, which had to be addressed in updated 
CVE strategy documents.256 The United States has yet to address this issue. 
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c. The Role of Federal Law Enforcements Agencies in Countering Violent 
Extremism—Counterterrorism vs. Counter Radicalization 
The strategy identifies the DHS, DOJ, and the FBI as national security or law 
enforcement agencies and directs them to “…execute many of the programs and activities 
outlined in the strategy” and to also “…support the CVE effort while insuring we do not 
change the core missions and functions of these departments and agencies.”257 This 
directive places local law enforcement and its community-based approach in conflict with 
its federal partners. The FBI mission, for example, is heavily intelligence collection 
oriented and appropriately designed to counter terrorism, which requires a heavy 
investment in all forms of intelligence gathering, including signals intelligence (SIGINT) 
and human intelligence (HUMINT). However, intelligence gathering and community-
oriented policing are two distinct functions and blending of the two can erode the trust 
necessary to engage in effective CVE efforts. In the United Kingdom, tension and a 
perception of mission conflict between the Prevent and Pursue strands of the national CT 
strategy known as CONTEST was noted in a 2011 study conducted to assess the 
effectiveness of Prevent.258 This very issue was also noted within the information-sharing 
recommendations of the 2010 CVE Working Group report calling it a “…inherent tension 
between federal law enforcement investigations and local partnerships to stop violent 
crime.”259  
The strategy conflates CT and counter-radicalization responsibilities, which also 
contributes to role and mission confusion in CVE efforts. This confusion can threaten the 
relationship between law enforcement and the community, particularly if the community 
believes the attempt to establish the relationship is predicated on intelligence gathering; 
in essence, securitizing the relationship. The resulting approach can alienate the local 
Muslim community, and further their fear and distrust of the U.S. government. If this 
alienation occurs, it may actually foster the self-radicalization process rather than deter it.  
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Counterterrorism efforts fit well within the mission of the FBI, and as noted 
previously, rely on a heavy investment in intelligence gathering. Counter-radicalization 
fits well within CVE programming, and as also noted above, relies on localized 
community engagement and relationship efforts. The U.S. strategy needs to more clearly 
distinguish CVE from counterterrorism and recognize CVE as a community-based 
program distinctly positioned within the counter-radicalization realm in support of the 
broader mission of CT. Counter-radicalization should not involve continuous intelligence 
gathering or primary law enforcement engagement.260 Understanding this concept, the 
role of the community police officer should be to focus on counter-radicalization and not 
CT, by recognizing that an individual is the bridge between the two. Figure 3, a diagram 
offered by the Bipartisan Policy Center, visually represents this relationship.261  
 
Figure 3.  Bipartisan Policy Center Counterterrorism-Community Policing-
Counter-Radicalization Relationship Model262 
To represent this concept better, a more detailed diagram of Figure 3 would 
illustrate federal law enforcement agencies within the CT bubble and CVE programs 
within the counter-radicalization bubble. Other non-law enforcement federal agencies that 
provide guidance, resources, and coordination in support of CVE programs most 
                                                 




certainly should be located within the counter-radicalization bubble. Upon analysis of the 
recommendations presented by the 2010 CVE Working Group, and in personal 
conversations with two members of the working group (Downing and Elibiary), it is 
apparent the CVE Working Group also supported the notion that local law enforcement is 
best positioned to engage in these efforts and not federal law enforcement.263  
d. Intelligence Gathering vs. Community Policing 
The divergence between intelligence gathering and community policing is not 
only confined to the law enforcement community. It has very real implications to the 
required trust component within these community partnerships. In 2009, The Markle 
Foundation’s Task Force on National Security in the Information Age claimed, “An 
information sharing framework will succeed only if the American people are confident 
that it will respect their privacy and protect against inappropriate disclosure.”264  
The desired objective of such a strategy is to increase the effectiveness of CT 
operations through the consistent application of guidelines and common frameworks, 
while always respecting privacy and individual rights. Any new options must clarify local 
law enforcement’s role of engaging in community partnerships—particularly with local 
Muslim communities—and identifying gaps in information sharing among local, state, 
and federal agencies.265 Further, when such an initiatives takes on a national or even 
international focus, a central authority should coordinate them.266 This central authority 
in the United States is the federal level and is the best place to deliver a clearly articulated 
framework that outlines how intelligence operations at all levels should function in 
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furtherance of countering terrorism and countering radicalization.267 Implementing a 
strategy that first unequivocally outlines this bifurcation between intelligence gathering 
and community policing, and then directs how this objective is going to occur, is a 
critical pillar for an effective nationally recognized CVE program. Without it, the success 
of any CVE program is doubtful. 
e. The Role of U.S. Attorneys in Countering Violent Extremism 
The strategy identifies U.S. attorneys as community-based CVE leads, and states 
they are well positioned through their historical engagement with communities, to make 
determinations at the local level with regard to which communities should be selected for 
engagement in CVE programs.268 The strategy recognizes U.S. attorneys as the senior 
law enforcement executives in their region and calls on them to: 1) discuss issues,  
such as civil rights, as they relate to CT efforts, 2) raise awareness of the threat of VE, 
and 3) to facilitate partnerships to prevent radicalization to violence.269  
This view—that U.S. attorneys are well positioned to lead community CVE 
efforts—is in direct contrast with the idea that locally placed assets are best positioned to 
work with their communities on CVE efforts. It is questionable that a presidentially 
appointed chief litigator—arguably the same person who will investigate and prosecute 
those responsible for acts of terrorism—is well positioned to facilitate and maintain 
effective and ongoing CVE program partnerships.270 This decision does not appear to be 
an outgrowth of the CVE Working Group, as no such recommendation was presented in 
its final report.271 
It is unclear if the determination to use U.S. attorneys is based on the Australian 
CVE model. If so, the United States must be reminded that a singular Attorney-General’s 
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Department (AGD) in Australia is responsible for focusing on countering extremism 
through efforts aimed primarily at social cohesion. While the Australian AGD continues 
to focus on community integration, it now places a newly formed emphasis on 
resiliency.272 Additionally, a CVE Taskforce—referred to as the CVE Unit—was created 
and placed within the Australian AGD and the Australian CVE strategy, entitled A 
National Approach to Countering Violent Extremism in Australia: the CVE Strategic 
Plan, was developed in this department.273  
f. The Responsibility for Countering Violent Extremism at the Federal 
Level 
A major critique of the U.S. CVE strategy is that it does not clearly identify who 
is responsible for oversight of CVE programming at the federal level. While the strategy 
lists a multitude of activities and efforts, and even directs federal agencies towards these 
activities and efforts, it is silent on which single federal agency is responsible for 
managing the CVE programming.274 This lack of detail creates ambiguity relative to the 
delegation of responsibilities and resources.275 To divide responsibilities of any program 
among multiple agencies reduces the sense of importance of the overall program; 
thereby, watering down the desired result and the sense of accountability as a “second 
tier” program. This very result was reflected in the area of CVE related training—a 
component of the CVE strategy and a recommendation of the CVE Working Group—
after a 2010 Government Accountability Office (GAO) document reported concerns and 
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complaints resulting from non-standardized training material and inconsistently applied 
training.276  
For the reasons outlined previous, the lead federal agency responsible for CVE 
program delivery should not be a federal law enforcement agency but rather an agency 
whose mission more closely aligns with program facilitation, guidance, and support. This 
approach recognizes the importance of CT efforts, its methods and tactics, allows for  
the separation of CT and counter-radicalization, and thereby, eliminates the securitization 
of the community relationship. This effort by federal law enforcement agencies  
to develop and maintain ongoing formalized partnerships at this highly localized  
level within Muslim communities is not seen in other community-oriented programs—
nor does federal law enforcement seem interested in doing so. CVE should not be the  
exception. While the design of such a program is with the best intentions, it may bring 
into question the motives and efforts related to this singular issue. A CVE program must 
avoid the perception that securitization and perfunctory intelligence gathering are the real 
objectives.  
g. Training 
The 2010 CVE Working Group cautioned, “[B]ad training not only is 
ineffective—but can serve to escalate tensions between law enforcement and the 
community.”277 Unfortunately, the resulting 2011 strategy did not incorporate this 
caution. A comprehensive 2012 GAO report focused on CVE training and found that 
some community members and advocacy organizations raised concerns about the quality 
of CVE training delivered by DHS, FBI, and DOJ.278 The report indicated that instances 
of federally sponsored or federally funded CVE and CT training that used offensive and 
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inaccurate information demonstrated the need to develop standards for CVE-related 
training.279  
A second concern with training is the funding and programming associated for 
specific CVE training. The access and understanding of what constitutes CVE-related 
training was unclear to many grant participants who may have otherwise sought out funds 
to provide related training in their communities.280 An added concern is that those 
agencies that chose to obtain funding may have pursued training that did not meet the 
intended CVE curriculum and grant criteria. The training issue is another example of the 
consequences resulting from a lack of clarity in roles and responsibilities.  
D. CONCLUSION 
The 2011 Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United 
States and the follow-on Strategic Implementation Strategy Plan for Empowering Local 
Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States are excellent first steps into 
the next phase of countering VE. The federal government is to be commended for its 
recognition of this emerging threat and then facilitating a thoughtful and deliberative 
process to develop the U.S. CVE strategy. It demonstrates the wisdom of inclusion of soft 
power strategies as another tool in the campaign against terrorism, and the necessity of 
localized community engagement in this effort.  
The 2011 U.S. CVE strategic plan states, “The Federal Government can foster 
nuanced and locally rooted counter radicalization programs and initiatives by serving as a 
facilitator, convener, and source of information to support local networks and 
partnerships at the grassroots level.”281 These objectives are the areas in which the 
federal government is best positioned to affect CVE efforts positively. It is an excellent 
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statement, and should serve as the federal government’s CVE mission statement to ensure 
CVE deliverables meet one of these mission objectives.  
Like any first iteration of a policy, plan, or strategy, an evaluative process of its 
strengths, weaknesses, identified gaps, and current relevance in an ever-changing 
environment, is essential to the longevity and effectiveness of such an important strategic 
plan. Failure to do so encourages the antithesis of these desired outcomes. This chapter 
has attempted to engage in that evaluative process, and as a result, has revealed several 
concerns with not only the content of the strategy but with the overall ineffectual 
implementation of the strategy at the federal level. 
To build upon this critique in a constructive manner that can offer 
recommendations for an improved U.S. CVE strategy, a review of CVE strategies in the 
similarly positioned countries of the United Kingdom and Australia is a necessary next 
step. Once completed, the applicable positive attributes from these case study analyses 
can be synthesized with the U.S. strategy to provide final recommendations for an 
updated U.S. CVE Strategy—a CVE 2.0 if you will—to counter VE in the United States. 
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V. THE UNITED KINGDOM 
This chapter examines the UK’s efforts in CT, including a historical view of the 
UK’s transition from a hard power to a soft power philosophy relative to domestic CT 
strategies in particular. This analysis provides a broad overview of the United Kingdom, 
its ethos, national and local governance structure, and the progression of its well-
documented use of doctrine and strategy as effective communication components used to 
guide its national efforts. The chapter concludes with an examination of the UK’s 
implementation of established programmatic strategies CONTEST-Prevent and Channel, 
which offer guidance and support to local community-based organizations to recognize 
and prevent—through specific intervention strategies—self-radicalization and VE. This 
focus identifies the relevant organizational similarities and differences—the causes, 
effects and variables—that impact programs designed to counter VE.  
The goal of the chapter is to develop a better understanding of the UK’s approach, 
both philosophically and practically, to countering terrorism overall and self-
radicalization and VE in particular. This evaluative process later contributes to this thesis 
by offering potential applicable attributes for consideration by the United States as it 
considers its updates and improvements to its own CT strategies related to self-
radicalization and VE. 
A. OVERVIEW OF THE UNITED KINGDOM 
To provide context to the United Kingdom as a relevant case study for analysis of 
its CT philosophy and resulting strategies, a brief overview of the UK’s ethos, 
governance, and policing structure is necessary. These foundational elements, which 
along with the specific CT strategies discussed in this chapter, add to the relevance of the 
United Kingdom as a pertinent subject of study for the United States. 
The United Kingdom has a long and well-documented history of domestic 
terrorism. Given this history, it has a distinguished parallel CT effort as well. It also has a 
similarly long history of using both doctrine and strategy to communicate its philosophies 
and guide its actions effectively. As a result, the UK CT strategy known as CONTEST—
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particularly its third iteration known as CONTEST 3 and its Prevent element—along with 
partner programs, such as Channel, offer themselves as creditable examples of CT 
strategies that effectively engages with its citizenry. The result is a more transparent 
interaction with the community, which is capable of providing an effective means of 
countering extremism and the extremist narrative.282  
1. Ethos 
The United States and the United Kingdom are comparable countries that face 
similar challenges in their effort to combat domestic and international terrorism. This 
comparable aspect not only comes as a result of their common ideologies and founding 
beliefs in democracy, and the rule of law, but also, in how they are perceived by other 
nations, extremist terrorist organizations, and those predisposed to self-radicalization 
within their own borders.  
As a democratic country with an ethos similar to the United States, the United 
Kingdom provides a relevant comparison to the United States for evaluating its CT 
methodologies and its subsequent public sector interaction to fight terrorism. While 
underlying fundamental differences in governmental and operational structure exist that 
must be considered, the United Kingdom has a differing but comparable legal and 
political ideology. Additionally, the United Kingdom, along with Western Europe, has a 
significant history of combating terrorism—both religious and insurgent—and thus, 
provides a robust set of experiences, references, and responsive strategies for analysis. 
These factors offer up a unique opportunity to research the UK’s relationship with its 
public—to include corresponding legislation, doctrine, strategies, and programs—to 
determine their contribution to the UK’s success in domestic counterterrorism efforts, 
which has been literally ongoing since the early 1900s.  
2. Governance 
The United Kingdom is a constitutional monarchy in which the monarch may 
hold some limited influence but does not set public policy or install political leaders. The 
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United Kingdom is comprised of England, Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland, the 
latter three having their own form of devolved governance. The United Kingdom has a 
parliamentary form of governance, and the people do not directly elect the prime 
minister. Rather, this person is appointed by the monarch and comes from the political 
party that holds the largest number of seats in the House of Commons. However, even 
though the prime minister is not directly elected in a popular electoral format, the British 
system ensures voters know who will fulfill the various governmental roles when voting 
for a given party’s representative in their voting district.283 
The prime minister is not an independent considered an equal among peers—
primus inter pares—and, in contrast to the United States, does not represent a separate 
branch of government. The constitutional monarchy has an established Parliament made 
up of an upper house known as the House of Lords. Not without periodic controversy 
throughout history, and in contrast to the United States, these members are not popularly 
elected. Rather, they are appointed due to their heritage, peerage, or ecclesiastic 
affiliation. Although overt religious interaction with the church is typically from a 
distance, no distinct separation of church and state exists under this system. The lower 
house is known as the House of Commons, and is comprised of popularly elected 
representatives. Although the majority of bills come from the House of Commons, both 
members can introduce bills for consideration and passage. 284 
3. Policing Structure 
The United Kingdom is responsible for unifying policing services in England, 
Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland, and its law enforcement responsibilities are 
encapsulated within three general categories. Similar to U.S. state and local agencies, the 
United Kingdom has regional (also known as territorial) police forces, some of which are 
still known as constabularies. The United Kingdom has 45 such police forces (39 in 
England, one in Scotland, four in Wales, and one in Northern Ireland) each lead by a 
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chief constable.285 In addition, the United Kingdom has six other non-geographically 
arranged police agencies: British Transport Police, Central Motorway Policing Group, 
Civil Nuclear Constabulary, Ministry of Defence Police, Port of Dover Police and the 
National Crime Agency.286 These forces total approximately 153,574 officers.287  
The United Kingdom has four primary intelligence agencies consisting of the 
Secret Intelligence Service (SIS or MI6), the British Security Service (BSS or MI5), the 
Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ), and the Defense Intelligence Staff 
(DIS).288 While these agencies could be tangentially compared to the U.S. federal law 
enforcement level by virtue of their national jurisdictional scope, the UK model is 
significantly unique from the U.S. model in that these four agencies do not possess 
powers of arrest and are not directly involved in domestic law enforcement matters.289 
This significant disparity between the U.S.’s nearly 18,000 law enforcement 
agencies and over 765,000 sworn officers,290 and the UK’s 55 agencies and 153,574 
officers must be noted. It cannot be overstated that when it comes to the multi-layers of 
policing, and the presumed effects on territoriality and information and intelligence 
sharing—among public agencies, as well as the private sector—it is apparent that the 
U.S. model creates measurable encumbrances not realized by the United Kingdom. This 
is not to say the United Kingdom does not have its own challenges relative to information 
sharing and CT, which reside in other categories subject to analysis. 
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B. AN ANALYSIS OF THE UK’S COUNTERTERRORISM EFFORTS 
1. A Long History of Strategy and Doctrine  
Dating back to the 16th century British empire, the United Kingdom has a long 
history of interacting within conflict and terrorism environments. The UK’s experience 
with terrorism and its more focused CT efforts span the entire 20th century dating back to 
the early 1900s with the Irish Republican Army (IRA) and continuing on from the late 
1960s with the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA).  
In more recent times, the always-present terrorist threat in Northern Ireland and 
the newer confluence of al-Qaeda and affiliate terrorist organizations, and self-radicalized 
“lone wolf” actors has allowed—although not without significant struggle—the United 
Kingdom to be a veritable ongoing case study in national CT efforts. In 2010, Northern 
Ireland alone experienced 40 terrorist related attacks, and between 2009 and 2010, over 
600 people were arrested for terrorist related activity in the United Kingdom.291 This 
activity is substantiated by the UK’s Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre (JTAC) nearly 
continuous designation of the UK terrorism threat level as CRITICAL or SEVERE 
during much of the period from 2006 through 2010.292  
In addition to its history in counterterrorism operations, the United Kingdom has a 
nearly equal history in the use of strategy and doctrine dating back to the British counter-
insurgency doctrine in the early part of the 20th century.293 In 1998, in response to the 
recognition by the Her Majesty’s Government (HMG) that UK operations needed to have 
a clearer and long-term vision, it directed the establishment of The Development, 
Concepts and Doctrine Centre (DCDC) under the guidance of the Ministry of Defense 
(MoD).294 The DCDC is responsible for producing concepts and doctrine intended to 
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inform decision makers in “defence strategy, capability development and operations.”295 
Presently, the DCDC contains more than 30 Joint Doctrine Publications (JDPs) written 
just within the past six years.296 It recognizes the purpose of doctrine is to educate and 
inform decision makers in the development of their own strategy and operations.297 The 
United Kingdom operates with a clear understanding of the difference between doctrine 
and strategy; using doctrine as an overarching guiding ideology and strategy as an 
operational tool that initiates and guides implementation.  
A noteworthy distinction between the United States and the United Kingdom is 
that beyond its military application, the MoD contributes directly to domestic CT efforts, 
such as CONTEST through its “intelligence collection counter-terrorism capacity 
building” for law enforcement and security agencies.298 In the United States, this 
consistent level of involvement by the military in civilian law enforcement operations 
would be the exception rather than the rule.  
2. A Brief History of CONTEST  
Like the United States, the United Kingdom maintains a National Security 
Strategy that is periodically updated and published. It provides an overarching analysis of 
the UK national security environment and identifies strategies that will be implemented 
to address identified areas of concern. In response to the global threat of terrorism in the 
aftermath of 9/11, the Secretary of State for Defence directed a new chapter be added to 
the UK Strategic Defence Review.299 The United Kingdom, now concerned with the 
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threat of al-Qaeda, moved forward to update its strategy from Northern Ireland to pursue 
terrorists.300  
The UK’s CT strategy known as CONTEST (COuNter-TErrorism STrategy) was 
developed in 2003 as part of the UK’s National Security Strategy. Initially, CONTEST 
followed typical national security strategic thinking in place at the time, and focused 
primarily on overseas and international terrorism.301 Understanding that CT has a 
necessary domestic component, this new strategy eventually began to employ CT 
strategies focused within the UK’s borders as well. Upon its development in 2003, 
CONTEST was originally a classified strategy and remained as such until 2006.302 Upon 
evaluation of CONTEST, the United Kingdom saw terrorism as a complex threat and 
recognized that greater public awareness and understanding of the threat, coupled with 
community partnerships and citizen support, would be instrumental in successfully 
combating terrorism.303 In part to allow for this public engagement, the United Kingdom 
declassified CONTEST in 2006. However, from a methodological and operational 
perspective, CONTEST remained largely intact as written.  
Based on the UK’s experience with terrorism, the framers of CONTEST 
understood that terrorism would remain an asymmetric tactic for violent extremist 
groups, and therefore, it was prudent not to draft a CT strategy that communicated an 
expectation of outright elimination of terrorism or otherwise to guarantee 100 percent 
effectiveness.304 Therefore, the purpose of CONTEST is to reduce—not eliminate—the 
overall risk of terrorism and to allow people a sense of freedom of movement, normalcy, 
and confidence as they go about their daily lives.305 This pragmatic approach by the 
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United Kingdom was drawn from hard lessons in Northern Ireland. Indeed, even as the 
United Kingdom implemented this new strategy to counter the terrorism narrative, it 
continued to deal with domestic terrorist attacks in Northern Ireland. 
Implementation of this new strategy allowed for a comprehensive CT approach to 
domestic terrorist activities, which provided a unique opportunity to address the causes of 
terrorist ideologies through soft power approaches.306 This shift towards countering the 
terrorist ideological narrative as a “prevention” strategy was a departure from the more 
militaristic and “reactive” international, COIN focus of the past.  
While similar to the “troubles” in Northern Ireland by virtue of its domestic 
application, this new ideological struggle is extremely dissimilar overall in comparison 
since decentralized and individualized actors do not represent a central form of 
governance with which to negotiate, and this type of terrorism is not ethnonationalist 
based. Therefore, HMG realized, it was going to be a long war that required a blend of 
hard and soft strategies, to include what became generally referred to as a “hearts and 
minds” campaign.307 This approach required an awareness that while it might be 
considered warfare, it included UK citizens, and not just foreign or military adversaries 
who would be engaged. In 2004, while discussing the development of CONTEST, former 
UK Security and Intelligence Coordinator, Sir David Omand, indicated that its CT efforts 
must effectively and clearly communicate its mandates to those who exercise authority in 
operations at the strategic and operational levels while still accounting for constitutional 
and legal frameworks.308  
As a singular CT strategy, CONTEST has always contained four elements, 
identified as work streams, which include objectives and expected outcomes. The first 
three work streams are Pursue—intended to stop terrorist attacks through detection,  
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investigation, and disruption, in the United Kingdom and against UK interests overseas, 
Protect—intended to strengthen the United Kingdom and its infrastructures, and reduce 
its vulnerabilities to terrorist’s attacks, and Prepare—intended to mitigate the impact of 
terrorist’s attacks when they do occur.309 The fourth work stream, known as Prevent, was 
originally designed with a narrowly focused aim to disrupt terrorist activity by utilizing a 
more clandestine approach.310 Prevent, in its current version, is the most relative to 
domestic CVE strategies. 
a. PREVENT—A Revised Focus on Community Support 
The defining quality of Prevent is that it has institutionalized an overt 
counter-terrorism policing capacity focused upon addressing individual 
and community level risks in a predictive and pre-emptive fashion.311 
Over the last several years, the UK’s CT strategies and corresponding 
methodologies have continued to undergo significant change.312 In large part, this change 
is the result of the ongoing evaluation and annual assessment of its CT strategies by 
HMG to ensure that these strategies and tactics are responsive to the ever-changing 
community and threat environments. This process of assess, implement, evaluate, update, 
and re-implement should be viewed as a positive, self-evaluative process. The Pursue, 
Protect and Prepare work streams of CONTEST have largely evolved in congruence 
with these CT methodologies, essentially remaining within that CT structure. Prevent, 
however, has continued to undergo the most significant transformation since the creation 
of CONTEST.313  
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A main concern for the Prevent strategy has been to establish greater community 
trust and methods of engagement between law enforcement and communities.314  
In response to complaints about the secrecy surrounding security services and 
intelligence gathering activities under CONTEST, in 2009, CONTEST underwent a 
major rewrite as part of HMG’s new approach to open up its CT strategies in an effort to 
be more transparent in hopes of building greater public trust and support.315 Known as 
CONTEST II, this new strategy directly resulted in a significant change in scope and 
purpose for the Prevent strand in particular.316 This new approach appears to be the 
beginning of the transformation away from intelligence gathering functions—now a 
function of the Pursue work stream—and towards community-based programs focused 
on holistic societal efforts to prevent extremism. Within CONTEST II, Prevent now 
focused on three types of activities. 
 Counter-radicalization—focuses upon inhibiting the spread and influence 
of extremist ideas both generally and in specific cases 
 De-radicalization—involves acts to reduce the influence of extremist ideas 
where they have gained traction 
 Community Cohesion Building—is focused upon increasing the resilience 
of communities so that they are less likely to be influenced by extremist 
views317 
In the October 2010 National Security Strategy, HMG listed CT as a highest 
national security priority.318 Additionally, the strategy suggested an upcoming 
fundamental change to the previous CT strategy by calling for “[A] radical 
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transformation in the way we think about national security and organise ourselves to 
protect it.”319  
A year later, in June 2011, the most current version of CONTEST—known as 
CONTEST 3—was published.320 Again, as evidenced by the ongoing annual 
reassessment of its CT strategy, this updated version of the Prevent work stream 
continued the migration towards a truly community-based and community-led counter-
radicalization program. This current version focuses on challenging the supporting 
ideology of terrorism, protecting vulnerable individuals, and supporting communities and 
organizations in which a risk of radicalization exists.321 It is a multi-discipline, 
community-minded approach that is much more than an intervention strategy; it seeks to 
eliminate the roots of the radicalization process altogether. This focus shift has led to the 
inclusion of an already existing and familiar program known as Channel (described in 
more detail in the next section) as an effective community-based and community-led 
program for those GOs (governmental organizations) and NGOs (non-governmental 
organizations) already engaged with assisting at risk individuals in their communities.322  
Success of Prevent is essential to the success of CONTEST and the UK’s CT 
efforts overall. In recognition of this need, the Office of Security and Counter Terrorism 
(OSCT), in partnership with communities and local governments, developed a 40-page 
guide to assist local partners and communities in the delivery of the Prevent strategy.323 
To help raise awareness of Prevent and to better recognize and understand when to 
support an individual who may be in need of services, a two-hour training program called 
Workshop to Raise Awareness of Prevent (WRAP) is provided to front line staff across 
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all sectors.324 This program supports the common understanding that CONTEST 3, and 
the Prevent strategy in particular, is a transparent CT strategy that engages the public and 
offers them a meaningful role in CT efforts.325 
Although the UK’s National Security Strategy does not specifically reference 
CONTEST or Prevent by name, CONTEST 3 is an obvious example of the National 
Security Strategy’s reference to the radical change in the UK’s CT strategy. A significant 
undertaking, Prevent, while still focusing on addressing radicalization by countering 
terrorist ideology, is now enjoined in partnerships with multiple public-private sectors of 
the community.326 In a review of multiple studies conducted during the evolution of 
Prevent, it can be demonstrated that the processes and practices guided by Prevent have 
also matured and evolved as a result of the Prevent reconfigurations.327 Prevent has now 
developed into the preeminent ingredient of CONTEST’s CVE strategy. 
3. Channel—A Localized Community-Based Partnership Program in 
Support of Prevent  
a. Overview 
Surveyed as part of a 2011 Assessment of Prevent study by researchers at Cardiff 
University, UK law enforcement agencies indicated that they have come to understand 
that Prevent has developed into a blend of methodologies that integrate traditional CT 
elements with good neighborhood policing practices. Further, they also understand that 
Prevent is not only enhanced but may even be dependent on these more localized 
policing practices.328 The Channel program is a good example of how this national 
strategy guides, supports, and blends with more localized community policing efforts.  
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The Channel program, developed as a pilot program in 2007, is based on similar 
successful initiatives designed to support individuals “at risk from involvement in gangs, 
drugs and other social issues.”329 Repurposing this successful programmatic structure, 
Channel provides “[S]upport to people at risk of being drawn towards support for or 
involvement in all forms of terrorism including that which is perpetrated by the extreme 
far-right.”330  
With a goal of early recognition, assessment, and intervention for both children 
and adults, Channel is well placed within already existing collaborative local community 
partnerships in an effort “[T]o identify individuals at risk of being drawn into terrorism; 
assess the nature and extent of that risk; and develop the most appropriate support plan 
for the individuals.”331 Channel partnership agencies include education, health, social 
services, children’s and youth services, offender management services (prisons and 
probation), law enforcement, and other local community organizations.332 The United 
Kingdom recognizes that these local individuals, organizations, and communities are best 
positioned to recognize an at-risk individual’s generally uncharacteristic behavior via 
changes in routine, ideology, and traditionally normative patterns of social engagement. 
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b. A Guide for Local Partnerships 
The Channel: Protecting Vulnerable People from Being Drawn into Terrorism. A 
Guide for Local Partnerships, and an accompanying vulnerability assessment framework 
(discussed in more detail in section 3c.), are provided to community organizations as a 
resource tool to assist with behavior recognition, intervention, and access to resources. 
The guide is a comprehensive 30-page strategy that first articulates the national 
overarching strategy to reduce terrorism (the UK’s NSS), then the objective of 
CONTEST and its Prevent work stream—identifying Prevent as a national program in 
support of the NSS but focused at the local level—and finally, the strategy of Channel to 
provide specific programmatic resources in support of Prevent.334  
Channel is emphasized as a key element of Prevent and its purpose is clearly 
articulated within the guide. The purpose of Channel is the following. 
 Provide advice for local partnerships on how to deliver Channel projects 
 Explain why people may turn towards terrorism and describe indicators 
that may suggest they are doing so 
 Provide advice on the support that can be provided to safeguard those at 
risk of being targeted by terrorists and radicalisers335 
In addition to recognizing CONTEST and Prevent, the resource guide identifies 
other more localized programs already in place and operated by many of the very same 
partnership agencies. Recognizing them as parallel to Prevent, these programs include the 
multi-agency public protection arrangements (MAPPA) program that guides how to 
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model), the working together to safeguard children program conducted by the 
Department for Education and the Building Partnerships, Staying Safe: Guidance for 
Healthcare Organizations Program conducted by the Department of Health.336 
Recognizing these programs by name and then emphasizing that they should be operated 
“‘alongside” Channel communicates their equality in importance as part of the greater 
system of programmatic strategies designed to positively impact and safeguard 
communities. For partnerships to be effective, a clear framework must exist for 
understanding the roles of both partners, their relationships among the partners, and the 
identified areas requiring cooperation.337 This level of detailed explanation regarding the 
relationship and role of each organization and the separate-but-equal parallel programs 
recognizes the systems approach to CVE. This reinforces the importance of good 
communication as an important element of an effective strategy. In the case of Channel, 
this approach informs, educates, and empowers these local partnerships to ensure they are 
not only a stakeholder, but also, an engaged participant in the battle against VE. 
Beyond the stated purpose and the explanation of partnership roles and parallel 
programs, the guide outlines the actual referral and determination process. This program 
is overseen by a multi-agency panel, and includes a designated police practitioner 
responsible for coordination of Channel. This police coordinator can either be a wholly 
dedicated Channel coordinator closely aligned with Prevent (in the case of larger 
communities), or as a portion of the duties of an officer in smaller communities. 
Regardless, these coordinating officers are identified as either the Prevent engagement 
officer (PEO) or the single point of contact (SPOC) officer.338 
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Surveys of these coordinating officers (identified as Prevent or CT officers) 
conducted as part of a 2011 study by researchers at Cardiff University indicate these 
officers often feel as if they must navigate the conflicts between the role of CT 
intelligence officer and the community engagement officer.339 The distinctly differing 
actions required of these two roles, along with the perceptions by the community, can 
negatively affect the relationship between law enforcement and the community. 
Presumably in its efforts to continue towards seeking trust and engaging in transparency, 
Channel addresses these ISE concerns in three separate sections of the guide: the Sharing 
Information section and two annex documents entitled Sharing Information with 
Partners, and Freedom of Information (FOI).340 The first two sentences of the Sharing 
Information section state “Channel is not [sic] a process for gathering intelligence. It is a 
process for providing support to the people at risk” and continues by recommending an 
information-sharing agreement be utilized at the local level.341  
c. A Vulnerability Assessment Framework 
The vulnerability assessment framework—known as safeguarding and the 
common assessment framework (CAF)—contains a 22 characteristic guidepost to assist 
local partnerships in determining whether individuals meet the criteria to be placed in the 
Channel program.342 The framework explicitly acknowledges that the presence of any of 
these characteristics does not imply that a person will always be drawn to terrorism or 
commit a terrorist act; rather, the presence of certain characteristics may be indictors of 
extremism or vulnerability towards committing illegal acts.343 These characteristics are 
contained within three primary sections of the assessment framework: engagement with a 
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group, cause, or ideology, intent to cause harm, and capability to cause harm.344 
Understanding the engagement-intent-capability framework and attendant characteristics 
allows the opportunity for early intervention and placement in the Channel program and 
access to particular resources that may be most beneficial to the individual.  
Figure 4 represents the complete cycle of the Channel process. Utilizing the 
Channel guide and vulnerability assessment framework, the process begins with the 
identification and referral of a person who may be exhibiting vulnerability characteristics 
towards extremism and violence. A referral can come from public agency employees, the 
police, or the community at large.345 The diagram exhibits the overall step-by-step 
process as a person moves through the Channel program. Note two important items in the 
Channel process diagram.  
 The diagram consists of two exit points—one in the Referral Screening 
step and the other at the Preliminary Assessment step. If and when people 
are exited from Channel, they may be referred to other assistance 
programs. Regardless, all exited cases will be reviewed again between six 
and 12 months from their exit date.346 This review is an excellent example 
of the importance of partnership programs identified in the guide, which 
offer a collaborative community approach to these intervention and 
prevention strategies. 
 As noted by the two directional arrows, after the Multi-Agency Panel 
creates an appropriate support package, and the support package has been 
implemented, an ongoing evaluation of the program’s effectiveness—and 
by implication the individual’s progress—continually occurs in the form 
of an evaluative feedback loop. This non-linear approach is an effective 
method of ensuring the program is not stagnant in its efforts to realize a 
successful resolution that benefits the individual and the community.347 
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Figure 4.  The Channel Process348 
d. Referral Data 
Like many prevention efforts, data used to quantify the “number of incidents 
prevented” or which are otherwise directly attributable to prevention “successes” is 
difficult to measure. Measurement of reduction in terrorist events overall has many 
variables; intervention programs just being one of them. In these circumstances, data on 
the types and numbers of available resources, and subsequent program participation, are 
most relevant. 
Data on Channel has been kept since April 2006. From April 2006 through March 
31, 2013, 2,653 referrals were made to Channel.349 Figure 5 provides a breakdown of 
these referrals by year. Other relevant data was not broken down by year but was collated 
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in aggregate during the same time period. Of the 2,653 referrals, 587 (22 percent) were 
deemed by the Multi-Agency Panel to have met the criteria to enter into the Channel 
program, and the remaining 2,066 referrals were deemed to not have met the criteria for 
admission into Channel, but were directed to other services as deemed appropriate.350 Of 
the 2,653 referrals 1,723 were adults and 930 were juvenile.351 See Figure 6.  
 
Figure 5.  Number of Referrals to Channel, April 2006 through March 31, 2013 
 
Figure 6.  Data on Referrals Accepted to Channel vs. Other Services,  
2007 through 2013 
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C. AREAS OF CONCERN 
Over the last 11 years in particular, mainly as a result of the 9/11, 2001, Madrid 
2004, and London 2005 terrorist attacks, the organizational structures and methodologies 
surrounding CT efforts have continually evolved in the United Kingdom.352 This 
evolution of structures and methodologies also includes significant changes to the legal 
framework used to guide and direct CT efforts. However, these legislative changes in 
particular have not occurred without debate.  
1. Expansive Terrorism Legislation 
One overarching concern by some in the United Kingdom has been the expansive 
reach of UK terrorism legislation. As an example, language in the UK Terrorism Act 
2006 (TA 2006) intended to assist in deterrence measures under the Prevent concept lists 
offenses, such as the encouragement and glorification “whether in the past, in the future 
or generally”353 of terrorism through written or verbal means that can apply to “a 
statement that is likely to be understood by some or all of the members of the public to 
whom it is published as a direct or indirect encouragement or other inducement to them 
to the commission, preparation or instigation of acts of terrorism or Convention 
offences.”354 Broadly worded legislation, such as that contained in the TA 2006, can be 
viewed as empowering the government to target innocent, non-terrorist, citizens.355 In 
fact, Prevent is premised on the disruptive intervention model since it is recognized as an 
effective model for addressing extremist anti-social and undesirable activities.356 
However, these activities are not illegal per se, and a struggle noted in the earlier versions 
of Prevent was a lack of awareness and confidence in law enforcement to engage in 
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disruptive intervention tactics appropriately.357 This issue has largely been addressed as 
part of the transformative process of Prevent discussed earlier.358 
In the most recent update, Counterterrorism Act 2008, the legislation actually 
broadens the definition of terrorism from the 2006 iteration that caused ambiguity in 
determining when “views sympathetic to terrorism amount to encouragement,” and thus, 
potentially violate the law.359 At worst, such broad reaching legislation carries the risk of 
actually radicalizing otherwise innocent individuals offended by government 
infringements.360 While well intended in the battle against terrorism, these types of 
provisions—particularly those codified into law—can actually be counterproductive in 
their CT efforts and attempts to forge community partnerships and trust. 
2. Interaction with Muslim Communities 
A second notable concern is the subject of targeted focus upon Muslims and their 
communities by the police to further CVE efforts. Due to its liberal post-war immigration 
policies, the United Kingdom is considered a pluralist nation. This policy, along with its 
geographical proximity to the Muslim world, has resulted in a significant Muslim 
immigrant population over the last several decades.361 According to the Pew Research 
Center, in 2010—the most recent year for which data is available—an estimated  
2.8 million Muslims live in the United Kingdom, which comprises 4.6 percent of the total 
population.362 Muslims continue to be the fastest growing segment of Europe’s 
population.363 Muslims are, and will continue to be, an integral part of the UK social 
fabric, and an important partner in the UK’s efforts to combat VE.  
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As noted in the chapter research, the issue of police roles—intelligence gathering 
versus community caretaker—was of particular concern in the first two iterations of 
CONTEST. Primarily due to a lack of trust and lack of desire for engagement, Muslim 
communities prefer to address problems internally initially using informal social 
interventions rather than involving the police.364 In a 2010 report for the House of 
Commons, the Communities and Local Government Committee noted, “We remain 
concerned by the number of our witnesses who felt that Prevent had been used to ‘spy’ on 
Muslim communities. Our evidence suggests that differing interpretations of terminology 
relating to concepts such as ‘intelligence gathering’, ‘spying’ and ‘surveillance’ are 
posing major challenges to the Prevent agenda.”365 In stark contrast to this position, 
HMG indicated in its 2011 Prevent strategy framework that no evidence exists to support 
this claim; however, it reaffirmed that to improve trust, “Prevent must not be used as a 
means for covert spying on people or communities.”366  
The relevance of the justification for either position is tangential to the more 
critical matter that perceptions of such actions in fact exist and it is these perceptions that 
can erode trust and damage the relationship. This belief is particularly critical to CT 
efforts since, although Prevent and Channel are not purported to be religious or ethnicity 
focused, the predominant threat of terrorism is from Islamist extremists who attack 
Muslims, and as a result, these two programs are prevalent within Muslim 
communities.367 
In 2011, CONTEST 3 was significantly re-tooled and re-implemented with a 
particular focus on these concerns. Laudably, HMG has gone to great efforts in rewriting 
these strategies to emphasize a focus on the behavioral characteristics and not the 
ethnicity or religion of a person.  
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D. CONCLUSION 
The UK’s experience with domestic terrorism—to include intermittent success 
and failures over an extended period of time—is generally considered to have been 
successful in thwarting homegrown terrorist threats.368 The NSS, CONTEST-Prevent and 
Channel together present as a strong example of an amalgamated system of strategies that 
support a common overarching ideology communicating how the United Kingdom 
approaches self-radicalization and VE.  
This overall result is an inward facing, actionable, and interconnected system of 
implemented domestic CT strategies, evaluated by scholars, the public, and HMG, then 
redesigned and re-implemented over time, all with the common purpose to combat self-
radicalization and VE. Further, this structured and transparent use of strategy allows for 
an ongoing analysis of the “social contract” between the government and its people while 
ensuring public and private sectors are on the same page—not to mean agreement—when 
it comes to CT efforts. The resulting benefit allows the public to engage in meaningful 
discourse on the topic and feel their opinions are valued. This objective is also 
accomplished by blending existing community organizations and their programs through 
collaborative interactions that synergize the overall effectiveness of each program. By 
this inclusion, communities are stakeholders and partners in the greater CT effort. 
According to former British Security Service officer Paul Smith, “Throughout this review 
process, the British Government regarded its counterterrorism strategy as a national 
policy, which incorporates economic, educational and social policy, and foreign affairs, 
as well as purely defence, security and intelligence matters.”369 This viewpoint is 
evidenced by the approach of Prevent and Channel in particular.  
This preventive programmatic concept would fit well within the U.S. NSCT and 
the U.S. CVE strategy. This concept also recognizes that, if implemented properly, and 
with awareness of the cautions outlined above, an effective domestic strategy to counter 
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self-radicalization and VE can be successfully administered at the national level and 
implemented at the local level.  
This chapter examined the UK’s efforts in CT, including a brief look at its 
transition from hard power to soft power philosophy in its CT application. This chapter 
then examined the UK CVE strategies known as CONTEST-Prevent and Channel that 
offer themselves as detailed programs for study.  
The goal of the chapter was to develop a better understanding of the UK’s 
approach, both philosophically and practically, to countering terrorism overall and self-
radicalization and VE, in particular. This evaluation can now join the earlier U.S. 
evaluation and together serve as a backdrop for the analysis of Australia’s approach 
towards CT and CVE.  
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VI. THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA 
This chapter examines the CT efforts of The Commonwealth of Australia 
(hereafter referred to as Australia), including a view of Australia’s philosophical shift in 
its attitude towards terrorism—both domestic and non-state actor—as well as its resulting 
domestic CT strategies. This change in philosophy is particularly significant relative to its 
CVE strategies. This chapter also provides a broad overview of Australia’s ethos, its two-
tiered governance structure, its policing structure, and its use of strategy as an effective 
communication tool used by the government to guide its approach to CT efforts over its 
history. This chapter then briefly views the history and evolution of Australia’s 
immigration policies and their relevancy to current terrorism and CVE challenges. The 
chapter then explores the progression of terrorism, as well as both the current and future 
terrorist threats to Australia as a result of the ongoing Syrian civil war. This is of 
particular relevance to Australia’s CVE programs and the likely possibility they will be 
tested in the near term due to this emerging threat. The chapter then briefly reviews the 
history of CT as a formalized strategy—commonly referred to as agreements—as well as 
an examination of Australia’s maturation towards its now robust menu of CVE programs, 
including its specially designated CVE unit and the building community resilience grants 
program. In addition to exploring Australia’s development and implementation of these 
programs, the chapter reviews Australia’s well-chosen placement of these programs to 
emphasize the outreach and community-based focus while minimizing their reliance on 
law enforcement. This approach offers guidance, resources, and extensive support to 
local community-based organizations to help Australia recognize and prevent self-
radicalization and VE.  
The goal of the chapter is to develop a better understanding of Australia’s 
approach, both philosophically and practically, to countering terrorism overall and self-
radicalization and VE in particular. This evaluative process contributes to this thesis by 
offering an alternative approach to dealing with these issues and providing potential 
applicable attributes for consideration by the United States as it considers its updates and 
improvements to its own CT strategies related to self-radicalization and VE. 
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A. OVERVIEW OF AUSTRALIA 
To provide context to Australia as a relevant case study for analysis of its CT 
philosophy and resulting strategies, it is necessary to provide a brief overview of 
Australia’s ethos, history, and governance and policing structure. These foundational 
elements, along with the specific CT strategies discussed in this chapter, add to the 
relevance of Australia as a pertinent subject of study for the United States. 
Noticeably evident is Australia’s similarities to the United Kingdom, which 
shares many of its formal cultural and governance compositions. However, in an 
equivalent number of ways, Australia is also similar to the United States relative to its 
historical transition from British colonies, elements of its governance model, progression 
as a more autonomous country, the evolution of its relationship with an already 
indigenous population, and its geographic size. Many of these elements are cause for 
recognition of Australia and its parallel processes relative to domestic CT efforts. 
In stark contrast to the United Kingdom, Australia has enjoyed a long history of 
relative freedom from terrorism.370 Additionally, when looking specifically at the 
transformative process towards radicalization as a component of terrorism, Australia 
ranks lower than the United Kingdom, France, Netherlands, and the United States.371 
This is not to say Australia is free from terrorism or VE. Australia’s overall risk from 
terrorism has substantially increased because of its close alliance with the United States, 
and support for post-9/11 conflicts promulgated by the United States in the GWOT.372 In 
spite of Australia’s relatively benign history of terrorism, the Australian governments—
both federal and state—have been quick to act by displaying a proactive rather than 
reactive approach towards its counterterrorism efforts. The result is an array of highly 
directed CVE programmatic strategies intended to engage and support local communities 
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with the objective of preventing the environmental conditions necessary for VE to take 
root initially. For comparative purposes, while not as lengthy in its overall history as that 
of the United Kingdom, Australia does use strategy to communicate its philosophies 
effectively and guide its actions. As a result, the Australian CT strategies discussed in this 
chapter offer a creditable example of programs that can be effectively implemented 
during a time when VE is perceived as manageable—the current environment in the 
United States—and not critical.  
1. Ethos 
The United States and Australia are comparable countries that face similar 
challenges in their efforts to combat domestic and international terrorism. As noted,  
while both have had minor incidents of terrorism over the course of their histories—the 
9/11 attacks not withstanding—they both have been relatively isolated from the long 
history of domestic terrorism seen by European countries. While this geographic  
isolation may have been useful in the past, globalization, and the increased number, 
frequency, and relative ease with which people travel, has relegated the relative 
geographic isolation irrelevant.373  
While underlying fundamental differences exist in governmental and operational 
structure that must be considered, Australia has a differing but comparable legal and 
political ideology. Australia also supports Western values, democracy, and the rule of 
law, and therefore, it shares a common ideology with the United States and other 
democratic countries. Australia’s connection to the United States, in particular, is further 
entrenched by Prime Minister Julia Gillard’s acknowledgement within the national 
security strategy of the importance of Australia’s alliance with the United States, which 
identifies this relationship as one of Australia’s eight pillars of national security.374 The 
United States is the only country recognized with such a distinction to be considered part 
of the foundation of Australia’s national security. As a result, Australia may be viewed in 
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a similar fashion as the United States by other nations, extremist terrorist organizations, 
and those predisposed to self-radicalization within their own borders. In fact, Australia’s 
close alliance with the United States, and its geopolitical influence, may act an as 
aggravator towards the potential for extremism and self-radicalization in the near term 
within Australia. This concept is explored further in the “Syrian Conflict and Its Threat to 
Australia” and the “View Ahead—Future Terrorism Challenges for Australia” sections of 
this chapter. These factors offer up a unique opportunity to research Australia’s 
relationship with its public—to include corresponding legislation, strategies, and 
programs—to determine their effectiveness in contributing to Australia’s relative 
freedom from significant events of domestic terrorism. 
2. History and Governance 
Australia, the world’s sixth largest country by land mass, is an island continent 
that also includes the island of Tasmania and several smaller islands. British colonization 
began in 1788, and the island evolved into six separately governed British colonies.375 
Paradoxically, the U.S.-Australian connection may have its origins around this period. 
Because of the defeat of Britain in the American Revolution, Britain lost its 13 North 
American colonies and began to pursue new territories in a desire to establish 
replacement colonies under British rule.376 Much like North America, an already 
established indigenous population lived on the island when British colonizers arrived. 
These native inhabitants, aborigines and Torres Strait islanders, quickly began to dwindle 
in population. Today, they comprise approximately 2.4 percent (460,000) of Australia’s 
estimated 22 million people.377  
On January 1, 1901, British Parliament passed legislation allowing the six 
colonies—who each independently voted as well—to govern themselves as part of a 
commonwealth. A constitutional monarchy was established and The Commonwealth of 
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Australia was created. The constitution itself was written in the years preceding the 
legislation with each colony providing a representative.378 Like the United States, the 
Australian Constitution defines its governmental structure, applicable authorities and 
procedures, and the rights and obligations of the states.379 Each of the six states also 
maintains its own state constitution and local government structure.380 This division of 
power between Australia’s central government and the individual state governments 
created the federal system of governance in existence today. Like the United States, 
Australia has an established capital city (Canberra), which is not part of a state. Rather, 
the region is identified as the Australian Capital Region (ACT) and operates in a manner 
akin to the District of Columbia in the United States.  
Like the United Kingdom, Australia is a constitutional monarchy. Due in part to 
its direct lineage to Britain, the Australian monarch is also the British monarch.381 
However, in the case of Australia—and Canada and New Zealand as well—the monarch 
appoints a Governor-General as the monarchs’ representative. As such, the Governor-
General maintains wide authoritative power, but in practice, typically only acts  
upon advice from ministers.382 Australia blends its monarchy with its federal and 
parliamentary systems and—like the United States—has established distinctly separate 
legislative, executive, and judicial branches of its government.383  
Its parliamentary system is comprised of a lower house (House of 
Representatives) and an upper house (Senate), with the House of Representatives 
maintaining 150 members and the Senate maintaining 76 members.384 The Senate 
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membership is comprised of two members from each of the six states, two members from 
the northern territory, and two from the Australian Capital Region.385 Similar to the 
United States, and unlike the United Kingdom, members of both houses are popularly 
elected.386 Unlike both the United States and the United Kingdom, voting in Australia is 
compulsory for citizens over 18 and failure to do so can result in a fine or prosecution.387  
Overall, Australia’s governmental structure is recognized as a liberal democracy 
and is founded on the democratic values of freedom of religion, freedom of speech, 
freedom of association, and the rule of law.388 Much of Australia’s philosophy toward 
these democratic values is reflected by its inclusion and endorsement of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights.389 While Australia’s roots come from the British model of 
governance, it has also incorporated many recognizable elements of the U.S. model, and 
blended these two models with elements unique to Australia, resulting in an effective 
federal-state-local system of governance. The symbiotic relationship between these three 
levels of governance may factor into its ability to develop, implement, and support 
successful CVE programs, which also allows for a close comparison to the U.S. 
governance structure and its potential corollary impact on similar CVE programmatic 
strategies in the United States. 
3. Policing Structure  
The policing structure in Australia is a two-tiered system comprised of a federal 
agency known as the Australian Federal Police (AFP) and eight state police forces. These 
eight state agencies represent the six states proper, the Northern Territory, and the ACT. 
The six state agencies are the New South Wales Police, Queensland Police, South 
Australia Police, Tasmania Police, Victoria Police and Western Australia Police. The 
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Northern Territory Police—an independent police agency—provide police services to the 
Northern Territory. The AFP is responsible for providing police services to the ACT 
through a police services agreement and delivers this service through its designated ACT 
police program. With the exception of the AFP officers assigned to the ACT, these state 
agencies employ approximately 50,000 sworn officers.390 Beyond these two levels, no 
other police agencies exist.  
The AFP has 4,270 sworn officers, and in addition to domestic federal level 
responsibilities and the ACT agreement, provides police service to external territories, 
such as Christmas Island, Cocos Island, Jervis Bay, and Norfolk Island.391 The AFP also 
maintains an International Deployment Group (IDG) by which officers are assigned to 
various overseas locations, such as the Solomon Islands, Cyprus, Sudan, Timor-Leste, 
Afghanistan, and Papua New Guinea.392 The mission of the AFP has changed 
significantly in recent years requiring a greater focus on national and international 
operations to include its CT efforts.393  
Australia has four primary intelligence agencies consisting of the Australian 
Security Intelligence Organization (ASIO), the Australian Secret Intelligence Service 
(ASIS), the Defense Intelligence Organization (DIO), and the Australian Signals 
Directorate (ASD).394 Similar to the British Security Service, the ASIO engages in 
domestic intelligence and security services but possesses no independent arrest authority, 
and therefore, any limited detentions must be conducted through the AFP.395 ASIS, 
similar to the UK SIS and the U.S. CIA, is Australia’s foreign intelligence service. 
Through the collection and distribution of secret intelligence, its primary focus is on 
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individuals or organizations outside of Australia that may threaten Australia’s interests 
and the security and safety of its citizens.396 The DIO provides intelligence to the 
Australian Defence Force (ADF) and the Australian government in matters relating to 
“global security, weapons of mass destruction, foreign military capabilities, defence 
economics and transnational terrorism.”397 In addition, the DIO employs a whole of 
government approach and supports agencies engaged in countering and combating 
terrorism.398 The ASD provides foreign SIGINT to the ADF and the Australian 
government as a means of support for effective decision making on matters that affect the 
security of Australia and its interests.399 
Australia has 13 police/intelligence agencies, fewer than the 55 agencies in the 
United Kingdom, and significantly fewer than the approximate 18,000 in the United 
States. As in the UK case study, it cannot be overstated that when it comes to the multi-
layers of policing and the presumed effects on territoriality and information and 
intelligence sharing—among public agencies, as well as the private sector—it is apparent 
that the U.S. model creates measurable encumbrances not realized by Australia. Even so, 
Australia’s many similarities in overall policing style, interaction with its communities, 
and efforts to counter VE through localized programmatic partnerships, make Australia a 
good model for study. 
With respect to the response and investigation of terrorism-related incidents, the 
primary overall responsibility and commensurate authority is clearly established at the 
state and territorial level by the National Counter-Terrorism Arrangement.400 The 
Commonwealth’s resources, such as the ASIO and the AFP, will provide investigative 
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support when appropriate.401 This designation of authority is important in understanding 
not only how a terrorism investigation will be conducted, but also more importantly, in 
understanding that the majority of incidents of terrorism in Australia are viewed as a local 
crime. In conjunction with this primary investigative responsibility, states’ governments 
are also required to maintain individual CT plans.402  
B. TERRORISM CHALLENGES IN AUSTRALIA—PAST TO PRESENT 
1. Australia’s Immigration Policy—Understanding Its Relevance to 
Terrorism and Countering Violent Extremism 
After the implementation of the Immigration Restriction Act 1901, the 
immigration policy of Australia from the initial days of colonization through the latter 
part of the 20th century was commonly referred to as the “White Australia Policy.”403 
This policy placed heavy restrictions on immigration, and at the same time, afforded the 
removal of certain immigrants already living in Australia. This policy officially ended 
after passage of the Migration Act of 1966; however, it was essentially being 
progressively dismantled from 1949 through 1966.404 As a result, over seven million 
people have immigrated to Australia from over 200 countries since World War II.405 
Today, Australia espouses a liberal and welcoming immigration policy that reflects 
Australia’s sense of obligation to assist immigrants and refugees from all over the world, 
particularly from countries in conflict. As a result, the number of immigrants from Africa 
and the Middle East has nearly doubled since 1996.406 The policy is also reflected in  
the overall demographic data, which indicates that today, over 25 percent of Australia’s 
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21.5 million Australians were born overseas, and nearly half of all Australian citizens 
were either born overseas or have at least one parent born overseas.407  
This situation results in geopolitics playing a large central role in Australia’s 
national security strategy and its domestic CVE strategy. Therefore, Australia must pay 
particular attention to areas of conflict around the world since these issues will almost 
certainly have an impact upon Australia’s citizens who may choose to identify with their 
ethnicity or country of origin in relation to geopolitical matters rather than aligning or 
identifying with Australia. With such a diverse composition, disagreements on these 
global issues—particularly during times of armed conflict—can have a polarizing effect 
among various Australian citizen populations who each may have vastly opposing and 
personal views. In addition, the political stance the Australian government may take in 
these matters may be in stark contrast to the views held by one or more groups. Along 
with this diverse population comes varying sets of values, customs, and beliefs that must 
be considered, understood, and effectively leveraged when determining how to best 
develop and implement community-based CVE strategies. This condition is currently 
evident because of the ongoing conflict in Syria and its relevance to the domestic security 
of Australia in the near future. 
2. Terrorism—1978 to Present  
Although not nearly as lengthy or arduous as the United Kingdom, Australia has 
actively engaged in CT efforts for some time, both domestically and abroad. In response 
to the 1978 Hilton Hotel Bombing in Sydney—viewed by many as the day terrorism 
began in Australia—the Australian government created the Standing Advisory 
Committee on Commonwealth and State Cooperation for Protection Against Violence 
(SAC-PAV) in an effort to create a common set of agreements for the response to threats 
and acts of politically motivated violence.408 Later the same year, Australia implemented 
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and began using a three-level National Terrorism Public Alert System, and in 2003, 
Australia implemented a fourth level.409 The current four levels are LOW—terrorist 
attack is not expected, MEDIUM—terrorist attack could occur, HIGH—terrorist attack is 
likely, and EXTREME—terrorist attack is imminent or has occurred.410 Since 2003, the 
National Terrorism Public Alert System has remained at the medium level; however, the 
level can be changed for one or more impacted communities or regions as necessary to 
provide for a more region specific advisement.  
On October 12, 2002, a terrorist bomb killed 202 people, 88 of whom were 
Australian, in a nightclub in Kuta, Bali. The AFP played a major role in the investigation 
with an estimated 100 AFP personnel deployed to Bali during the height of the 
investigation.411 Earlier in that same year, Indonesia and Australia signed a memorandum 
of understating (MOU) to develop a cooperative police agreement in an effort to combat 
transnational crime mutually. After the Bali bombing, the AFP established a permanent 
presence in Jakarta to provide ongoing investigative assistance to the Indonesian National 
Police (INP). On August 5, 2003, the joint AFP-INP team investigated the Jakarta 
Marriot hotel bombing.412 Overall, Australia has been progressive in its efforts to 
respond to terrorism committed both in Australia and against Australians around the 
world. This has required the AFP, in particular, to embrace its shift in responsibilities by 
moving towards an emphasis on CT both domestically and abroad. 
As a result of all domestic CT operations in Australia, between 2001 and 2010,  
38 people were arrested for terrorism related offenses, which resulted in 23 convictions, 
and another 40 people were identified as having a nexus to terrorism.413 These numbers 
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are in stark contrast to the over 600 people arrested for terrorist-related activity in the 
United Kingdom during a much shorter period between 2009 and 2010.414 
However, Australia’s biggest challenges with terrorism may lie immediately 
ahead. A 2009 assessment of Australia’s terrorism threat environment by the RAND 
Corporation opined that the primary domestic threat to Australia is Islamist extremists 
attempting to inspire individuals to commit political violence.415 Coinciding with the 
RAND assessment, Australia’s 2010 Counter-Terrorism White Paper noted that 
beginning in 2004, a notable increase was detected in the terrorist threat emanating from 
people born and raised in Australia who are at risk of becoming influenced by this 
radicalization message.416 In 2011, an assessment of terrorism trends in Australia 
conducted by The Australian Strategic Policy Institute recommended that Australia shift 
its CT and counter-radicalization efforts towards those elements most at risk from the 
influence of al-Qaeda’s ideology.417 This environment is not unique to Australia, and like 
in the United Kingdom and United States, may be the consequence of an effective global 
campaign against terrorist organizations and their resulting shift in strategy as a 
countermeasure to those efforts. 
3. The Syrian Conflict and Its Threat to the Security of Australia 
Syria has become a magnet for foreign fighters, including Australians.418 
It is estimated that since 2012, 120 to 150 Australians have traveled to Syria to 
either support or fight alongside rebels against the regime of President Bashar al-
Assad.419 Of those Australians who are fighting, many are believed to be members of 
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Jabhat al-Nusra and the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), a militant group 
connected to al-Qaeda.420 The concern for Australia is the significant possibility of 
radicalized Australians—with battle experience and a renewed profound anti-Western 
ideology—returning to Australia to recruit others to VE, and then pursue acts of domestic 
terrorism against the citizens and governments of Australia.421 This bitterness towards 
Western ideology, coupled with Australia’s active role in the post-9/11 GWOT, and the 
U.S. role of unremarkable involvement in the Syrian conflict, could aggravate the 
eventual post-Syria response by extremists towards countries, such as Australia, and 
thereby, create additional tension between extremists and those they believe threaten 
Islam. These factors will almost certainly allow extremists the ability to further justify 
their use of violence, as well as provide a content rich narrative to recruit others towards 
violence. According to Anthony Bibalo of the Lowy Institute, “For Australia the 
immediate focus is, and should be, on individuals returning from Syria.”422 
The Syrian situation and its potential domestic impacts to Australia are of such 
concern that ASIO Director General David Irvine specifically addressed the Syrian issue 
in his recent 2013 ASIO Report to Parliament.423 In addition, the report also discussed 
the challenges for security agencies associated with “home-grown terrorism” and “lone 
actors.” 424 The Lowry Institute for International Policy presents a different context to 
ASIO’s perceived challenge, which notes that even if some Australians are not intent on 
continuing their terrorist activities upon arriving home, the Australian security agencies’ 
focus on them could create feelings of resentment and discrimination that could lead 
them to retaliate.425 The potential for near-term terrorism in Australia appears to be on a 
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trajectory that will eventually test the effectiveness of Australia’s CVE programmatic 
strategies. 
4. The View Ahead—Future Terrorism Challenges for Australia 
In the coming years Australia will face a more complex and serious 
terrorist threat than it did after 9/11426 
Australia’s national security effort has been in constant transformation over the 
last 14 years and has been noticeably influenced by the 9/11 attacks upon the United 
States, the 2002 and 2005 Bali bombings, Australia’s involvement in both Iraq and 
Afghanistan, and the deaths of over 100 Australians worldwide in the last decade 
attributed to terrorism.427 One result of this transformation has been the more than 
tripling of Australia’s annual spending on national security between 2000 and 2012, to 
$1.5 billion dollars.428 
With the near certain domestic unrest as Australians return from Syria, Australia 
is by no means exempt from the effects of terrorism. Australia has done well in its ability 
to respond quickly and adapt both nationally and internationally to the ever-changing 
threat of terrorism, its shifting environs, and methods. However, Australia’s current 
environment may be its biggest challenge to date and the strength of its CVE programs is 
undoubtedly currently being tested and will continue in the coming months and years.  
Going forward, addressing the long-term causes of terrorism by focusing on 
programs designed to recognize, intervene, and prevent self-radicalization from taking 
hold through community engagement may be the most effective strategy in maintaining 
and strengthening Australia’s resistance to self radicalization and VE. Australia’s pace of 
constant transformation will need to continue to anticipate, prevent, and counter the 
effects of extremist ideological rhetoric effectively and its call to VE, which some 
Australians will undoubtedly experience into the coming years. Countering the narrative, 
engaging communities to build and maintain trust and provide practical, useful resources 
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will be the foundation crucial to delivering an effective CT strategy. Published just two 
months ago, a March 2014 report by the Lowy Institute for International Policy, which 
studied the genesis of the next generation of jihadists, indicated, “For these and other 
reasons Australia is not about to escape the ‘war on terror’ era any time soon.”429  
C. AUSTRALIA’S DOMESTIC COUNTERTERRORISM DOCUMENTS  
1. The Evolution from SAC-PAV to NCTC 
With the exception of the immediate aftermath of the 1978 hotel bombing in 
Sydney, prior to the 2000 Sydney Olympics, Australia perceived its threat from terrorism 
to be negligible and the responsibility for countering terrorism was largely the domain of 
the states.430 In preparation for the 2000 Olympic Games, Australia passed major 
legislation redefining the military’s domestic role and authority by granting them powers 
to detain and use force against civilians.431 This action began to move the focus on 
terrorism and CT efforts into the national spectrum. As a direct result of the 9/11 attacks 
upon the United States, in April 2002, the Australian Prime Minister and other 
Parliamentary members determined an updated security strategy would be critical to the 
security of Australia.432 This action coincided with another round of legislative changes, 
this time passing significant anti-terrorism laws giving broad authority to domestic 
intelligence agencies.433 The 1978 SAC-PAV Agreement was used as a framework for an 
updated agreement—which now included a new focus on prevention and consequence 
management—and on October 24, 2002, a new intergovernmental agreement (IGA) on 
Australia’s National Counter-Terrorism Arrangements was signed, which formally 
                                                 
429 Bubalo, “Next-gen jihad in the Middle East,” Lowy, 10. 
430 RAND Corporation: Center for Asian Pacific Policy, “Australia’s Security Policy and the War on 
Terrorism,” 2003, 1, http://www.rand.org/international/capp/events/03/australwot.html. 
431 Ibid. 
432 National Counter-Terrorism Committee: Council of Australian Governments, “Ten Year 
Anniversary Report,” July 25, 2012, 1, http://www.coag.gov.au/sites/default/files/NCTC%20Ten% 
20Year%20Anniversary%20Report.pdf. 
433 RAND Corporation: Center for Asian Pacific Policy, “Australia’s Security Policy and the War on 
Terrorism,” 1. 
 130
established the National Counter-Terrorism Committee (NCTC).434 Like the SAC-PAV 
to NCTC shift, the National Counter-Terrorism Plan (NCTP) now replaced the existing 
National Anti-Terrorist Plan, which was also developed immediately following the 1978 
Hilton hotel bombing in Sydney. The NCTC is comprised of Commonwealth (federal), 
state and territorial representatives and reports annually to the Council of Australian 
Governments (COAG).435 The NCTC provides strategic and policy advice to the various 
Australian governments, maintains the cooperative agreements between them, conducts a 
terrorism environmental threat assessment every three years, and maintains the NCTP.436 
In 2002, the initial scope of the NCTC was terrorism centric and focused primarily on the 
consequences of terrorism. As it has evolved in the last 10 years, it has broadened its 
focus and taken on a more whole-of-government approach now—much like the United 
States—to encompass prevention, preparedness, response, and recovery elements.437  
As a strategic policy and oversight committee, the NCTC plays an important role 
in defining Australia’s approach to countering VE. In its 10-year report, published 
October 4, 2012, the NCTC acknowledged the growing concern with self-radicalization, 
and as a result, committed to increasing its CT capabilities through community-oriented 
CVE initiatives intended to assist communities in increasing their resilience to VE.438 
Further, the NCTC recognizes that the funding and coordinating of these various CVE 
projects throughout Australia is essential to assist vulnerable individuals in disengaging 
from the ideological influences of VE and to empower communities to intervene prior to 
the need for a law enforcement response.439  
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2. The NCTP—Australia’s Domestic Counterterrorism Plan 
Australia’s CT efforts evolved into the creation of the NCTP to reflect the newly 
refocused understanding that CT has a necessary domestic component. As noted in the 
previous section, the NCTP is under the purview of the NCTC and is reviewed and 
updated at least triennially, which occurred in 2005, 2008, and 2011. The NCTP is 
Australia’s inward facing domestic strategy and has evolved in sync with Australia’s 
continuous transformation in its CT strategies. Today, the NCTP contains distinct 
elements that focus on addressing long-term causes of terrorism, of which CVE programs 
now play a prominent role. 
a. 1st Edition NCTP—2002 to 2005  
The first edition of the NCTP was created in 2002, and as a result of the attitude 
of the NCTC, focused primarily on combating terrorist organizations and the 
consequences of terrorism. The NCTP focused on three CT principles. 
 Maximum Preparedness—strong ability to detect and disrupt terrorist 
activity 
 Comprehensive Prevention—strong protection of people, assets and 
infrastructure from terrorist activity 
 Effective Response—rapid and effective capabilities to reduce the impact 
of a terrorist incident, should one occur440 
b. 2nd Edition NCTP—2005 to 2012 
The NCTC conducted its first review of the NCTP in 2005, and the second edition 
was published later that same year. While this 2005 edition continued the theme of 
Prevention and Preparedness (as one combined element), Response and Recovery, it was 
devoid of any reference to—or recognition of—the concept of self-radicalization, 
extremism, VE, CVE, homegrown VE, or any “long term” approach to CT as a strategy 
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option. This iteration was still heavily entrenched in codifying agency roles and 
obligations, lines of authority, and formalized governmental responses to terrorism.441 
Between 2009 and 2011, terrorism assessments by the Australian Commonwealth, 
RAND Corporation, and The Australian Strategic Policy Institute, each suggested that the 
emerging primary threat to Australia’s security was self-radicalization by Australian 
citizens susceptible to the influence of radicalization messaging.442 The Australian 
Strategic Policy Institute further recommended that Australia change its CT policy to 
enhance its focus on CT and counter-radicalization, particularly in those areas “most at 
risk from the from the influence of al-Qaeda’s ideology.”443 Australia and the NCTC 
were responsive to these studies and recommendations, and thus, began a philosophical 
shift in Australia’s approach towards terrorism by distinguishing between its international 
and domestic CT approaches. 
c. 3rd Edition NCTP—2012 to Present 
As the NCTC attitude has evolved over the last 12 years, so has the corresponding 
NCTP. In 2011, the NCTC conducted its second review of Australia’s Counter-Terrorism 
Plan, which resulted in the 3rd edition of the NCTP being published in 2012. This NCTP 
significantly differentiates itself from the previous two versions by introducing 
Australia’s newly formulated domestic CT approach to countering VE.444 For the first 
time, Australia formally recognized this issue and set a course to develop and implement 
a national approach to this newly evolving terrorist threat. Considered an integral part of 
its overall national security strategy, the 2012 NCTP continues to outline Australia’s 
strategy to prevent and respond to acts of terrorism through the implementation of its four 
                                                 
441 Commonwealth of Australia, National Counter-Terrorism Committee, National Counter-Terrorism 
Plan, 2nd ed. (Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, 2005).  
442 Australian Government, Counter-Terrorism White Paper; Securing Australia-Protecting Our 
Community–2010, ii; Chalk et al., Considering the Creation of a Domestic Intelligence Agency in the 
United States: Lessons from the Experiences of Australia, Canada, France, Germany, and the United 
Kingdom, 14. 
443 Ungerer, “Beyond bin Laden: Future Trends in Terrorism,” 2. 
444 Australian Government, Counter-Terrorism White Paper; Securing Australia-Protecting Our 
Community–2010, i, 3.  
 133
key components; preparedness, prevention, response, and recovery.445 It is the fourth 
component, prevention, which is studied in more detail and contains this newly formed 
CVE focus. 
As stated, the first three components of the 3rd edition 2012 NCTP are as follows. 
 Preparedness—refers to the process of planning, resourcing, and testing to 
ensure governments, agencies, and communities are prepared and 
equipped to prevent or respond to acts of terrorism 
 Response—refers to actions taken by governments post-incident and 
reinforces that the state and territory governments have primary 
responsibility and the Commonwealth will act in a support role 
 Recovery—refers to the process of supporting communities affected by 
man-made and natural disasters and like Response, outlines the 
responsibilities of state, territorial and Commonwealth governments446 
The fourth component, Prevention, focuses on “[M]easures taken to eliminate or 
reduce the occurrence or severity of a terrorist act.”447 These measures are contained 
within the multiplicity of broad categories of intelligence, threat assessment, criminal 
investigation, protection of the community, public awareness, border control, transport 
security, aviation, maritime, surface transport, dignitary and foreign mission protection, 
business and community, being aware and vigilant, staying informed, countering violent 
extremism, protecting major events, critical infrastructure protection, regulation of 
hazardous material, and cyber security.448 A majority of these efforts is both needed, and 
familiar in most CT plans, and focus on hardening targets and systems as a means to 
deter and defend against acts of terrorism. CVE is a departure from these more traditional 
prevention efforts but is no less critical to the safety and security of Australia, its citizens, 
its infrastructures, and its systems. A notable concern of the prevention component is its 
potential dilution in overall effectiveness because of this multitude of categories; 
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however, the CVE strategy itself is recognized as a standalone category, which, for the 
first time, indicates recognition and acceptance of CVE as an important aspect of 
prevention strategies.  
As further evidence of its importance to the national security strategy, the CVE 
category articulates in detail four key principles for CVE used as guideposts for further 
programmatic strategies. These guideposts are the following.  
 “Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) is an integral component of 
Australia’s counterterrorism prevention strategies.”  
 “The effective prevention of violent extremism involves combining an 
appropriate security and law enforcement response with broader strategies 
to enhance resilience to, and lessen the appeal of, violent extremist 
influences.”  
 “CVE is a national challenge requiring a national response, recognizing 
that strong partnerships between all levels of government are critical to 
success. Solutions must be locally appropriate and implemented with the 
active support of local communities. Coordination at a national level is 
imperative to reduce duplication of effort and to facilitate sharing of best 
practice.”  
 “To ensure national coordination, Australian governments have 
established a CVE Sub-Committee under the NCTC consisting of 
representatives from all jurisdictions to share information, develop 
initiatives that are locally appropriate, and work collaboratively to counter 
violent extremism.”449  
The states, territories, and Commonwealth each recognize that they must have the 
public’s confidence in the governments’ delivery of the NCTP and its Prevention, 
Preparedness, Response and Recovery components. Through broader actions, such as the 
regular review, critique, and update of its National Counter-Terrorism Strategy, along 
with the continuous evolution of its approach toward domestic strategies, demonstrates 
the commitment of the various levels of Australia’s government structure to maintain 
strong, cooperative, coordinated relationships as part of that effort to garner confidence 
from its citizens. In addition to these broader efforts, more detailed and localized 
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programmatic strategies—such as CVE measures delivered through the NCTP 
Prevention component—have also been implemented because of Australia’s recognition 
of the importance of communities and organizations as essential partners in Australia’s 
broader CT efforts.  
D. COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMISM—SPECIFIC PROGRAMMATIC 
STRATEGIES  
As noted in the previous section, CVE was formalized as a concept within the 
NCTP as part of its prevention component in 2012. However, recognition of the 
emerging environmental factors that could potentially contribute to self-radicalization 
and extremism, as well as possible CVE programmatic strategies to counter this threat, 
were occurring in the years leading up to the 2012 NCTP. In essence, the 2012 NCTP 
addition of CVE was merely validating and supporting the actions already under way. 
The Australian government believes that policies that address real or perceived 
grievances, encourage social and economic participation, and discourage violent 
ideology, can mitigate extremism and self-radicalization within its borders, and further, 
that the best solutions to this approach are those developed within the community.450  
As a result of this belief, the Australian government implemented its Resilient 
Communities Initiative as part of its CVE programming. This strategy recognizes  
that VE comes in multiple forms and involves the use of violence to achieve ideological, 
religious, or political goals, and “Communities are best placed to develop solutions  
to local problems.”451 A nationally sponsored but locally centric program that  
effectively addressed all forms of VE was necessary. This attitude is represented through 
five core strategic CVE elements: 1) building community resilience (BCR) grants 
program, 2) resilient communities resource website, 3) CVE strategic research panel,  
4) international engagement strategy—to ensure it complements international CT efforts, 
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and 5) “whole of government education and communication frameworks.”452 While all 
five elements of the Australian CVE initiative have application to a U.S. domestic CT 
strategy, the building community resilience grants program fits well within the existing 
U.S. programmatic grant structure. Additionally, the CVE Unit—discussed in more detail 
in the next section—as part of the broader CT effort, also offers itself as a program for 
consideration for U.S. application.  
Australia’s formation of its CVE unit, its host of other CVE programs, and its 
oversight, placement, and delivery of its CVE programs and initiatives overall, is 
representative of Australia’s genuine commitment towards providing resources to its 
communities and together engaging in collaborative efforts to counter VE.  
1. The Attorney—General’s Role in CVE Efforts and the CVE Unit 
In 2008, Attorney-General Robert McCelland came to believe that the primary 
goal of domestic CT should be prevention and he directed the staff within his office to 
begin developing CT strategies focused on prevention. Unsurprisingly, the initial result 
was largely predicated on the UK model. During this same time period, recognition of the 
negative impact of terminology used to describe extremism also began to develop and 
this paradigm shift was an important first step in engaging communities to further CVE 
strategies. Previous terms, such as “Islamist extremism,” “Islamic terrorism,” and even 
the phrase “war on terror” were no longer to be used and were replaced with new terms, 
such as “violent extremism” and “extremist ideology.”453 This shift was an important 
step to demonstrate the government’s focus on actions rather than cultures or religions.454 
This slight but significant shift in terminology also demonstrates respect for the diversity 
and culture within Australia, as well as the government’s commitment to honoring 
personal, political, and religious freedoms. 
In 2009, the AGD established the national security policy and programs branch 
whose purpose was to identify and respond to weaknesses in the national domestic 
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security policy.455 In 2010, the AGD took over responsibility from the Department of 
Immigration and Citizenship (DIAC) for focusing on countering extremism through 
efforts aimed at social cohesion. While the AGD continued the previous focus on 
community integration, it now placed a newly formed emphasis on resiliency.456  
In 2010, the Australian government published the Counter-Terrorism White 
Paper, which acknowledged the threat of homegrown terrorism, and called for a 
coordinated national approach to address the threat.457 As a direct result, in 2010, the 
CVE taskforce—referred to as the CVE unit—was created and placed within the national 
security policy and programs branch.458 As part of the broader national coordinated CT 
effort, the CVE unit developed a CVE strategy entitled, A National Approach to 
Countering Violent Extremism in Australia: The CVE Strategic Plan, and while the full 
strategy remains classified, the government did release a two-page public summary 
version entitled, Countering Violent Extremism Strategy.459 The vision of the CVE 
strategy is to “reduce the risk of home-grown terrorism by strengthening Australia’s 
resilience to radicalization and assisting individuals to disengage from violent extremist 
influences and beliefs.”460 To achieve this vision, the CVE unit engages state and 
territory governments, NGOs, and community groups in pursuit of four objectives. 
 Identify and divert violent extremists and, when possible, support them in 
disengaging from VE 
 Identify and support at-risk groups and individuals to resist and reject 
violent extremist ideologies 
 Build community cohesion and resilience to VE 
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 Achieve effective communications that challenge extremist messages and 
support alternatives461  
Through the CVE unit, Australia has developed an overarching approach that 
blends the ability to influence national level policy with localized community 
engagement, arguably the best place to observe, detect, and intervene at the earliest 
possible opportunity. This clear framework also allows for coherent and well-defined 
roles between the government and its community partners; which is a necessary element 
for effective partnerships.462  
2. Building Community Resilience (BCR) Grants Program 
Also established in 2010, and housed within the AGD, the BCR grants program 
offers grants to community organizations that wish to implement programs specifically 
designed to encourage and empower communities and individuals to either resist or 
disengage from extremist ideologies.463 This CVE program continues with the emerging 
theme in Australia at the time of empowering communities and individuals who are best 
positioned to counter the influence of extremist ideologies and implement CVE 
strategies. 
The BCR program is modeled after a successful pilot program administered in 
New South Wales and Victoria, which focused on mentoring youth at risk of VE.464 This 
program, known as the Building Community Resilience Youth Mentoring Grants 
program, is also presently administered by the AGD and is extremely similar in overall 
scope and implementation design to the BCR program. The fundamental difference 
between the two programs is that while the youth mentoring grants program focuses 
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solely on youth, the BCR program encompasses the entire range of participants—to 
include youth—who may be at risk of VE. For purposes of this analysis, the BCR 
program presents itself as a more broadly applicable program, which also encompasses 
the youth mentoring grants program elements. For these reasons, the youth mentoring 
grants program is not reviewed in this case study.  
Under the BCR program from 2005–2010, Australia awarded $4.1 million in 
funding for 56 BCR program community projects, and in the subsequent three years and 
six months—2011 to date—Australia has awarded approximately $5 million in funding 
for 59 projects across Australia.465 These project awards range from $11,000 to $200,000 
and include a diverse spectrum of programs designed to counter extremism in several 
communities.466 This considerable increase in the BCR program budget and its corollary 
grant award funding for BCR programs—that, by their very nature, require a CVE 
nexus—demonstrates a significant resource commitment by the Australian government 
towards the issue of VE.  
To assist communities in understanding the components of the BCR program, the 
AGD provides a 13-page “Building Community Resilience Grant Program Guidelines” 
document that first identifies the program’s purpose and objectives, and then outlines 
detailed grant information covering subject areas, such as eligibility, duration, funding, 
project evaluation, assessment criteria, and reporting requirements.467  
No clear profile exists for a violent extremist, and the BCR program is a CVE 
strategy that recognizes that VE comes in multiple forms and involves the use of violence 
to achieve not only religious goals but ideological and political goals as well.468 This 
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strategy also leverages the recognition that “Communities are best placed to develop 
solutions to local problems.”469 The BCR program is a nationally sponsored but locally 
centric program that contains the necessary elements to address multiple forms of 
ideation towards VE effectively. It recognizes that local partners are often the first to 
become involved in incidents and the last to disengage. Without local buy in, these 
programs would be less effective.  
E. AREAS OF CONCERN 
To a much lesser degree than in the United Kingdom but still a concern by some 
in Australia, has been the expansive reach of Australian terrorism legislation. As a result 
of the 9/11 attacks upon the United States, and the 2002 and 2005 Bali bombings, 
Australia has introduced a number of CT measures including amendments to the crimes, 
telecommunications interception and surveillance legislation, and an increase to ASIO’s 
powers.470 Many of these terrorism related changes came in July 2002 when Australia 
amended Section 5.3 of its criminal code as part of the Security Legislation Amendment 
(Terrorism) Act 2002. This act, in particular, gave domestic intelligence agencies 
increased powers to detain citizens under control and detention orders.471 By placing 
terrorism language within the criminal code, Australia continued to demonstrate its long-
held position that states are primarily responsible for these matters with the federal 
government acting in a supporting role. As noted in this chapter, Australia has enjoyed 
relative freedom from terrorism. The relatively nominal presence of terrorist-related 
activity in Australia could address the relatively low number of complaints with regard to 
the impacts of sweeping anti-terrorism laws. However, with the impending domestic 
tension mounting, and the likely increase in encounters because of the current state of 
affairs, the Australian government should be careful not to overstep its use of the current 
laws in place, which could alienate an otherwise supportive population and impede CT 
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and community partnership efforts. Such legislation can carry the risk of actually 
radicalizing otherwise innocent individuals offended by government infringements.472 
This issue is of particular significance to the Australian government-Muslim community 
relationship since the Muslim community is projected to increase nearly 80 percent in 
Australia—from approximately 399,000 to 714,000—between 2010 and 2030.473 
F. CONCLUSION 
The Australian government recognizes that individuals and communities, while 
overwhelmingly opposed to VE, may not possess the resources to challenge and 
intervene when signs of extremism emerge.474 Further, it recognizes, by its words and 
actions, that communities are fundamental and necessary to counter the influences of 
radicalizers and extremists.475 These views are consistent with a 2013 Victoria University 
study that indicates citizens also recognize that communities are best positioned to 
identify and support at risk individuals, and a strong need exists for the government to 
support and equip communities—particularly Muslim communities—to identify and 
respond to the emerging threat of radicalization and extremism.476 In addition, the study 
indicates a majority of citizens also view the role of government is to prevent or mitigate 
the threat of VE through empowerment, education, and engagement of communities, 
most notably, to be facilitative rather than directive.477 Australia is responding well to 
these expectations and delivering programs that have real, tangible benefits to the citizens 
of Australia.  
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The NCTC, NCTP, CVE unit, and Resilient Communities programs—such as the 
BCR grant program—together present as an excellent example of an amalgamated 
system of strategies that represent Australia’s philosophy in its CT approach towards the 
threat of self-radicalization and VE. Clearly, this threat does not appear to be diminishing 
anytime soon for Australia, quite the opposite. However, by providing resources through 
these programmatic strategies, and a feeling of community inclusion, these communities 
become stakeholders and partners in the greater CT effort, which is essential to the 
success of community-based programs.  
What is most impressive is what is missing from Australia’s community-based 
CVE programs. Absent is a law enforcement centric, law enforcement lead community 
program that runs the risk of confusing the roles of community caretaker and intelligence 
officer, of enforcer and community police officer. This is not to say that law enforcement 
does not have a role in such important community-based programs. To call these 
community-based “policing” programs administered by law enforcement, can run the risk 
of labeling the community or the program as a policing problem at its core. However, the 
community-policing program methodology has relevance in many applications, and 
Australia has shown that a healthy community-based CVE strategy does not require law 
enforcement to be the lead agency. 
Many of the unique preventive programmatic concepts implemented by Australia 
could blend well within a U.S. NSCT. If implemented properly, and with awareness of 
the cautions outlined above, an effective domestic U.S. strategy to counter self-
radicalization and VE could be effectively administered at the national level and 
implemented at the local level. 
Through case study analysis, this chapter presented an understanding of 
Australia’s approach, both philosophically and practically, to countering terrorism 
overall, and self-radicalization and VE, in particular. This evaluation process, combined 
with the earlier examinations of the United States and United Kingdom, now allows for 
the consideration of the applicability of these concepts towards the recommendations 
offered as part of an updated U.S. CVE strategy.  
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VII. CONCLUSION  
The United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia possess similar historical, 
social, and political characteristics relative to their national security environment. 
Collectively, each country faces similar ongoing—as well as future—challenges in 
efforts to counter self-radicalization and VE within its own borders. While these common 
characteristics exist, a fair number of nuanced differences were also present in the 
analysis, which allowed an opportunity for thoughtful and deliberative case study 
examinations.  
Using CVE as the analytical frame, the research in this thesis examined the 
national level governmental structures and strategies within each of these countries as 
they relate to the challenges associated with delivering effective programs to counter VE. 
The results have provided a general foundation by which recommendations for an 
improved and updated national level U.S. CVE strategy can be presented. This chapter 
presents those high-level CVE recommendations deemed most influential to the U.S. 
strategy, as well as offering a few conclusions derived from the analysis. Finally, this 
chapter closes with a discussion of opportunities for further research that were realized 
during the research process, and in the author’s opinion, offer great opportunity for 
additional contributions to the global CVE effort. 
A. A RESTATEMENT—THE APPLICATION OF THE PROBLEM SPACE, 
HYPOTHESIS AND RESEARCH QUESTION  
1. Problem Space 
In 2011, the United States implemented two CVE companion documents entitled 
the Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States and 
the Strategic Implementation Strategy Plan (SIP) for Empowering Local Partners to 
Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States. These documents are a good start and 
demonstrate that federal government’s awareness of the importance of countering VE 
within its borders.  
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However, several gaps within these documents, as well as the U.S.’s conceptual 
approach to CVE, were identified in this research. In its current 2011 iteration, the U.S. 
CVE strategy does not provide a current and adequate national CVE framework; thereby, 
not fully leveraging the potential of community-based resources necessary to promote 
and support a complete engagement of CVE strategies at the local level. This observation 
is represented by the fact that these documents are overly vague and do not contain 
actual, substantial programmatic strategies, exemplified by a program lead agency, 
specific CVE programs or CVE approved grants, or other available resources. 
2. Hypothesis 
To research the problem space for this project sufficiently, the research conducted 
began with the hypothesis that there is an immediate need for an updated U.S. CVE 
strategy at the national level. More specifically, that the creation and programmatic 
implementation of an updated national CVE strategy will offer support for local agencies 
to deliver effective localized CVE programs that can generate collaboration between law 
enforcement and community organizations. Finally, moving the current U.S. national 
strategy beyond its broad descriptive and evaluative paradigm, and delivering an 
actionable program-based strategy, will provide the environment for the development of 
trusted and effective community partnerships to counter self-radicalization and VE within 
this nation’s borders. 
3. Research Question  
Next, to narrow the scope of the research, it was necessary to establish the 
research question. The question selected was “What are the necessary and effective 
components of the national U.S. CVE strategy that best prevent self-radicalization and 
VE in the United States?” From this established question, research was then conducted 
that looked for these components. This approach allowed an examination of the U.S., 
UK, and Australian CVE strategies and concepts to first answer the research question, 
and then through a comparative analysis of these strategic elements against the current 
U.S. CVE strategy, ascertain if the hypothesis was correct. This final chapter offers a 
synthesis of the research results.  
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B. FINAL COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 
Table 1 is presented in an effort to synthesize the analysis of those components 
deemed most relevant from the examinations of the CVE environment in the United 
States, the United Kingdom, and Australia. These qualitative studies explored the past 
and present terrorism and CT environments in an effort to understand each country’s 
migration to its current CVE philosophy, and further, how that philosophy correlates to 
today’s CVE program engagement at the national level. While the application of CVE 
programs is relative for each country based upon its own model of governance, culture, 
and ideology, no “one-size” national CVE program fits all countries. However, looking at 
the resulting analysis of the most relevant CVE program attributes allows an 
understanding of the areas in which the United States is presently deficient at the national 
level, and thus, offers an opportunity for innumerable improvement.  
Table 1.   Comparative Analysis of Relevant CVE Program Attributes—
United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia 
 United States United Kingdom Australia 




Partners to Prevent 
Violent Extremism in the 
United States  
and 
Strategic Implementation 
Strategy Plan for 
Empowering Local 
Partners to Prevent 







Terrorism Plan (NCTP)  
Year originally 
implemented 
2011 2003 2002 





2006, 2009, 2011  
YES 
2005, 2008, 2012  
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 United States United Kingdom Australia 
Is there a 
requirement that the 
national CVE 




In addition, an annual 
update report on the 




This must occur at least 
triennially 
Are terms and 
terminologies 
relevant to VE and 
CVE defined in the 
document(s)? 
NO YES—While not an 
exhaustive list, many 
terms and concepts are 




Is there a defined 
programmatic 
strategy within CVE 
program? 
 
NO YES—Prevent YES 
The Resilient 






The Office for Civil 
Rights and Civil 
Liberties offers a two 
page Countering Violent 
Extremism (CVE) 
Training Guidance and 
Best Practices  
 
YES 
A 40 page guide to assist 
local partners and 
communities in the 
delivery of the Prevent 
strategy 
YES  
                                                 
478 Her Majesty’s Stationary Office, CONTEST: The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering 
Terrorism–Annual Report April 2014 (London, The United Kingdom, Her Majesty’s Stationary Office, 
2011): 7. 
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 United States United Kingdom Australia 





programs aimed at 
supporting the 
national CVE 
strategy or CVE 
philosophy? 
NO 
The DHS CVE Program 
Overview refers to 
Building Communities 
of Trust. However, 
BCOT is a fusion center 
centric document and not 
a CVE specific 
program479 
YES  
WRAP Workshop to Raise 
Awareness of Prevent 
(WRAP) offers training 
for all front line staff 
across all community 
sectors 
and 
Channel Program which 
focuses on those most 
vulnerable to VE. 
Channel comes with its 
own 30 page guide 
YES 
Through five core 
strategic CVE elements: 
1. Building Community 
Resilience (BCR) Grants 
Program 
2. Resilient Communities 
resource website 
3. CVE strategic research 
panel 
4. International 
engagement strategy  





Living Safe Together: 
Building Community 
Resilience to Violent 
Extremism481 
Does the national 
CVE strategy 
formally recognize 









Do such frameworks 
exist? 
YES 
The Muslim Public 
Advisory Council 
provides the Safe Spaces 




The UK provides the 
Safeguarding and the 
Common Assessment 
Framework (CAF) which 
a 22 characteristic 




Australia– The Way 
Forward: An Islamic 
Mentoring Guide to 
Building Identity and 
Resisting Radicalisation 
(BIRR)483 
*The BIRR guide also 
provides multiple 
definitions of VE related 
terms 
                                                 
479 Robert Wasserman, Guidance for Building Communities of Trust (Washington, DC. U.S. 
Department of Justice-Office of Community Partnerships, 2010), 3. 
480 Australian Government: Attorney General’s Department, “Countering Violent Extremism.” 
481 Australian Government, “Living Safe Together: Building Community Resilience to Violent 
Extremism,” accessed July 16, 2014, http://www.livingsafetogether.gov.au/pages/home.aspx. 
482 “Safe Spaces Initiative: Tools for Developing Healthy Communities.” 
483 Mustapha Kara-Ali and BIRR Initiative Research Team, The Way Forward: An Islamic Mentoring 
Guide to Building Identity and Resisting Radicalisation (Australia: Department of Immigration and 
Citizenship under the direction of the National Action Plan Community Project Funding Program, 2010). 
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 United States United Kingdom Australia 
Is CVE related 
training offered as 
part of the national 
CVE strategy? 
YES 
See reference to training in 
the Recommendations 
section of this chapter  
YES  
In addition, detailed program 
guides and resources are 
often provided 
YES 




available—as part of 
the ongoing analysis of 
the CVE program 







The U.S. national CVE strategy is the most nascent of the three, and has yet to be 
updated. As reflected in Table 1, and offered as recommendations in the following 
section, the United States is presented with multiple opportunities for improvement. In 
other words, the United States could develop exponentially in the CVE realm if it 
candidly assesses its current national strategy, leverages the positive and negative 
experiences of the United Kingdom and Australia, and then implements the overarching 
recommendations presented in the following section.  
C. RECOMMENDATIONS 
While the United States must develop a CVE strategy that meets its needs 
domestically, it cannot be developed, implemented, and conducted in the absence of the 
recognition that other countries—Muslim and non-Muslim majorities alike—offer several 
applicable and effective strategies, many of which are supported in academia and the 
scientific community. However, this subject area is still rapidly evolving, which requires 
a malleable CVE strategy. To remain a relevant tool to counter VE in the United States, 
the 2011 Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States 
and the follow-on Strategic Implementation Strategy Plan for Empowering Local 
Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States must be re-evaluated and 
updated now. These documents must then be reviewed and updated on an annual basis 
going forward to reflect best the most current VE environment and CVE practices. This 
approach is essential if the U.S. government is serious about countering VE in this 
country and partnering with other nations to counter VE throughout the world. The 
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ensuing recommendations are overarching and intended to act as framework 
recommendations from which other more detailed objectives can be built. They are 
offered as a result of the analysis contained in this document, as well as the current 
domestic and international CVE environment in place at this time. 
As a backdrop for this section, bullet points of the 2010 HSAC CVE Working 
Group recommendations are again presented. As a result of this thesis research, it is 
evident that many of these recommendations were not implemented in the 2011 CVE 
strategy, or at least not to a satisfactory degree. Therefore, several of these working group 
recommendations are still relevant today as supported by this research. In those 
circumstances, some of the more notable recommendations are offered as part of the 
supporting detail in the section following this checklist. 
1. 2010 HSAC CVE Working Group Recommendations 
 Develop and use common terminology 
 Expand CRCL engagement efforts separate from the support of 
community-oriented policing 
 Incorporate information-driven, community-based violent crime reduction 
into local preparedness efforts  
 Support efforts to establish local dispute resolution capabilities 
 Through policy, the DHS should utilize the philosophies based on 
communication, trust, and mutual respect to develop relationships with 
local law enforcement 
 Generate threat-related information products  
 Establish a communication platform to share threat-related information 
directly with faith-based or other communities 
 Increase public awareness regarding terrorism and other homeland 
security related trends so that they can be demystified and incorporated 
into local violent crime reduction efforts 
 Develop case studies 
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 Continue efforts to ensure that fusion centers have the capacity to receive 
and understand threat-related information and to share that knowledge 
with local authorities 
 Expand availability of training and technical assistance focused on the 
understanding, identification, and mitigation of threats through 
community-oriented policing 
 Improve the quality of training 
 Expand the availability of training for state, local, and tribal law 
enforcement and DHS components484 
Fully implementing each of the above recommendations in itself would improve the U.S. 
CVE strategic environment. However, in the broader realm, the recommendations that 
follow are intended to act as overarching influencers to the greater CVE strategic 
narrative from which objectives that are more detailed can be developed. Nonetheless, the 
following general recommendations are offered in the pursuit of an updated U.S. CVE 
strategy.  
2. Identify Who Is in Charge of Countering Violent Extremism at the 
Federal Level—and Not U.S. Attorneys or the FBI  
This concept seems intuitive to any program at any level, and therefore, almost 
unnecessary to discuss. However, according to a most recent CRS report, still today—a 
full three years after the delivery of the CVE strategy—this topic remains a major 
concern.485 In particular, the U.S. CVE strategy directs federal agencies towards multiple 
CVE-related activities and efforts, but is silent on which single federal agency is 
responsible for managing the CVE programming.486 This uncertainty affects the sense of 
importance of the program and reduces accountability for results. 
The current strategy identifies U.S. attorneys as community-based CVE leads and 
suggests they are well positioned to make determinations at the local level with regard to 
                                                 
484 Homeland Security Advisory Council, Recommendations, Countering Violent Extremism Working 
Group, 15–26. 
485 Bjelopera, Countering Violent Extremism in the United States, ii, 20–23. 
486 Ibid. 
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which communities should be selected for engagement in CVE programs.487 The 
accuracy of this statement is questionable at best, and irrespective, this attempt at local 
level engagement contradicts the very notion that the federal government acts as a 
facilitator and support structure for local communities. The Australian CVE model does 
utilize a singular AGD format focusing on CVE through efforts primarily aimed at social 
cohesion. While this format works well within the Australian CVE model, it is an 
example of one program attribute that does not parlay well to the American CVE model 
due to the multiple numbers of U.S. attorneys at the federal level. 
The FBI’s mission is heavily intelligence collection oriented and appropriately 
designed to counter terrorism. As noted in the analysis, a significant investment in all 
forms of intelligence gathering is required, and while this function is both necessary and 
meaningful, it conflicts with the concept of community oriented policing—an arguably 
local police function as well—and can erode the trust necessary to engage in effective 
CVE efforts. This very issue was noted in the UK case study, which revealed tension and 
a perception of mission conflict between the Prevent and Pursue strands—community 
oriented vs. intelligence oriented—of the UK’s national counterterrorism strategy.488 
This issue was also noted within the information-sharing recommendations of the 2010 
CVE Working Group report calling it a “…inherent tension between federal law 
enforcement investigations and local partnerships to stop violent crime.”489 For these and 
other reasons noted in the analysis, the lead federal agency responsible for CVE program 
delivery should not be a federal law enforcement agency but rather an agency whose 
mission more closely aligns with program facilitation, guidance, and support.  
In addition, the Australian program is as an excellent model to create and 
implement a federal level CVE unit in the United States. Such a unit can provide program 
oversight and ongoing evaluation, standardized training, timely execution of process and 
                                                 
487 Office of the President of the United States, Strategic Implementation Plan for Empowering Local 
Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States, 8. 
488 Innes, Roberts, and Inness, Assessing the Effects of Prevent Policing: A Report to the Association 
of Chief Police Officers, 5. 
489 Homeland Security Advisory Council, Countering Violent Extremism Working Group, 17. 
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procedure updates based on current environmental factors and represent the U.S. VE and 
CVE interests on a broader academic and research level. 
3. Develop An Actionable National CVE Framework 
The application of CVE programming is best placed at the state and local levels. 
Guidance, resources, and coordination—in the form of funding, support, training, tools 
and structure—are best provided at the federal level.490 The 2011 U.S. CVE strategic 
plan states, “The Federal Government can foster nuanced and locally rooted counter 
radicalization programs and initiatives by serving as a facilitator, convener, and source of 
information to support local networks and partnerships at the grassroots level.”491 This 
excellent statement could serve as the federal government’s CVE mission statement by 
ensuring CVE deliverables meet one of these mission objectives. By using these 
objectives, the federal government is well positioned to affect CVE efforts positively. 
The SIP reinforces this notion by stating, “The SIP provides a blueprint for how we will 
build community resilience against violent extremism.”492  
As noted in the critique in Chapter IV, some questions remain as to whether or not 
the federal government is effectively following its own prescriptive statements in this 
regard. Ultimately, the federal government appears to be providing little federal guidance 
to community groups on how to engage or intervene with people who may be susceptible 
in radicalization.493 It has been established that these partnerships are critical. However, 
research that focuses on effective public private partnerships, in particular, suggests that 
“Partnerships require a clear framework specifying the roles of the public and private 
sectors”494 That clear framework, which outlines detailed role identification and 
actionable strategies is lacking from the current iteration of the U.S. CVE strategy. 
                                                 
490 Neumann, Preventing Violent Radicalization in America, 7. 
491 Office of the President of the United States, Strategic Implementation Plan for Empowering Local 
Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States. 
492 Ibid., 2. 
493 Bjelopera, Countering Violent Extremism in the United States, i. 
494 European Network and Information Security Agency, Cooperative Models for Effective Public 
Private Partnerships: Good Practice Guide, 11.  
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Therefore, the federal government must provide a model policy framework that 
agencies can adopt. Once provided, this framework—a tool kit of sorts—can then allow 
local agencies to build and deliver malleable community tailored CVE programs within 
this broader federal framework. The U.S. CVE strategy must follow the UK CONTEST 
model’s depth and breadth of detail. This document must be an actual comprehensive 
strategy, and not just an executive summary. Additionally, with the complex and ever 
changing VE and CVE environment, an annual or biennial review of the U.S. CVE 
strategy must also occur. It is evident that the 2011 strategy is already outdated. For a 
number of reasons, of which the changing environment is one, the strategy is not an 
effective strategy nor is it reflective of the current environment. 
4. The Federal Government Must Re-Focus on the Support of 
Countering Violent Extremism and Not Attempt to Engage in 
Countering Violent Extremism at the Local Level 
CVE Working Group member Michael Downing best described this issue when 
indicating that at the federal level, CVE should be considered a noun, and at the local 
CVE level, it should be considered a verb.495 The philosophy should be that the federal 
level provides the framework and the resources necessary for CVE, and the local level 
implements these resources within the framework. Additionally, this framework and the 
management of CVE resources could be provided through a CVE unit as described in 
Recommendation 1. 
5. Define the Terms and Terminologies in Every Document 
As examined in detail in Chapter II, the significant amount of terms and 
terminologies associated with the discourse on terrorism is cause for great confusion in 
understanding the overall context in which these terms are presented. Just looking at the 
term terrorism has long shown over 100 potential definitions.496 If the term terrorism is 
the foundation from which most other associated terms draws their meaning—and that 
                                                 
495 Downing, email message to author. 
496 Schmid and Jongman, Political Terrorism: A New Guide to Actors, Authors, Concepts, Data 
Bases, Theories, and Literature, 5. 
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foundation is in question—then the entire discourse from which that topic is built must 
also be in question. At the very least, it is greatly subjected to misinterpretation.  
The U.S. CVE strategy uses strongly evocative terminologies throughout its 
document but fails to offer any definitions or intended meanings of any terms. One clear 
example is the confusing use of “ideology”—a term that offers an indelible number of 
meanings and understandings. The U.S. strategy utilizes the term “ideology” in phrases, 
such as “violent ideology,” “hateful ideology,” “bankrupt ideology,” “al-Qa’ida’s 
ideology” and “al-Qa’ida’s violent ideology.”497 As examined in this thesis, the 
understanding of ideology and its role in VE and CVE strategies is one subject area that 
continues to evolve significantly, particularly over the last several years. The use of 
ideology in this manner, particularly without defining its intended meaning in 2011, may 
be misunderstood, and even harmful, in today’s environment. Had a definition been 
offered, then today’s readers of the U.S. CVE strategy could understand the context of its 
application three years ago. Without such a definition, readers are left to input their own 
interpretation, and likely, inputting the context with which they are most familiar, not the 
intended meaning.  
This recommendation was also part of the 2010 CVE Working Group report. 
Interestingly, in the report, the committee specifically states, “use of various terms to 
describe ideologically-motivated crime (radicalization, violent extremism, etc…) causes 
confusion.”498 It is evident that not only was the recommendation to define terms 
excluded, but the concept of assuring clarity was also disregarded. The United States 
should follow the example of the United Kingdom, as examined in Chapter V, and 
include definitions of terms and explanations of terminologies and phrases, either through 
a dedicated appendix—which is preferred—or as footnotes within the document. The 
worth of a document is not defined by the fact that it exists, but rather, by the clarity of its 
contents. Properly defining terms and phrases is an essential component to this cause.  
                                                 
497 Office of the President of the United States, Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent 
Extremism in the United States, i, 2, 7. 
498 Homeland Security Advisory Council, Countering Violent Extremism Working Group, 18. 
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6. VE and CVE Training and Education 
It has been articulated throughout this document that local law enforcement plays 
a critical role in CVE. Further, an October 2012 GAO report—which supports this 
notion—identifies the DHS and DOJ as having the responsibility for executing and 
offering CVE-related training to local agencies and their communities.499 This instruction 
further supports the concept that the federal level is responsible for the supporting 
framework and resources associated with CVE and not the programmatic delivery at the 
local level.  
Standardized VE and CVE training has not occurred since the inception of the 
2011 CVE strategy. As noted in Chapter IV, poorly designed and delivered CVE-related 
training can be detrimental to the relationship between law enforcement and its 
community.500 Nowhere was this fact more evident in the research than the discovery of 
literature suggesting instances of federally sponsored or federally funded CVE training 
that incorporated offensive and inaccurate information.501 Practitioners and academics 
alike must jointly develop training curricula, which can offer an accurate and practical 
framework for better understanding VE at the practitioner level. In addition, opportunities 
for further education for strategists and policy makers must be made available.  
To provide just a multiple number of operational objectives without putting in 
place any guiding structure would be ineffectual and short-lived. These five overarching 
recommendations have been selected in an effort to provide a broad but essential CVE 
framework. This framework can then act to guide the way forward in the development of 
a CVE programmatic structure that can continuously operate in changing and challenging 
environments. It is not the objectives themselves, but rather, the process of moving 
                                                 
499 Government Accountability Office, Report to the Committee on Homeland Security and 
Governmental Affairs, United States Senate, Countering Violent Extremism: Additional Actions Could 
Strengthen Training Efforts, 2. 
500 Homeland Security Advisory Council, Countering Violent Extremism Working Group, 24. 
501 Government Accountability Office, Report to the Committee on Homeland Security and 
Governmental Affairs, United States Senate, Countering Violent Extremism: Additional Actions Could 
Strengthen Training Efforts, 2. 
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concepts to action, which will ensure a most successful U.S. CVE strategy that, in turn, 
offers the greatest opportunity to protect the American people and this nation.  
D. OPPORTUNITIES FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
The goal of this research was to offer a straightforward framework to further the 
United States in its pursuit of a relevant and well-timed domestic CVE strategy. While 
research associated with this topic is clearly “still emerging yet seemingly ubiquitous”—
an ostensibly contradictive association of terms—this work strives to present applicable, 
evidence-based information. In the process of doing so, several additional questions and 
opportunities for further research became readily apparent. Several of these areas were 
only touched on in this thesis as supportive evidence for an updated U.S. CVE strategy 
and are deserving of a much more in depth analysis in their own right. Doing so would 
most certainly contribute to the broader homeland security discipline. 
This work merely provides a foundation from which others may build on to 
further the analysis and literature on the larger discipline of homeland security. It is the 
intent of this author that this research serves as a launching point for others to move these 
issues forward through future research. This section identifies some of these areas and 
explains their connection to CVE research. 
One opportunity for additional research, which offers itself as an interesting 
sociological examination, is the pursuit of an evidence-based theory explaining the 
transformation of Americans’ pre-9/11 perspective of terrorism to the uniquely American 
held perspective of terrorism in the post-9/11 environment. Certainly, 9/11 was an iconic 
and tragic event. Nonetheless, it was an event not a directive for behavior, and stands as 
the great anomaly in U.S. terrorism history. Why then have Americans—politicians, 
media, and urban and rural populations alike—taken on this perspective of terrorism that 
arguably has shaped U.S. policy, strategy, and politics? In some ways, U.S. policies and 
strategies—CVE included—might be a manifestation of this perspective, while at the 
same time, not be in the best interest of Americans or national security. Utilizing 
Grounded Theory Research as a qualitative approach to inquiry, or some other 
appropriate methodology, research can be offered that may suggest how to “change the 
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paradigm rather than change the policy” as a strategy to combat terrorism and counter 
VE.502  
With respect to CVE in particular, this research did not examine effective 
marketing strategies associated with delivering programmatic CVE strategies to local 
communities. Nor did it examine the familiarity of the term or concept of CVE through a 
survey mechanism or other research design to determine which—and at what level—
Americans are familiar with CVE. This research has shown that CVE is highly 
contextualized, and successful CVE strategies are rooted in their communities. Further 
analysis that focuses on multi-agency implementation strategies along with developing 
stakeholder buy-in are also important factors to the overall success or failure of such 
programs. These additional areas of research would complement this thesis by building 
an efficient delivery platform for a newly updated CVE strategy. In the broader 
perspective, such research could not only benefit the U.S. CVE environment, but also the 
greater U.S. policy environment as well. 
A critical area for additional research is the use of the Internet and its associated 
media platforms as a mechanism for recruiting individuals towards radicalization and VE. 
This thesis focused on the need for an updated U.S. CVE strategy. However, throughout 
the entire research process, the topic of the Internet and its relationship to self-
radicalization was prevalent in much of literature. This topic is important for CVE and 
one that must receive more attention in the U.S. CVE strategy. The evolution of this 
issue—as a component of rapidly changing technology—is arguably more important to 
CVE than any other aspect at this time. 
Just as critical to the implementation of effective CVE strategies is a better 
understanding of the topic of youth violence and its role in VE. While this phenomenon 
has broader implications beyond just terrorism, understanding its role in terrorism—many 
of the CVE programs mentioned in this research focus on youth—may offer a better 
understanding of the role age plays in the allure towards VE, particularly for males. 
                                                 
502 For an explanation of Grounded Theory Research, as well as other qualitative research 
methodologies, see as an example: John Creswell, Qualitative Inquiry & Research Design: Choosing 
Among Five Approaches (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 2007), 62–63. 
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Further, examining the correlation between age (youth) and ideology, and their roles as 
motivators towards terrorism—or lack thereof—may debunk myth and confusion 
surrounding the nexus between religious ideology and terrorism. While this nexus may 
currently present itself as more of an international version of youth violence, 
understanding the psychology of this process can assist in the formation of both domestic 
and international prevention strategies. 
These topics will likely remain as prevalent themes in the ongoing discussion  
of terrorism, and are therefore, deserving of ongoing rigorous examination. Similar  
to the research conducted in this thesis, inquiry into each of these important subject  
areas are likely to generate its own set of additional questions and opportunities for 
further research.  
E. CONCLUSION 
One of the many strengths of the United States is its pluralistic society that 
welcomes and embraces divergent thoughts and ideologies. On occasion, Americans see 
examples of thoughts and ideologies that “mainstream” society may view as radical, 
which causes them to misunderstand or misread the intention, to disagree with overtly or 
otherwise, not accept. Nonetheless, the societal fabric of the United States encourages 
Americans to embrace the notion of these non-violent radical beliefs and place them 
above their own personal objections, which suggests the United States is willing to 
tolerate this radicalism as a fundamental right of all. At the same time, Americans are as 
equally intolerant of any violence that may be associated with these radical beliefs. This 
belief as well has been woven into the fabric of American society.  
While overarching attributes and ideologies exist within every distinct group, at 
the localized level, specific groups—such as the Muslim community—are also markedly 
diverse throughout the country. Their ethnicity, national origin, as well as sectarian and 
political lines, further divides Western Muslim communities.503 Therefore, CVE 
programs must recognize these distinct localized differences—sometimes as a nuance and 
                                                 
503 Carolyn Warner and Manfred Wenner, “Religion and the Political Organization of Muslims in 
Europe,” Perspectives on Politics 4, no. 3 (September 2006): 457–479. 
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sometimes as a chasm—and pursue programmatic strategies that are highly localized, 
engaging, genuine, collaborative, and long lasting. Communities must not just accept 
such programs; they must embrace them as a valuable resource that adds significance to 
their pursuit of a common goal to help those in their community that may be vulnerable 
to VE.  
The programmatic framework and tools used in the United States to combat 
illegal gang activity is a good parallel and can continue to be followed. However, the 
primary role in CVE implementation and operation—the highly localized and 
contextualized work of countering VE—may not best rest with law enforcement, 
particularly at the federal level. The U.S., UK and Australian governments have all done 
well to incorporate existing intervention models with which at-risk communities are 
familiar. These models allow for the utilization of a common framework and language. 
To utilize law enforcement, U.S. attorneys or the FBI as the primary or lead authority, 
rather than as a supporting partner, suggest that CVE is a criminal justice effort and not a 
social effort. A more holistic approach that utilizes the federal government as a 
supporting framework—legislation, funding, training, resources, education, and ongoing 
CVE research—is the area in which best to focus CVE efforts at the federal level. 
Downing and Mayer support this notion when stating,  
Community outreach remains a vital tool. Federal grant funds should also 
be used to create robust community outreach capabilities in higher-risk 
urban areas. Such capabilities are key to building trust in local 
communities, and if the United States is to thwart “lone wolf” terrorist 
attacks successfully, it must do so by putting effective community 
outreach operations at the tip of the spear.504 
While a refocus is in order, the current CVE strategy should not be discounted. 
These types of programs do fit well into the existing community-oriented policing model 
as an effective partnership strategy. This approach is correct; however, it must be just 
that, a partnership. Putting the law enforcement branch of local, state, and federal 
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governments in charge of countering a person’s ideology, beliefs, or desires is akin—
using the drug analogy—to law enforcement conducting surveillance on drug counseling 
centers or other social sections of communities as a prevention methodology. The United 
States has learned this approach does not effectively work because inherently this method 
does not address—as discovered with the war on drugs in the 1980s—the underlying root 
cause of addiction. As a methodology, codified within its strategy, the United Kingdom 
also learned this difficult lesson from its earlier versions of CONTEST between 2003 and 
2009, and the United States would do well to learn from these experiences. 
In the United States, as a whole, the religious societal sector is structured as a 
large-scale collective of identities that function independent of the state.505 According to 
authors Buzan, Waever, and Wilde, in viewing this unique “religious identity-state” 
relationship from a security perspective, it is “[E]xtremely difficult to establish hard 
boundaries that differentiate existential threats from lesser threats.”506 They add that 
changes to security in this realm can be viewed as invasive, threatening, and even 
heretical, due to the conservative nature of religious identity.507 Law enforcement should 
be mindful of this concern and acknowledge the unique distinction between CVE and its 
more traditionally accepted criminal justice roles. The 2010 HSAC CVE Working Group 
appears to concur on this point, and cautions that discussions on law enforcement crime 
reduction efforts should be separated from academic and policy discussions on 
radicalization and CVE until a more thorough understanding of these concepts is 
developed.508 Simply overlaying a crime reduction framework without ongoing and 
thoughtful analysis can be counterproductive to the CVE effort. This viewpoint supports 
the observations offered by Buzan, Waever, and Wilde regarding community concerns of 
securitization by law enforcement.  
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Law enforcement should be one part of the overarching communal process to 
counter VE by participating in a supporting partnership role, not as the lead or directive 
agency. Strategic programs led and administered by non-LE organizations—particularly 
religious, health, and human services related organizations—would generate trust and 
provide greater opportunities for the production of successful strategies designed to 
counter the terrorist narrative and prevent VE in the United States.  
It is evident from the examination of the literature and observing the multiple acts 
of terrorism that have—and continue—to occur throughout the world, the global 
influence of VE is not in decline.509 In the past, CT strategies have focused on the use of 
physical, hard power capabilities designed to defeat the organizational structures and 
assets of these terrorist groups using physical, hard power methods.510 However, while 
effective, these efforts cannot occur to the exclusion of arguably more impactful soft 
power strategies designed to defeat the initial draw to VE.  
CVE strategies, while continuing to evolve and take shape, are proving 
themselves effective in the struggle against terrorism. The United States must continue to 
look toward other countries for emerging CVE practices, and thereby, allow its own CVE 
strategy to evolve continuously and effectively. More importantly, if the United States 
genuinely engages in partnerships with other countries to continue the discourse and 
study of VE, and soft power strategies to counter VE, then it can contribute to the greater 
global effort to rid the world of the attractions to VE. While no doubt an audacious goal, 
it must be pursued. It is in that spirit that this modest research is presented. 
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